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Viking Construction vs. Hayden Lake lrrigation District Kootenai County
Date

Code

User

NEWC

DRAPER

New Case Filed

DRAPER

Filing: A1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No John P. Luster
Prior Appearance Paid by: Scott Rose Receipt
number: 0633868 Dated: 12/10/2004 Amount:
$77.00 (Check)

SUM1

MCCOY

Summons Issued

John P. Luster

SUMR

HILDRETH

Summons Returned-Found-Donna Atwood
12- 14-04

John P. Luster

Judge

-

1211012004

12/23/2004

John P. Luster

Filing: I1A - Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than John P. Luster
$1000 No Prior Appearance Paid by:
Owen/James Receipt number: 0638071 Dated:
01/20/2005 Amount: $47.00 (Check)
ANSW

VICTORIN

AnswerISusan Weeks

John P. Luster

1/26/2005

NTSV

MO'REILLY

Notice Of Service Of Plaintiffs Requests For
Production Of Documents Promulgated Upon
Defendant

John P. Luster

1/28/2005

NTSV

MCCOY

Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs Request for
Admissions Promulgated Upon Defendant

John P. Luster

NTSV

HILDRETH

Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs lnterrogatories
Promulgated Upon Defendant

John P. Luster

2/9/2005

MOTN

MO'REILLY

Motion For Extension Of Time To Respond To
Discovery

John P. Luster

211 112005

OBJT

31112005

NTSV

SWIGART

Notice Of Service

John P. Luster

6/28/2005

HRSC

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0811112005 03:30
PM) to deem request for admissions admitted
and motion to compel

John P. Luster

6/30/2005

AFFD

MCCOY

Affidavit of Scott Rose in Support of Motions to
Deem Requests for Admissions Admitted, to
Compel Responses to Requests for Production
and Interrogatories, and for Attorneys Fees and
Costs

John P. Luster

MOTN

MCCOY

Motion to Deem Plaintiffs Requests for
John P. Luster
Admission Admitted, Motion to Sign Under Oath,
and Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs

MNCL

MCCOY

Motion To Compel Answers to lnterrogatories
and Responses to Requests for Production,
Motion for an Order that the Answers and
Responses be Signed Under Oath, and Motion
for Attorneys Fees and Costs

John P. Luster

NOHG

MCCOY

Notice Of Hearing

John P. Luster

MOTN

MO'REILLY

Defendant's Response To Plaintiffs Motion To
John P. Luster
Compel Responses To Requests For Production
and lnterrogatorries

8/4/2005

Plaintiffs NO Objection to Defendant's motion for John P. Luster
Extension of time to Respond to Discovery
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Viking Construction vs. Hayden Lake lrrigation District Kootenai County
Date

Code

User

Judne

AFFD

MO'REILLY

Affidavit Of Susan Weeks In Responses To
Plaintiffs Motion To Compel Responses To
Reqests For Production And lnterrogatorries

John P. Luster

MOTN

MO'REILLY

Defendant's Response To Plaintiffs Motion To
Deem Requests For Admission Admitted

John P. Luster

RTSV

HILDRETH

Return Of Service-Found-Susan Weeks Attrny for John P. Luster
Defendant 08-05-05

INHD

BOOTH

Hearing result for Motion held on 0811 1/2005
03:30 PM: Interim Hearing Held to deem
request for admissions admitted and motion to
compel

John P. Luster

NOPD

DUBE

Notice Of Proposed Dismissal Issued

John P. Luster

AFFD

JOKELA

Affidavit of Scott Rose in Support of Retention

John P. Luster

IOPR

MEYER

Inactivity Order Printed - File Sent to Judge

John P. Luster

ORDR

JOKELA

Order Regarding Plaintiffs Discovery Motions

John P. Luster

REVR

JOKELA

Reviewed And Retained

John P. Luster

SDTA

BROOK

Subpoena Duces Tecum Acceptance of Service
Cathy Meyer 10May06

John P. Luster

NOTC

BROOK

Notice of deposition pursuant to IRCP rule
30(b)(6)of the Hayden Lake lrrigation District

John P. Luster

NOTC

BROOK

Notice of Deposition of Bert Rohrbach

John P. Luster

SDTA

BROOK

Subpoena Duces Tecum Acceptance of Service John P. Luster
Del Karr 1OMayO6

SDTA

BROOK

Subpoena Duces Tecum Acceptance of Service John P. Luster
Cathy Meyer lOMayO6

AFSV

HUTCHINSON Proof of Service and Affidavit On Return Of
Service Re: Deposition of Cathy Meyer-Scott
Rose-5-30-06

MlSC

BROOK

Corrospondance from M&M court reporting
05Jun06

John P. Luster

MlSC

BROOK

Corrospondance from M&M court reporting
06Ju106

John P. Luster

HRSC

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
12/14/2006 03:30 PM)

John P. Luster

HRVC

BOOTH

Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on
12/14/2006 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated

John P. Luster

NTSV

MCCORD

Notice Of Service to def and defs atty, Susan
Weeks, on 1/18/07 via mail

John P. Luster

NTSV

REMPFER

Notice Of Service

John P. Luster

NOPD

MEYER

Notice Of Proposed Dismissal Issued

John P. Luster

AFFD

HUFFMAN

Affidavit of Scott Rose in Support of Retention

John P. Luster

NOTC

HUFFMAN

Notice of Deposition of Bert Rohrbach

John P. Luster

HUFFMAN

Notice of Proposed Dismissal

John P. Luster

John P. Luster

-
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Date

Code

User

MlSC

HUFFMAN

Supplemental Affidavit of Scott Rose in Support
of Retention

John P. Luster

REVR

RICKARD

Reviewed And Retained

John P. Luster

MOTN

BOWLES

Motion to Amend Petition

John P. Luster

AFFD

BOWLES

Affidavit in support of Motion to Amend Petition

John P. Luster

NOTC

GBROWN

Notice of Change of Address

John P. Luster

HRSC

BOOTH

John P. Luster

CONT

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/07/2008 03:OO
PM)
Hearing result for Motion held on 02/07/2008
03:OO PM: Continued for mediation

HRSC

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/19/2008 03:OO
PM) FOR MEDIATION

John P. Luster

MOTN

VICTORIN

Motion for and Order to Mediate

John P. Luster

NOHG

VICTORIN

Notice Of Hearing on Motion

John P. Luster

NOTR

BAXLEY

Notice Of Transcript Delivery Unsigned for Bert
Rohrbach

John P. Luster

NOTH

MCCORD

Notice Of Hearing

John P. Luster

AFFD

BAXLEY

Second Affidavit In Support of Motion to Amend
Petition

John P. Luster

WATKINS

Hearing result for Motion held on 0211912008
03:OO PM: Interim Hearing Held FOR
MEDIATION

John P. Luster

HRSC

WATKINS

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled
1111212008 09:OO AM) 2 Day

John P. Luster

ORDR

BOOTH

Order for court mediation

John P. Luster

ORDR

BOOTH

Order granting leave to amend petition

John P. Luster

PETN

SHEDLOCK

Amended Petition For Declaratory Relief And
Injunctive Relief

John P. Luster

HRSC

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 1012212008 03:OO PM)

John P. Luster

HRSC

BOOTH

John P. Luster

FILE

MCCORD

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0711012008 03:OO
PM)
New File Created
.........................
FILE
2*************************

MOTN

Judge

John P. Luster

John P. Luster

Motion for An Order to Enlarge Time to Disclose John P. Luster
Expert Witnesses

AFFD

LSMITH

Affidavit in Support of Motion for An Order to
Enlarge Time to Disclose Expert Witnesses

ORDR

MCCOY

Order on Plaintiffs Motion for an Order to Enlarge John P. Luster
Time to Disclose Expert Witnesses

MOTN
MCCORD

John P. Luster

Motion for Relief From Scheduling Order and
Notice of Hearing

John P. Luster

Stipulation for Motion for Relief

John P. Luster
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Date

Code

User

Judge

MOTN

MCCORD

Motion for Relief From Scheduling Order and
Notice of Hearing

John P. Luster

DCHH

BOOTH

John P. Luster

CANTU

Hearing result for Motion held on 0711012008
03:OO PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Anne MacManus
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: for relief from PTO under 100
pages
Preliminary Expert Witness Disclosure

John P. Luster

MNSJ

MCCOY

Motion For Summary Judgment

John P. Luster

NOHG

MCCOY

Notice Of Hearing on Motion for Summary
Judgment

John P. Luster

BRIE

BAXLEY

OPENING Brief In Support Of Motion For
Summary Judgment

John P. Luster

AFFD

BAXLEY

Affidavit Of Scott Rose In Support Of Summary
Judgment

John P. Luster

ORDR

BOOTH

Order (relief from PTO)

John P. Luster

NTSV

BAXLEY

Notice Of Service

John P. Luster

FILE

JANUSCH

New File Created***3**********EXPAND0

John P. Luster

MEMO

ROBINSON

Memorandum In Response To Plaintiffs Motion
For Summary Judgment

John P. Luster

DCHH

BOOTH

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John P. Luster
held on 10/22/2008 03:OO PM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Terri Rosadovelazquez
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: X summary judgment motions - over
100 pages

HRVC

BOOTH

Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled held on John P. Luster
1111212008 09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated 2 Day

MlSC

HUFFMAN

Stipulated Motion to Continue Trial

John P. Luster

DEOP

BOOTH

Memorandum Opinion and Order in re: motion
for summary judgment

John P. Luster

MlSC

BOOTH

Summary Judgment

John P. Luster

DSAT

BOOTH

Dismissal Duringlafter Trial Or Hearing

John P. Luster

FJDE

BOOTH

Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered

John P. Luster

STAT

BOOTH

Case status changed: Closed

John P. Luster

CVDl

BOOTH

Civil Disposition entered for: Hayden Lake
lrrigation District Kootenai County, Defendant;
Viking Construction, Plaintiff. Filing date:
1/29/2009

John P. Luster

FJDE

BOOTH

Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered

John P. Luster

AFFD

CRUMPACKER Affidavit of Computation

John P. Luster

HRSC

BOOTH

John P. Luster

-

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/02/2009 03:OO
PM) Rule 548 and/or enlargement of time
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Date

Code

User

Judge

STAT

BOOTH

MOTN

ROSENBUSCH Motion for A Rule 54(B) Certificate, and/or Motion John P. Luster
for Enlargement of Time to Motion for Permission
to Appeal the Denial of Summary Judgment in
this Action for Declaratory Relief

NOTH

MCCORD

Notice Of Hearing

John P. Luster

STlP

LEU

Stipulation Re: Objection To Costs

John P. Luster

NOTC

LEU

Notice Of Change Of Fax Number

John P. Luster

MlSC

ROSENBUSCH Amended Certificate of ServiceNiking
Construction, lnc./03/03/09

NOTC

BOOTH

Notice of Change of Fax number to;
(208)342-3669.

John P. Luster

NOTC

HUFFMAN

Notice of Appeal

John P. Luster

BNDC

RICKARD

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 837334 Dated
3/5/2009 for 100.00)

John P. Luster

RICKARD

Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court
John P. Luster
($86.00 for the Supreme Court to be receipted via
Misc. Payments. The $15.00 County District
Court fee to be inserted here.) Paid by: Rose,
Scott (attorney for Viking Construction) Receipt
number: 0837335 Dated: 3/5/2009 Amount:
$15.00 (E-payment) For: Viking Construction
(plaintiff)

RICKARD

Miscellaneous Payment: Supreme Court Appeal
Fee (Please insert case #) Paid by: Scott Rose
Receipt number: 0837336 Dated: 3/5/2009
Amount: $86.00 (E-payment)

John P. Luster

OBJT

BAXLEY

Objection To Attorney Fees and Costs

John P. Luster

ANOA

BOOTH

Amended Notice of Appeal - filed by Scott Rose

John P. Luster

MlSC

LEU

Request For Additional Clerk's Record

John P. Luster

HRVC

BOOTH

Hearing result for Motion held on 04/02/2009
03:OO PM: Hearing Vacated Rule 548 and/or
enlargement of time

John P. Luster

HRSC

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/15/2009 08:OO
AM) Pl's objection to attorney fees and costs

John P. Luster

NOHG

VICTORIN

Notice Of Hearing

John P. Luster

Case status changed: Closed pending clerk
action

John P. Luster

John P. Luster

Scott Rose
Attorney at Law
300 Main Street. Suite 153
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 41 97
(208) 342-2552 Telephone
scott@idahoiplaw.com
(208) 345-1 836 Fax
Idaho State Bar #4197

Plaintiffs' Attorney
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Viking Construction, Inc.,
an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,

Hayden Lake Irrigation District,
an Idaho quasi-municipal
corporation,
Defendants.

)

CASE NO.:

1

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

1
)
)
)

COMES NOW Viking Construction, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Plaintiff, by and through its
attorney, Scott Rose, and for cause of action against the Defendant Hayden Lake Irrigation District,
an Idaho quasi-municipal corporation hereby petitions, complains, and alleges as follows:
COUNT I
DECLARATORY RELIEF
I.

At all relevant times Plaintiffherein, Viking Construction, Inc., & Idaho Corporationin good

Viking Construction, Inc., v. Hayden Lake Irrigation District

Petition

Page No. I

standing (hereinafter referred to as "Viking") residing in the City of Hayden, County of Kootenai,
State of Idaho, owned and owns multiple parcels of land within the boundaries of both the Hayden
Lake Irrigation District (hereinafter referred to as "Irrigation District") and the City of Hayden
(hereinafter referred to as "City"), and as such is a water user with water rights within said Irrigation
District and City. Plaintiffs entitlement to water from the Inigation District is evidenced by the
representative invoices from the Irrigation District attached and fully incorporated herein as Exhibits
1,2, and 3. Said Exhibits are representative invoices of the Irrigation District for the 2005 yearly
assessment on lots recently purchased by Plaintiff, other lots in Plaintiffs inventory without
construction activity purchased in the last Two to Three (2 -3) years, and lots ofplaintiffwith houses
under construction. Plaintiff is an interested person as defined by Section 10-1201, et seq., Idaho
Code.
2.

At all material times alleged herein, Defendant, Hayden Lake Irrigation District, an Idaho

quasi-municipal corporation resided in the City of Hayden, County of Kootenai, State of Idaho.

3.

Venue is proper in Kootenai County pursuant to and by virtue of Idaho Code Section 5-404.

4.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction in this action and the damages herein are in excess

of $10,000; and the monetary amounts in controversy exceed the minimum jurisdictional amounts
of the District Court. Viking finds itself in jeopardy and has no relief save froin submission of the
issue to a court of equity for the determination of (1) whether or not the Charge imposed by the
Irrigation District, is permissible or not permissible, (2) whether or not the increase in the amount
of the Charge imposed by the Irrigation District, is permissible or not permissible, and (3) whether
or not the immediate i~nplen~entation
of the increase in the amount of the Charge imposed by the
Irrigation District, is permissible or not permissible. But for the relief set out herein, there is no
adequate remedy available to Viking for the deprivation of its Civil Rights.
Viking Construction, Inc., v. Hayden Lake Irrigation District

Petition
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5.

Plaintiff desired and continues to desire to construct new homes on its real property lying

within the boundaries ofboth the City of Hayden and the Hayden Lake Irrigation District.
6.

Before the City will accept applications for or issue a building permit, it requires Plaintiff

(and similarly situated landowners) to gain an approval signature from the Irrigation District,
acknowledging to the City that Plaintiff is entitled to water fiom the Irrigation District, i.e. the
Irrigation District must sign-off on the application form before the City will accept or issue
Plaintiffs applications for building permits. Ever since Plaintiff provided Notice pursuant to the
Tort Claiins Act, on or about November 5, 2004, Defendant altered the time requirement for the
payment of the Charges, such that it will now give an approval signature upon request, but will not
unlock the water meter until the Charges are paid.
7.

Even though Plaintiff as a landowner is entitled to water as evidenced by Exhibits 1,2, and

3, the Hayden Lake Irrigation District required Plaintiff (and continues to require Plaintiff over its
objections) to pay additional money before it signs off on an application for building permit forms
of the City. These payments are often fallaciously and spuriously referred to as "hook on fees",
"hook up fees", "connect fees", andlor "connection fees" (hereinafter referred to as "Charges"). The
nomenclature is misleading: (1 ) the payments do not pay for any type of physical connection; (2) the
payments are neither a fee nor are they regulatory in nature; and (3) the Irrigation District does not
have police powers permitting the constraint and regulation of business by means of a fee.

8.

Since the City of Hayden will only accept Viking's application for building permits

conditioned on receipt ofHayden Lakes Irrigation District's "sign-off' that its Charge is paid, Viking
can only get building pennits issued from the City of Hayden if Viking pays Hayden Lake Irrigation
District's Charge. Viking is therefore forced by the Irrigation District to pay the Charges in order
to pull building permits froin the City. To date Viking's Charges paid to Hayden Lake Irrigation
Viking Construction, Inc., v. Hayden Lake Irrigation District
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District are believed and therefore alleged to be in the amount of Four Hundred Seventy-Five
Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty Dollars ($475,920). Presently Viking anticipates applying for more
than two hundred (200) building permits in the City over the next couple of years which presently
will require payment to the Irrigation District for Charges. The acts of the Irrigation District against
Viking places Viking in jeopardy.
9.

Plaintiffbelieves and therefore alleges that the Hayden Lake Irrigation District's requirement

for payment of a Charge is without statutory basis. According to Titles 42 and 43 ofthe Idaho Code,
irrigation districts may only raise revenue by issuance of bonds, by yearly assessments, and by
special assessments. There is no authority for a Charge. Plaintiff further believes and therefore
alleges that the Irrigation District does not have police powers to make regulations or charge fees.
It only has the statutory given specific regulation making power, which does not provide for Charges
or fees. Even if the Charges were a fee, it is none-the-less unlawful, because a fee inust be
reasonably related to what is given for the fee. The District provides nothing new in exchange for
the Charge.
10.

Plaintiff further believes and therefore alleges that the Hayden Lake Irrigation District's

requirement for payment of a Charge is an equal protection and due process right violation of the
US Constitution and the Constitution of the State ofIdaho. Assessment rates and special assessment
rates must be applied to all landowners equally. Plaintiff further believes and therefore alleges that
the Charge violates Article VII, Sections 4 and 5 of the Idaho Constitution as well, as it is at best a
tax which is not uniformly applied.
I .

Plaintiff further believes and therefore alleges that the Charge is really nothing but a

disguised unconstitutional tax; That even if it was a tax within a constitution it is nonetheless
imposed without a statutory basis or enabling legislation; That the Irrigation District does not have
Viking Construction, Inc., v. Hayden Lake Irrigation District
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the requisite enabling legislation; That no new duties are required of the Irrigation District as
consideration for the Charge; That nothing is received in exchange for the Charge payment; That the
Charge is unlawfully applied for revenue generation; and That the Irrigation District has usurped its
quasi-public trust by iinposing the tax.
12.

Plaintiff further believes and therefore alleges that Article VII, Section 6 of the Idaho

Constitution does not give the District taxing authority. As well, the Charge does not conform to
the statutory scheme set out in the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.
13.

Plaintiff further believes and therefore alleges that the Irrigation District imposition of

Charges violates Article XV, Sections 4 and 5 of the Idaho Constitution, because it interferes with
Viking's water rights and priority. The District holds title to the water rights in trust for the
landowners. Under irrigation distiict law every landowner is to be treated equally. A Charge
derogatesotheconstitutional protections in Article XV and the statutory protections of due process
in Section 43-404, Idaho Code. The imposition of Charges treats different land owners disparately.
The imposition of Charges penalizes Vilung directly and singularly, causing irreparable harm.
14.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that The Charge further violates the uniformity and

proportionality requirements for taxes as set forth in Sections 2 and 5 of Article VII of the Idaho
Constitution.
15.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges the Charge unjustly enriches the Irrigation District;

That the Irrigation District unlawfully profiteers against its users by requiring payment of a Charge;
That the Irrigation District does not own the facilities, but operates the system under contract with
the Bureau of Reclamation which does own the facilities; That the profiteering is a breach and
violation of the contract(s) between the Irrigation District and the Bureau of Reclamation of the
United States to which Viking is a third-party beneficiary; That the non-proportional application of
Viking Construction, Inc., v. Hayden Lake Irrigation District
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Charges to different water users is contrary to the requirements with the Bureau of Reclamation;
That the Charge is a disproportionate burden on new homes contrary to the requirements with the
Bureau of Reclamation; That the Charges divest Viking of its rights secured by existing contracts
with the Bureau of Reclamation and by the reclamation laws; and that the imposition of Charges
violates the Commerce Clause.
16.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the Irrigation District's imposition of Charges is

Ultra Vires and outside of its Articles and Bylaws.
17.

The Charges do not cover actual costs of connecting pipes. The Charges are collected for

the Irrigation District at large, and not for each newly constructed house. Plaintiff believes and
therefore alleges the exachnent of Charges constitutes a conversion. The Irrigation District and City
acting together are depriving Viking of property without just compensation while acting under color
of State law in contravention of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment made applicable
through the Fourteenth Amendment, Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States,
and Article I, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution, and in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983.
18.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the conditions and exactions by the Irrigation

District are arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable; and are an abuse of governmental power.
19.

Plaintiff believes and therefore further alleges that even if there was constitutional and/or

statutory authority, the Charge amount and the manner in which it was developed is unreasonable,
arbitrary, and capricious.
20.

Pursuant to Section 10-1201, et seq., Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief fiom the Court to

declare the rights and status of Plaintiff, as well as, to declare the whether the Charge is permissible
or impermissible under the laws of the State of Idaho and the United States; That the Coui-t should
declare the imposition of Charges null and void for the reasons given above and in particular without
Viking Construction, Inc., v. Hayden Lake Irrigation District
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limitation because the Charge is at best a tax disguised as a fee; and That the Court Order the
iinposition of Charges as unconstitutional.
COUNT I1
DECLARATORY RELIEF

21.

The Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein, all of the

allegations contained within the preceding paragraphs I - 20 of this Complaint.
22.

At the Hayden Lake Irrigation District regular meeting on September 7, 2004, Defendant,

amended and raised its commercial and domestic Charge, implementing the increase beginning
immediately the following day, on September 8,2004. The domestic Charge increased from $2200
per house to $2700 per house. The commercial Charge increased substantially, as well.
23.

Prior to the September 7,2004, regular meeting of Defendant, Viking sold sixty-five (65)

houses for delivery after September 8,2004, at a contract price based on the $2200 Charge; and has
exhaustively requested the Hayden Lake Irrigation District provide time before implementation of
its Charge increase without avail. The Irrigation District will not sign off on the City's application
fonn unless it receives payment of $2700 per home as a Charge. The City of Hayden will not
receive, accept, nor issue Viking's application for building permits on any of the sixty-five (65)
houses unless Viking first pays the Charges to Hayden Lake Irrigation District. V i l n g is suffering
irreparable injury.
24.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the Hayden Lake Irrigation District's Charge

increase violated procedural and substantive due process protections. In particular the Irrigation
District failed to provide proper notice of its proposed Charge increase or the reasonable opportunity
to be heard on the proposed increase. Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the Irrigation
District, prior to implementation of the increase should have at least published the reasons for
Viking Construction, Inc., v. Hayden Lake Irrigation District
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adopting the increase, the amount of the increased, and the date on which the increase would become
final and effective. Furthennore Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the little notification
which was given was faulty. The Irrigation District only gave notice of a "Rate Increase" which
implied that it had to do with assessments, not Charges, and as such that notice was clearly
misleading and not substantively correct. Viking repeatedly requested copies of all notices of public
hearings scheduled regarding the proposed Charge increase, and the only written notice provided by
the Irrigation District is attached and fully incorporated herein as Exhibit No. 4.
35.

Plaintiff further believes and therefore alleges that the immediate implementation ofHayden

Lake lrrigation District's Charge increase violated procedural and substantive due process
protections; That proper notice of the iinmediate implementation was not provided; and That there
was no reasonable opportunity to be heard about the iinmediate implementation.
26.

Pursuant to Section 10-1201, et seq., in the event the Court finds the imposition of a Charge

is permissible, then Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief from the Court to declare the rights and status
of Plaintiff, as well as, to declare the whether the increase is permissible or impermissible under the
laws of the State of Idaho and the United States; and That the Court Order that the increase in
aixount of the Charge as unconstitutional.
27.

Furthermore, pursuant to Section I 0-1201, et seq., in the event the Court finds the imposition

of a Charge is permissible and finds that the increase is permissible, then Plaintiff seeks declaratory
relief from the Court to declare the rights and status of Plaintiff, as well as, to declare the whether
the immediate implementation of the increase is permissible or iinpennissible under the laws of the
State of Idaho and the United States; and That the Court Order that the immediate implementation
of the increase in amount of the Charge as unconstitutional.
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COUNT 111
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
28.

The Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein, all of the

allegations contained within the preceding paragraphs I - 27 of this Complaint.
29.

Plaintiff should be awarded a mandatory injunction preventing and enjoining Defendants

from imposing and collecting future Charges.
30.

Plaintiff should be awarded a mandatory injunction preventing and enjoining Defendants

fi-om keeping Charges already collected; and be Ordered to return all monies it collected as Charges,
reimbursing Viking fully, plus interest.
COUNT IV
REIMBURSEMENT
3 1.

The Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein, all of the

allegations contained within the preceding paragraphs 1 - 30 of this Complaint.
32.

To date Viking paid Charges to Hayden Lake Irrigation District in an amount believed and

therefore alleged to be in excess of Four Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty
Dollars ($475,920).
33.

Viking believes and therefore alleges that it should be reimbursed for all the monies it paid

to the Irrigation District plus interest.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief and judgment against Defendants as follows:
I.

An order fi-om this Court providing for a speedy healing on the actions for declaratory

judgment, and prays that the matter be advanced on the calendar pursuant to the authority of Rule
57, IRCP;
2.

An order declaring the imposition of Charges null and void;
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3.

An order declaring the increase in the a~nountof the Charges null and void;

4.

An order declaring the iinmediate i~nple~nentation
of the increase in amount of the Charges

null and void;
5.

An order enjoining and restraining the Defendant from imposing Charges;

6.

An order directing Defendant to reimburse to Plaintiff all Charges paid plus interest thereon;

7.

For reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred in prosecution of this Complaint; and

8.

For all such other relief as may be available under the law which the court deems just and

equitable under the circumstances.
DATED this

/P

day of December, 2004.

SCOTT ROSE

n

By:
Attorney for Plaintiffs

VERIFICATION
I, Wendell Olson, hereby verify that I have read the foregoing Complaint and affirm that it
is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Viking Construction, Inc.

By:
Its President
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to

Residing at %Eu J) D ' NL GOt
, Idaho
My Commission expires:
r I. L Z . b o y
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MAKE CI-IECKS PAYABLE TO:

MAKE CHECKS PAYABLE TO:

HAYDEN LAICE IRRIGATION DISTRICT
P.O. BOX 162
.2160 WEST DAILOTA
HAYDEN, IDAHO 83835-0162

MAYDEN LAICE IRRIGATION DISTRICT
P.O. BOX 162
2160 WEST DAKO'l'A
HAYDEN, IDAHO 53535-8162

HAYDEN LAKE IRRIGATION
DISTRICT
PO BOX 162 + 2160 W. Dakota Ave.
Hayden, Idaho 83835-0162
24 hr (208) 772-2612 + FAX (208) 772-5348
e-mail hlidh2o@hotmail.com
Web page haydenirrigation.com
REGULR MEETING
SEPTEMBER 7,2004

NOTICE & AGENDA FOR MEETING SEPTEMBER 7THAT 6: OOPM.
WILL SERVE LETTERS FOR THE FOLLOWING SUB-DIVISIONS:
BRADFORD ESTATES, SUMMER GLENN, SUNSHINE MEADOWS 4TH
ADDITION, STRAWBERRY FIELDS. FINALIZE RICHMOND PROJECT.
RATE INCREASES; HYDRANT LOCK-OFF AGREEMENT; REVISIT PARTTIME ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION. BFUAN HOOKER REGARDING
ABANDONING A WATERLINE

SUSAN P. WEEKS, ISB # 4255
OWENS, JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1875 N. Laltewood Drive, Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 14
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
Fax: (208) 664-1684
E-mail: sweelts@ojvw.com

CLERK DISTRICT COURT

Attorneys for Defendant Hayden Lake Irrigation District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Case No. CV-04-8889

Vilting Construction, Inc.,
an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,
VS.

I
CATEGORY : 1-1
FEE : $47.00

Hayden Lake Irrigation District an Idaho
quasi-municipal corporation.
Defendant.

I

Defendant Hayden Lake Irrigation District, as and for its answer to the petition filed
herein, states and alleges as follows:

1.

Defendant denies each and every allegation of the petition, except as herein stated,

qualified or admitted.

2.

In response to Paragraph 1, Defendant alleges that it is without sufficient

knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or accuracy of the allegations contained
therein and places Viking Construction, Inc. to its strictest proof thereof.

3.

In response to Paragraph 2, Defendant admits it is the Hayden Lalte Isrigation

District, and that it is located in the City of Hayden, Kootenai County, Idaho. Defendant
aclmowledges that at times courts have held irrigation districts to be quasi-municipal
corporations, and affirmatively alleges at times courts have held them to be for-profit
corporations. Defendant also affirmatively alleges that certain portions of Idaho Code refer to
ii-rigation districts as "political subdivisions" of the state of Idaho.
4.

Defendant admits paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs complaint,

5.

Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs

complaint.

6.

111response to Paragraph 5 , Defendant alleges that it is without sufficient

lu~owledgeor information to form a belief as to the truth or accuracy of the allegations contained
therein and places Viking Construction, Inc. to its strictest proof thereof.
7.

In response to Paragraph 6, Defendant admits that the City of Hayden requires

its signature on building permits. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of Paragraph 6.

8.

In response to Paragraph 7, Defendant admits that it charges a water connection

fee. Defendant denies the remaining allegatioils of Paragraph 7.

9.

Defendant admits that the City of Hayden will not issue a building permit w i t h o ~ ~ t

Hayden Lake Irrigation District's signature on it. Defendant admits that it will not
serve residences within its district without payilleilt of the connection fee. Defendant is without
sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or accuracy of the allegations
regarding the amount of coimectioil fees paid by Vilting Construction, Inc. or the anticipated
number of building permits that Viking Construction, Inc. intends to apply for, and therefore
denies the same.

ANSWER: 2

10.

Defendant denies the allegations of Paragraph 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18,

19 and 20 of Plaintiffs complaint.
11.

In response to Paragraph 17, Defendant admits that the connection fee is higher

than the cost of merely connecting a pipe to another pipe. Defendant denies the
remaining allegations of Paragraph 17 and affirmatively alleges that the
coiulection fee is an appropriate equity by-in.
12.

In response to Paragraph 2 1 of Plaintiffs complaint, Defendant hereby

incorporates by reference, as so fully set forth herein, all of the answers to the previous
paragraphs of this Answer.
13.

In response to Paragraph 22, Defendant admits that at a regularly noticed meeting

on September 7,2004, that it raised its domestic connection fee as indicated in Plaintiffs
complaint. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of Paragraph 22.
14.

In response to Paragraph 23, Defendant is without sufficient laowledge or

information to form a belief as to the truth or accuracy of the allegations regarding the number of
homes sold by Viking Construction, Inc.. Defendant admits that after the September 7,2004
public meeting that Viking Construction, Inc. has requested that it reconsider the connection fee
for domestic lots. Defendant affirmatively alleges that despite the public nature of its meeting,
Plaintiff did not attend or give comment to the Board regarding the setting of coilnection fees,
which item was contained on the agenda. Defendant adinits that at the current time, the City of
Hayden will not issue a buildiilg permit unless it contains the Hayden Lake Irrigation District's
signature. Defendant denies that it requires a payment of the coilnection fee at the time of
signature of the building permit and affirmatively alleges that such payment is not required until
such time as a connection request is made.

ANSWER: 3

15.

Defendant denies the allegations of Paragraph 24, 25, 26, and 27 of Plaiiltiffs

complaint.
16.

In response to Paragraph 28, the Defendant hereby incorporates by reference, as so

fully set foi-th herein, all of the allegations contained within the proceeding paragraph of this
answer.
17.

Defendant denies Paragraph 29 and 30 of Plaintiffs complaint.

18.

The Defendant hereby incorporates by reference, as so fully set forth herein, all

the allegations contained within the proceeding paragraph of this answer.
19.

Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to

Admit or deny the truth or accuracy of the allegations in Paragraph 32.
20.

Defendant denies the allegations of Paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs complaint.

AFFIMATIVE DEFENSES
2 1.

Plaintiffs complaint fails to state claims upon which relief may be granted.

22.

Plaintiffs claims are barred in whole or in part due to the equitable doctrines of

laches, estoppel, waiver and unclean hands.
23.

Plaiiltiff's claims are barred in whole or in part of the doctrines of recoupment and

24.

Plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages, if any, and said alleged damages should be

set-off.

barred or reduced accordingly.
25.

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statutes of limitation, Idaho Code §§ 5-218 and

26.

Plaintiff pre-sold residential lots in violation of Idaho Code.

5-224.

WHEREFORE, Haydell Lake Irrigatioil District requests the Court:

ANSWER: 4

a.

Dismiss Plaiiltiff's complaint with prejudice;

b.

Award Defendant its costs and disbursements, including reasonable

attorney fees, to the extent permitted under law; and
c.

Award such other and further relief as the Court shall deem to be just and

proper.
DATED this

day of January, 2005.
OWENS, JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

By:

Susan P. Weeks
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3
correct copies of the foregoing document by

Scott Rose, Esq.
300 Main Street, Ste. 153
~ o i s eID
, 83702
Fax: (208) 345-1836
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,2005 I served true and

SUSAN P.WEEKS, ISB # 4255

-

OWENS, JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1875 N. Lakewood Drive, Suite 200
Coeur d'Alene,:JD 83 8 14
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
Fax: (208)664- 11684
E-mail: sweeks(ij>,ojvw.com
ISB &I255
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Attorneys for Defendant Hayden Lake 1rrigati.onDistrict

IN THlE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THB COUI\TT\?OF KOOTENM
Case No.CV-04-8889

Viking Construction, lnc.,
an Idaho Corporation,

DEFENDNYI"I'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DEEM
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION ADMITTED

Pl.aintiff

vs.
Hayden Lake Irrigation District an Idaho
quasi-municipal corporation.
,

Defendant.

I.

I

PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO DEEM CERTAIN REOUESTS ADMITTED SHOULD
RE DENIED
Plaintiff has filed a motion to deem recluests for admission admitted, a motion to sign

under oath, and a motion for attorney fees and costs. The motion is not based.upon Defendant
not answering the discovery within the extended time agreed to between the parties, but rather
th.e sufficiency of the answers. Rule 36, I.R.C.P, provides th,at

The party who has requested the admissions may move ta determine the
sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless the court determines that ail
objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If the court
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determines that an answer d.ocs not comply with the requirements of this rule, it
may ordcr either that the matter is admitted or tlut an mended answer: be served.
Th,ecolut may, in lieu of these orders, determine that fmal disposition of the
request be made at a pre-trial conference or at a designated,time prior to trial.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant's answers aren't justified and seeks an order that the matters be

deemed admitted,
Th.eRequcsts for Admission to which Plaintiff complains about the answers d.o not seek
the application of law to fact. Rather, they seek admissions of the inferpretarion o f law, a matter

which this court will determine in the present litigation, Our court has recognizcd.this important
distinction.in requests for admission.. In the case of Ruge v. Posey, 114 Idaho 890 (Ct.App.

1988) in commenting in passing on this distinction ths court noted:
Under Rule 36(a), rcqucsts f o admission
~
are ilot limited to questions of fact. The
rule has been i,nterpretedto permit rcqucsts involving opini.ons,conclusions and
mixed questions of law and.fact. See 8 C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER,
FEDEUL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2255 (1.970).See also I.R.C.P.
36(a) (requests may be made about any matters within,the scope of Rule 26(b) Illat
relate to statements or opinions of fact or the application of law to fact). Thus, a
request to admit one's f a ~ ~ negligence
lt,
or liability is permissible. However, in
circumstances where response to a mixcd question.would be difficult, or
would turn primarily on a legal issue to be resolved by the court, an
objection to the request may be filed. No such objection was filed in this case.
(Emphasis added.)
The requests for admission which Plaintiff seeks admission ( 3 7, 18, 1.9,20,22,23,26,27,28,

3 1,33,34,30 (sic), 1.4,47,52, 58,59,60,62 and 63) all represent mi.xedquestions of law an,d
fact aimed at obtaining admissions regarding legal issues to be resolved by this Court. The
primary legal, issue in. this litigation is whether Defendant has thc legal ability to charge
connection fees for new users of water smices. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleged Defendant
was without a statutory basis under Titles 42 and 43 of Idaho Code and that the connection fee

vj.olated Idal~o'sconstitution or cxceedcd the legal authority of Defendant. This court will
determine these issues as a matter of statutory and constitt~tionalinterpretation, and therefore,
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DEEM REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION ADMITTED: 2
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If Defendant had not deemed these matters n.ot to

t~unprimarily on this Court's interpretation of legal and constitutional interpretations, it would
have denied the matters, consistent with its answer.
Plaintiff's reason for seeking these denials even though they were previously interposed
in the answer is clear from PlaintiFs position rcgslrcling tbe n,eedto support denials with

specificity. Plaintifftakcs the position. in the present motion with respect to otller denials of
requests for admission that Defendant is und.er the affirmative duty to provide an explanation of

the denial. Thus, Plaintiff seeks to require Defexldani's to essentially present n summary
jud.gment argument j.n its responses to requests for admission. The purpose: of discovery is not to
determine the other party's legal arguments it will present to the Court in su.pport of its
interpretation of the law, but rather to obtain admissible evidence for use at trial [or:in swnmaty
judgment proceedings).

n.

INTERPOSED DENIALS ARE APPROPRIATE
Turning to the issue of specificity, Plaintiff claims tbat a simple denial of:a request for

admission does not meet the requirements of rule 36, and that spccific reasons must be set forth
supporting the dmial. No case law i s cited to support this proposition. Rule 36 requires that an

answer spe~ificallydeny the matter or set forth in d.ctailthe reasons why the answering party
c m o t trutb.full,y admit or deny the matter. Plaintiff wants the Court to read "speci.fi.ca1l.y
deny"
to read "d.eny with specificity". T l ~ rule
e
clearly sets forth that if one is to deny a response tl~at

the answer be a n unqudifi.ed denial. It does not require that the d.enialbe supported by specific
facts as suggested by Plaintiff.

RuIE:36 also rcquircs that a den.ia1fairly meet th.e substance of the requested admission,

and wh.en good faith, requires that a party qual..ifythe answer or deny only a part of t h matter
~
of
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which,an admission is requested, the party sl~allspecify so mu.cb of it as is true

qualify or

deny the remainder. This section merely provides that a res,ponse must be to the elltire request,
and if only a portion is denied, tllcn the answering party must qualify what portion i s denied and

admitted. It does not require that denials contain explanations. Requests for Admissions Nos. 3,

unqualified denids scnd require no qualification.

Regarding Requests for Admissions No. 29,30(sj.c), 74,76 and 78, these answers
complied with Rnle 36. Good faith rcquired that the answers be qualified and.they were.
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTJONS THAT SOME REQUESTS WEE VAGUE AND
AMI3IGUOUS WERE VALID

111.

Plaintiff complains that Defendant's objections aren't va1i.d. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that Request for Admission No. 10 is not vague. n , i s Request and Response were as follows:

REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10: Admit you serve numerous residences
within the District wbicl~havc not paid n coltnec1:ion fcc in contradiction to your Answer
at paragraph no. 9.

RJXSPONSE: Objection. This request i s vague and ambiguous as to the
definition of the term "numerous". Without wajving said objection, admit th.at a
tap on (connection) fee has been charged to all individuals who were not part of
the original Bureau of Reclamation project.
Admission No. 1.0incorporates Defendant's Answer, 7 9. The incorporated para.graph.from the
an.swerread as follows:

9.

Defendant admits that the City of Hayden will not issue a building permit witb,out
Hayden Lake Irrigation Distrj.ci"s signature on it. Defendant admits'thatit will not
s m e resi.denceswithin its district wi.th.outpayment of the connection.fee.
Defendant is without sufici.ent knowledge or infomation to form a belief as to
the truth or accuracy of the allegations rcgad.ingthe am.out~tof coimection fecs
paid by Viking Constsu.ction,Inc. or the anticipated,number o f building pennits
that Viking Construction, Inc. intends to apply for, and therefore denies 1:11e same.

Th,eresponse meets the requirem.mt of Rule 36 of that the answering party meet thc substmce of
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTTFF'S MOTION TO DEEM REQUESTS FOR
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the requested admission, and when good faith.requires that a party qualify the answcr or d,cny
only a part of the m,atterof which an admission i s requested. The request sought an, answer as to
which members of Hayden Lakc Irrigation Di.strictpaid connection fees and informed Plainti.ff
that all members except for th,oseproperties that were originally included in th,e Bureau of
Reclamation project ( a d the attendant bond) paid a connection fee. Defendant was not sum
what Plaintiff meant by the reference to paragraph 9 of the Answer. Patagrap11 9 of the answer
ind.icatedthat the De:Fendant would not serve residences wj.tb.outpayment of th.e conn.ecti.onfee.
The response qualified the response to make clear which users were cl~argedm d which users
were not charged a connection fee.
Plai.ntiiTtakes exception with the response to Request for Admission No. 13 and Request

for Admission.No. I 1. Plaintiff asked Defendant to admit that it treated "new1.yconstructed
residential property regarding connection fees" di.ffere11tl.y:From.residences that were constructed
before the implementation of a connection fee program." Defendant objected to this request as
vague md ambiguous. Plaintiff never clarified.the information it sought. However, without

waiving the objection, Defendant qualified the answer and admitted a connection fee was
charged to all individuals who were not part of the original Bureau of Reclamation project
(including the bond h d i n g for the project) and that a connection fee is charged on new

construction of residences that arc not rcplaoiag a previously exi.sti.ngresidence. Plaintiff claims

the response does not give it information i~~forming
it of i.tspolicy before and after the District
adopted,connection'fees. Clearly it does. Except for those residences that were encompassed in
the original Bureau of Reclamation project and bond, all users subsequently have bccn charged a

connection fee, provided liowever, if a residence is destroyed and.rebuilt and has previously paid

a connection fee, it is not again charged a connection fee even lhough it i s "newly constructed".
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DEEM REQUESTS FOR
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Plaintiff raises the same concern over the response to Request for Admission No. 17.
Besides being objectionable for the reasons previously discussed in P u t J of this memorandum,

No. 17 is not clear. It requests and admission that Defendant "only has the statutory given
specific regulation making power" of Titles 42 and 43. Titlcs 42 and 43 do not refer to

"regulation rnakin.gpowers". Plaintiff is umablc in its m.emorandumto explain to the court what
is sought by this admission,
Plaintiff also claims that Repests for Admission Nos. 29,46,53,57 and 76 are not
vague ad ambiguous. Again, Plaintiff does n.ot support its allegation with.any explanation of

what is sought by the requests. Request for Admission No. 29 aga.inrefers to '"newlyconstructed
residences" and "new duties" without providing any parameters as to what is meant b y these

terms. Even though.Defendant is left to guess as to wlmt is meant by these terms, it denied No.

29 because th.e addition of additional users to a water system always increases the duties of the
District if "new duties" refer to meter reading, service and billi.ng.
The same issue was Mised in Admission No. 46. Pld.11ti.ffsought an admission that a.
connection fee on "new homes" was contrary to the requirements of tl~cBurcau of Reclamation..
Defendant defined the twm in its answer and then denied the request based upon,the definiti.on of
the term as it understood it. Plaintiff never indicated that the definition as ~mclastoodby
Defendant was incorrect.

'This iss~reagain sudaced at Request for Admi.ssi.onNo. 53. Defendant was not sure
wl~etherPlaintiff was askj.ngi.f
the agenda was only posted once or if it sought admission tl~at:
there were no othm agenda or notice of the meeting. Defendant answered the question on bow
many times i%lc actual agenda was posted.

On Request for Admission for Admission No. 57, Plaintiff sought an admissio~~
that "the

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DEEM REQUESTS FOR
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collected,connection fees are meant to be spent on capital improvements." The language is
subject to several interpretatj,ons. Plaintiff could be asking Defendant to admit the statutory and
case 1,awrequired ihat the connection fees be spent on capital improvements. Plaintiff could bs

asking if Ule Defendant to admit it had a policy that thc coimccfion fees be spent on capital
improvements. Plaintiff could be asking how the collected fees had been spcnt in the past.
Defendant could not tell, so Defendant compl.iedwith Rule 26 and qualified its atwwer to meet
what it believed was the substance of Plaintiffs inquiry.

Finally, on Requ.estfor Admission No. 76, Plaintiff wishes tl~edistrict to admit ihat

agricultural use is greater than residential use of water per acre per year. P1,aintiffdid not specify
a time period. Defendant objected because the mix between agricu1,turalusers and residential
usas has shified throughout the history of the District. Defendant denied this request with

respect to the current year because currently residential use is great= than agricultural use.
IV.

RESPONSES UNDER OATH
Plaintiff:is correct th.atDefendant did not verification to the answers. This omission is

being corrected.

V.

ATTORNEY FEES
Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees on th.i.smotion as Defendant answered discovery

as required by the d e s and did not interpose fiivolaus objections.

DATED this 4" day of August, 2005.
OWENS, JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA

By:
Susan I?. Wceks
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4'" day of August, 2005 1 served true and correct copies
of the foregoing document by facsimile upon the footlowing:
Scott Rose, Esq.
300 Main Street, Ste. 153
Boise, ID 83702
Fax: (208) 345-1836

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DEEM REQUESTS FOR
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n3n.

Scott Rose
Attorney at Law
300 Main Street, Suite 153
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 342-2552 Telephone
(208) 342-3669 Fax
scott@idahoiplaw.com
Idaho State Bar #4197
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Plaintiffs' Attorney
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Viking Construction, Inc.,
an Idaho Corporation,

1
CASE NO.: CV 04-8889

Plaintiff,

1

Hayden Lake Irrigation District,
an Idaho quasi-municipal
corporation,

1

ORDER GRANTING LEAVE
TO AMEND PETITION

VS.

)

Defendants.
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend the Petition having come before the Court on
February 19,2008; that Defendant stipulated to Plaintiff's motion; and with good cause
appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to
Amend Petition is granted.
DATED this

By:

1

5

fiv1;L,

day of+kktmy, 2008.

!sx'd&

Hon. John Patrick Luster
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID

Order Granting Leave of Motion to Amend

1

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILmG
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on th < i 4 d a y 0 2 ; r & O 8 , a true and .correct
. copy of'
the foregoing Order was mailed to Defend t and Plaintiff, by p l a w U.S.
y
to:
Susan Patricia Weeks
Attorney at Law
James, Vernon & Weeks, PA
1626 Lincoln Way

/

/

Scott Rose
Attorney at Law
300 West Main Street, Suite 153
Boise, Idaho, 83702
Clerk

\

\

Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID

Order Granting Leave of Motion to Amend
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STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI ) ss
FlLE3:

Scott Rose
Attorney at Law
300 Main Street, Suite 153
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 4 197
/

DEPUTY

(208) 342-2552 Telephone
scott@idahoiplaw.com
(208) 342-3669 Fax
ldaho State Bar #4197

Plaintiffs' Attorney
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Viking Construction, Inc.,
an Idaho Corporation,
CASE NO.: CV 04-8889
Plaintiff,
VS.
AMENDED PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Hayden Lake Irrigation District,
an Idaho quasi-municipal
corporation,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Viking Construction, Inc., an ldaho corporation, Plaintiff, by and through its
attorney, Scott Rose, and for cause of action against the Defendant Hayden Lake Irrigation District,
an Idaho quasi-municipal corporation hereby petitions, complains, and alleges as follows:
COUNT 1
DECLARATORY RELIEF
1.

At all relevant times Plaintiffherein, Viking Construction, Inc., an Idaho Corporation in good
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standing (I~ereinafterreferred to as "Viking") residing in the City of Hayden, County of Kootenai,
State of Idaho, owned and owns multiple parcels of land within the boundaries of the Hayden Lake
Irrigation District (hereinafter referred to as "Irrigation District"), and as such is a water user with
water rights witllin said Irrigation District. Plaintiff is an interested person as defined by Section

1 0- 1201, el seq., Idaho Code.
2.

At all material times alleged herein, Defendant, Hayden Lake Irrigation District, an Idaho

quasi-municipal corporation resided in the City of Hayden, County of Kootenai, State of Idaho.
3.

Venue is proper in Kootenai County pursuant to and by virtue of Idaho Code Section 5-404.

4.

This Court has subject lnatterjurisdiction in this action and the damages herein are in excess

of $10,000; and the ~nolletaryamounts in controversy exceed the mini~nutnjurisdictional amounts
of the District Court. Viking finds itself in jeopardy and has no relief save from sublnission of the
issue to a court of equity for the determination of (1) whether or not the Charge imposed by the
lrrigation District, is per~nissibleor not permissible, (2) whether or not the increase in the amount
of the Charge imposed by the Irrigation District, is permissible or not permissible, and (3) whether
or not the immediate implementation of the increase in the amount of the Charge imposed by the
Irrigation District, is permissible or not permissible. But for the relief set out herein, there is no
adequate remedy available to Viking for the deprivation of its Civil Rights.

5.

Plaintiff desired and contin~lesto desire to construct new homes on its real property lying

witllin the boundaries of the Hayden Lake Irrigation District.
6. [Deleted]

7.

The Hayden Lake Irrigation District required Plaintiff (and continues to require Plaintiff over

its objections) to pay money. These paylnents are often fallaciously and spuriously referred to for
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instance as "tap-on fees'' "l~ookon fees", "hook up fees", "connect fees", and/or "connection fees"
(hereinafter referred to as "Charges"). The nomenclature is misleading: ( 1 ) the payments do not pay
for any type of pllysical connection; (2) the paylnents are neither a fee nor are they regulatory in
nature; and (3) the Irrigation District has not invoked its police powers to tlle extent it has police
powers by passage of an ordinance permitting the constraint and regulation of business by means
of a fee.
8.

Viking's Charges paid to Hayden Lake lrrigation District are believed and therefore alleged

to be in the amount of One Million Five Hundred Eighty-Nine Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Three
Dollars ($1,589,163). Presently Viking anticipates future payment to the Irrigation District for
Charges. Tlle acts of the lrrigation District against Viking places Viking in jeopardy.
9.

Plaintiffbelieves and therefore alleges that the Hayden Lake Irrigation District's requirement

for payment of a Charge is without statutory basis. According to Titles 42 and 43 of the Idaho Code,
irrigation districts may only raise revenue by issuance of bonds, by yearly assessments, and by
special assessments. There is no authority for a Charge. Plaintiff further believes and therefore
alleges that the lrrigation District did not implement the police powers to the extent it has police
powers by passage of an ordinance required to make regulations or charge fees. It only has the
statutoly given specific regulation making power, which does not provide for Charges or fees. Even
if the Charges were a fee, it is none-the-less unlawful, because a fee must be reasonably related to
what is given for the fee. The District provides nothing new in exchange for the Charge.
10.

Plaintiff further believes and therefore alleges that the Hayden Lake Irrigation District's

requirement for payment of a Charge is an equal protection and due process right violation of tlle
US Constitutioll and the Constitution of the State of Idaho. Assessment rates and special assessment
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rates must be applied to all landowners equally. Plaintiff further believes and therefore alleges that
tlie Cliarge violates Article V11, Sections 4 and 5 of the Idaho Colistitution as well, as it is at best
a tax wliicli is not uliiforlnly applied.

11.

Plaintiff further believes and therefore alleges that tlie Charge is really nothing but a

disguised unco~istitutionaltax; Tliat even if it was a tax within a constitution it is nonetheless
imposed without a statutory basis or enabling legislation; Tliat the Irrigation District does not have
the requisite enabling legislation; That no new duties are required of the Irrigation District as
consideration for the Charge; That nothing is received in exchange for the Cliarge payment; That
the Charge is unlawfully applied for revenue generation; and That the Irrigation District has usurped
its quasi-public trust by imposing the tax.

12.

Plaintiff further believes and tlierefore alleges that Article VII, Section 6 of tlie Idalio

Constitution does not give the District taxing authority beyond yearly assessments. As well, tlie
Cliarge does not conform to the statutory scheme set out in the Idalio Revenue Bond Act.
13.

Plaintiff further believes and therefore alleges that the Irrigation District imposition of

Charges violates Article XV, Sections 4 and 5 of the Idaho Constitution, because it interferes with
Viking's water rights and priority. The District holds title to the water rights in trust for the
landowners. Under irrigation district law every landowner is to be treated equally. A Charge
derogates tlie constitutional protections in Article XV and the statutoly protections of due process
in Section 43-404, Idalio Code. Tlie irnpositioli of Charges treats different land owners disparately.
Tlie ilnpositioli of Cliarges penalizes Viking directly and singularly, causing irreparable Iiann.
14.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the Cliarge further violates tlie uniformity and

proportionality requiren-~entsfor taxes as set forth in Sections 2 and 5 of Article V11 of the Idaho
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Constiti~tion.
15.

enriches the Irrigation District;
Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges the Charge unj~~stly

That tlie Irrigation District unlawfully profiteers against its users by requiring payment of a Charge;
That the Irrigation District does not own tlie facilities, but operates the system under contract with
the Bureau of Reclamation which does own tlie facilities; That tlie profiteering is a breacli and
violation of the contract(s) between the Irrigation District and the Bureau of Reclamation of tlie
United States to which Viking is a third-party beneficiary; That tlie non-proportional application of
Charges to different water users is contraly to the requirements witli the Bureau of Reclamation;
That the Charge is a disproportionate burden on new liomes contrary to the requirements with the
Bureau of Reclamation; That the Charges divest Viking of its rights secured by existing contracts
witli the Bureau of Reclamation and by the reclalnatioli laws; and that tlie imposition of Charges
violates the Commerce Clause.

16.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the Irrigation District's imposition of Charges

is Ultra Vires, that its Bylaws concerning tap-on fees, hook-on fees and connection fees, i.e Charges
is unlawful, and its Bylaws concerning altering, repealing, and amending tlie Bylaws are unlawful.
17.

Tlie Cliarges do not cover actual costs of connecting pipes. The Charges are collected for

tlie Irrigation District at large, and not for each newly constructed house. Plaintiff believes and
tlierefore alleges the exactment of Cliarges constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property under
the Takings Clause of tlie Fiftli Amendment made applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment
and Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States, and Article I, Section 14 of tlie
Idaho Constitution. Viking claims under 42 U.S.C. Sectioli 1983 that the Irrigation District is
e r of State law; and
depriving Viking of property without just compellsation while acting ~ ~ n dcolor
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therefore the Irrigation District has com~llittedthe tort of conversion by keeping property whicll has
no right to retain.

18.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the conditions and exactions by the Irrigation

District are arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable; and are an abuse of governmental power.
19.

Plaintiff believes and therefore further alleges that even if there was constitutio~~al
and/or

statutory authority, the Charge amount and the manner in which it was developed is unreasonable,
arbitrary, and capricious.

20.

Pursuant to Section 10-120 1, el seq., Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief from the Court to

declare the rights and status of Plaintiff, as well as, to declare the whether the Charge is perlnissible
or i~npermissibleunder the laws of the State of Idaho and the United States; That the Court should
declare the i~npositio~l
ofcharges null and void for the reasons given above and in pal-ticularwithout
limitation because the Charge is at best a tax disguised as a fee; and That the Court Order the
ilnposition of Charges as unconstitutional.
COUNT l l
DECLARATORY RELIEF
21.

The Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein, all of the

allegatio~lscontai~ledwithin the preceding paragraphs 1 - 20 of this Complaint.
22.

At the Haydell Lake Irrigation District regular meeting on September 7, 2004, Defendant,

amended and raised its commercial and domestic Charge, implementing the increase beginning
i~n~nediately
the followil~gday, on Septelnber 8,2004. The domestic Charge increased from $2200
per house to $2700 per house. The commercial Charge increased substantially, as well.
23.

Prior to the September 7,2004, regular meeting of Defendant, Viking sold sixty-five (65)
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houses for delivery after September 8,2004, at a contract price based on the $2200 Charge; and has
exhaustively requested the Hayden Lake Irrigation District provide time before implemel~tationof
its Charge increase without avail. The Irrigation District will not provide water unless it receives
payment of $2700 per home as a Charge. Viking is suffering irreparable injury.
24.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the Hayden Lake Irrigation District's Charge

increase violated procedural and substantive due process protections. In particular the Irrigation
District failed to provide proper notice of its proposed Charge increase or the reasonable oppol-tunity
to be heard on the proposed increase. Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that tile Irrigation
District, prior to ilnplementation of the increase sllould have at least published the reasons for
adopting the increase, the alnount ofthe increased, and the date on which the increase would become
final and effective. Furthermore Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the little notification
which was given was faulty. Tlle Irrigation District only gave notice of a "Rate Increase" which
implied that it had to do with assessments, not Charges, and as such that notice was clearly
misleading and not substantively correct. Viking repeatedly requested copies ofall notices of public
hearings scheduled regarding the proposed Charge increase, and the only written notice provided
by the Irrigation District is attached and fully incorporated herein as Exhibit No. l(a) and Exhibit
No. l(b).
25.

Plaintiff further believes and therefore alleges that the immediate im~lementationof

Hayden Lake Irrigation District's Charge increase violated procedural and substantive due process
protections; That proper notice of the immediate i~nple~nentation
was not provided; and That there
was no reasonable opportunity to be heard about the irnnlediate implementation.
26.

Pursuant to Section 10-1201, el seq., in the event the Court finds the imposition ofa Charge
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is permissible, then Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief fiom the Court to declare the rights and status
of Plaintiff, as well as, to declare the whether the increase is permissible or ilnpermissible under the
laws of the State of Idaho and the United States; and That the Court Order that tlie increase in
alnount of the Charge as unconstitutional.
27.

Furtliermore, pursuant to Sectioli 10-120 1, et seq., in tlie event the Court finds the ilnposition

of a Charge is perlnissible and finds that the increase is permissible, then Plaintiff seeks declaratory
relief from the Court to declare the rights and status of Plaintiff, as well as, to declare the whether
the irnnlediate in~plementationof the increase is permissible or i~npennissibleunder the laws of the
State of Idaho and the United States; and That the Court Order that the immediate implementation
of tlie increase in alnount of the Charge as unconstitutional.
COUNT 111
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
28.

The Plaintiff liereby incorporates by reference, as though fully set fort11 herein, all of the

allegations contained within the preceding paragraphs 1 - 27 of this Complaint.
29.

Plaintiff should be awarded a mandatory injunction preventing and enjoining Defendants

from imposing and collectil~gfuture Charges.
30.

Plaintiff should be awarded a mandatory injunction preventing and enjoining Defendants

from keeping Charges already collected; and be Ordered to return all monies it collected as Charges,
reinlbursing Viking fully, plus interest.
COUNT lV
REIMBURSEMENT
3 1.

The Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference, as tllougli fully set fort11 herein, all of the
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allegations contained within the preceding paragraphs 1 - 30 of this Complaint.
32.

Viking paid Charges to Hayden Lake Irrigation District in an amount believed and therefore

alleged to be in excess of One Million Five Hundred Eighty-Nine Thousand One Hundred SixtyThree Dollars ($1,589,163).
33.

Viking believes and therefore alleges that it sho~lldbe reimbursed for all the monies it paid

to the lrrigation District plus interest, together with costs and attorney's fees.
COUNT V
Bvlaws Not Lawful Regarding Amendment Sections
34.

The Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference, as though fi~llyset forth herein, all

of the allegations contained within the preceding paragraphs 1 - 33 of this Complaint.
35.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the adoption of the August 3, 1915

Hayden Lake Irrigation District (HLID) By-Laws, Section 9 oftlie General Provisions page 6, is and
was unlawful and without legal effect, as are all future By-Laws adopted by the HLID concerning
the same subject matter of Section 9 concerning the Board of Director's authority to alter, amend
or repeal the By-Laws, on the grounds and for the reasons that it (a) constitutes an ultra vires act,
(b) violates constitutional due process requirements of notice, the opportunity to be heard, as well
as, the opportunity to vote, and (c) violates State law.
36.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that all Hayden Lake lrrigation District By-

Laws adopted after the 19 15 By-Law be declared null and void; and that August 3, 1915 Haydeli
Lake Irrigation District (HLID) By-Laws, Section 9 of the General Provisions page 6, be stricken
and declared null and void.
37.

Viking

Plaintiff should be awarded a mandatory injunction preventing and enjoinilig
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Defendant from altering, anlending or repealing the By-Laws without due process such as prior
ratepayer notice, oppol-tunity to heard, an election by the ratepayers.
38.

Plaintiff should be awarded a mandatory injunction preventing and enjoining Defendants

from keeping Charges already collected; and be Ordered to return all monies it collected as Charges,
reimbursing Viking fully, plus interest, costs and attorney's fees.
COUNT VI
Bylaws Not Lawful Regarding Ratepayer Notice Sections
39.

The Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein, all

of the allegations contained within the preceding paragraphs 1 - 38 of this Complaint.

40.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the adoption of the August 3, 19 15

Hayden Lake Irrigation District (HLID) By-Laws, Sectioli 9 ofthe General Provisions page 6, is and
was unlawful and without legal effect, as are all future By-Laws adopted by the HLID concerning
the same subject matter of Section 9 concerning the two week notice provision for the Board of
Directors to alter, amend or repeal the By-Laws, on the grounds and for the reasons that it (a)
constitutes an ultra vil-es act, (b) violates constitutional due process requirements of notice, the
opportunity to be heard, as well as, the oppol-tunity to vote, and (c) violates State law.

41.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that all Hayden Lake Irrigation District By-

Laws adopted after the 19 15 By-Law be declared null and void; and that August 3, 1915 Hayden
Lake Irrigation District (HLID) By-Laws, Section 9 of the General Provisions page 6, be stricken
and declared null and void.

42.

Plaintiff sliould be awarded a mandatory ilijunctioli preventing and enjoining

Defendant from altering, amending or repealing the By-Laws without due process such as prior
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ratepayer notice, oppostunity to heard, an election by the ratepayers.
43.

Plaintiff should be awarded a niandatory injunction preventing and enjoining Defendants

from keeping Charges already collected; and be Ordered to return all monies it collected as Charges,
reimbursing Viking fi~lly,plus interest, costs and attorney's fees.
COUNT VII
Bvlaws Not Lawful Regarding Board of Director Notice Sections
44.

The Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein, all

of the allegations contained within the preceding paragraphs 1 - 43 of this Complaint.
45.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that all Hayden Lake Irrigation District By-

Laws adopted after the 1915 By-Law be declared null and void; and that August 3, 19 15 Hayden
Lake Irrigation District (HLID) By-Laws, Section 9 of the General Provisions page 6, be stricken
and declared null and void concerning the provision enabling the Board of Directors authority to
alter, amend or repeal the By-Laws without any prior notice at all to either the owners of lands
subject to assessment within the District or to the Board members.
46.

Plaintiff should be awarded a mandatoly injunction preventing and

elljoining Defendant from altering, amending or repealing the By-Laws without due process sucli
as prior notice, opportunity to heard, an election by the Board of Directors.
47.

Plaintiff should be awarded a mandatory injunction preventing and enjoining Defendants

from keeping Charges already collected; and be Ordered to return all lnonies it collected as Charges,
reimbursing Viking fully, plus interest, costs and attorney's fees.
COUNT VIIl
1947 Bvlaws Not Lawful Regarding Charging For Tau-on Fees
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48.

Tlie Plaintiff' liereby incorporates by reference, as t110~1glifully set forth herein, all

of tlie allegations contained within the pl-eceding paragraphs 1 - 47 of this Complaint.
49.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the adoption of the August 19, 1947

Hayden Lake Irrigation District By-Laws, Section 1 1, as are all future By-Laws concerning the same
subject matter of Section 1 1 adopted by tlie HLID allowing for a fee to be charged for tapping to the
main for domestic purposes, is and was unlawful for (a) being an trltra vires act, (b) violating
constitutional due process requirelnents of notice, the opportunity to be heard, as well as, the
opportunity to vote, (c) violating State law pertaining to quasi-municipal entities; and (d) breaching
contracts between tlie United States and the HLID;
50.

Plaintiff sliould be awarded a mandatory injunction preventing and enjoining

Defendant from charging a fee without compliance with passage of an ordinance requirements and
the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act, Section 67-8201, etc., Idaho Code.
51.

Plaintiff should be awarded a mandatory injunction preventing and enjoining Defendants

from keeping Charges already collected; and be Ordered to return all monies it collected as Charges,
reimbursing Viking fully, plus interest, costs and attorney's fees.
COUNT IX
1947 Bvlaws Not Lawful Regarding Multiple Tap-on Fees
52.

The Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein, all

of the allegations contained within the preceding paragraphs 1 - 5 1 of this Complaint.
53.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the adoption of the adoption of tlie

August 19, 1947 Hayden Lake Irrigation District By-Laws, Section I 1, as are all fi~tureBy-Laws
concerning the same subject matter of Section 1 1 adopted by the HLID allowing for multiple fees

Vilting Construction, Inc., v. Hayden Lake Irrigation District
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to be charged for additional tapping to tlie main within a tract, is and was unlawful for (a) being an
ullra vircs act, (b) violating constitutional due process requirements of notice, the opport~lnityto be

heard, as well as, the opportunity to vote, (c) violating State law pertaining to quasi-municipal
entities; and (d) breaching contracts between the United States and the HLID.
54.

Plaintiff should be awarded a mandatory injunction preventing and elljoining

Defendant from charging multiple fees on land within tlie District.
55.

Plaintiff should be awarded a mandatory injunction preventing and enjoining Defendants

from keeping Charges already collected; and be Ordered to return all monies it collected as Charges,
reimbursing Viking fully, plus interest, costs and attorney's fees.
COUNT X
1947 Bvlaws Not Lawful Reparding Notice Sections
56.

The Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein, all

of the allegations contained within the preceding paragraphs 1 - 55 of this Complaint.
57.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the adoption of the August 19, 1947

Hayden Lake Irrigation District By-Laws are and were unlawful for failing to give notice and for
failing to put its adoption to the vote of the ratepayers.
58.

Plaintiff sliould be awarded a mandatory injunction preventing and elljoining

Defendant from adopting the 1947 By-Laws.
59.

Plaintiff should be awarded a lnandato~yinjunction preventing and enjoining Defendants

from keeping Charges already collected; and be Ordered to return all monies it collected as Charges,
reimbursing Viking fully, plus interest, costs and attorney's fees.

Viking Construction, Inc., v. Haydeil Lake Irrigation District
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COUNT XI
2002 Bvlaws Not Lawful Regardi11r7Due Process
60.

The Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein, all

of the allegations contained within the preceding paragraphs 1 - 59 of this Complaint.
6 1.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the adoption of the May 7,2002 Hayden

Lake Irrigation District By-Laws are and were unlawful for failing to give notice and for failing to
put its adoption to the vote of the ratepayers.
62.

Plaintiff should be awarded a mandatory injunction preventing and enjoining

Defendant from adopting the 2002 By-Laws.
63.

Plaintiff should be awarded a mandatory injunction preventing and enjoining Defendants

from keeping Charges already collected; and be Ordered to return all monies it collected as Charges,
reimbursing Viking fully, plus interest, costs and attorney's fees.
COUNT XI1
Application of the ldaho Development Impact Fee Act
64.

The Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference, as though fully set forth herein, all

of the allegations contained within the preceding paragraphs 1 - 59 of this Complaint.
65.

Plaintiff seeks Declaratory Relief concerning the meaning of "Connection or hookup

charges" in Section 67-8203(9)(b), I.C., the Idaho Developnlent Impact Fee Act.
66.

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that the statutory meaning of "Connection or

hookup cliarges" in Section 67-8203(9)(b), I.C., the ldaho Development Impact Fee Act is for actual
physical costs of connecting to a water system.
67.

Viking

Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that defining "Connection and hooltup

Construction, Inc., v. Haydeli Lake Irrigation District
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charges" beyond actual pllysical costs wo~lldenable any governmental entity to avoid Development
Impact Fees and/or other provisions of tlie "Idaho Development impact Fee Act" by simply naming
charges: connections or hookups.

68.

Plaintiff seeks Declaratory Relief that the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act

applies to the HLID, fora finding that in order for tlie HLID to charge a fee it must comply with tlie
Idaho Development Impact Fee Act requirements; for a finding that the revenue HLID generates by
charging for a connection fee is not excluded from the Act as "Connection and hookup cliarges";
and that tlie police power ordinance was not implemented even though the Charges are an nonexcluded impact fee.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief and judgment against Defendants as follows:
1.

An order from this Court providing for a speedy hearing on the actions for declaratory

judgment, and prays that the matter be advanced on the calendar pursuant to the authority of Rule
57, IRCP;
2.

An order declaring the imposition of Charges null and void;

3.

An order declaring the increase in the amount of the Charges null and void;

4.

An order declaring the immediate ilnplementation of the increase in amount of the Charges

null and void;
5.

An order enjoining and restraining the Defendant from imposing Charges;

6.

An order directing Defendant to reimburse to Plaintiff all Charges paid plus interest thereon;

7.

An order declaring the 1915 By-laws Section 9 and all later By-laws unlawful and without

legal effect concerning the authority to alter, amend or repeal the By-laws;
8.

An order declaring the 1915 By-laws Section 9 and all later By-laws unlawful and

Viking Construction, Inc., v. Hayden Lake Irrigation District
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without legal effect concerning tlie notice provision to ratepayors;
9.

An order declaring tlie 1915 By-laws Section 9 and all later By-laws u~llawfilland

witliout legal effect concer~lingtlie notice provision to Directors;
10.

An order declaring the 1947 By-laws Section 1 1 and all later By-laws unlawfill and

without legal effect concerning tlie cliarging of Tap-on fees;

I I.

An order declaring the 1947 By-laws Section I I and all later By-laws unlawful and

witliout legal effect concerning the charging of lnultiple Tap-on fees;
12.

An order declaring tlie 1947 By-laws Section I I and all later By-laws unlawful and

without legal effect for failing to give notice of its proposed adoption, for failing to give an
opportunity to be heard, and for failing to put the matter to a vote of tlie ratepayors;
13.

An order declaring the 2002 By-laws unlawful and without legal effect for failing to

give notice of its proposed adoption, for failing to give an opportunity to be heard, for failing to put
the matter to a vote of the ratepayors, and for failing to comply with procedural and substantive due
process;
14.

An order finding application of the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act to the

HLID, defining the meaning of "Connection or hookup charges" in Section 67-8203(9)(b), I.C., and
an order finding that the Charges in this matter are not within the meaning of "Connection or hookup
charges" in Section 67-8203(9)(b), I.C., the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act;
15.

For reasoliable attorneys fees and costs incurred in prosecution of this Complaint;

16.

For all such otlier relief as may be available under tlie law which the court deems just and

Vilci~~g
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equitable under the circumstances.
DATED this

a 7day of

,M&L- L-

,2008.

SCOTT ROSE

By:
Attorney for Plaintiffs

VERIFICATION
I, Wendell Olson, hereby verify that I have read the foregoing Complaint and affirm that it
is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
.

-

Viking Construction, Inc.

By:

SUBSWW@,),PND SWORN to before me this
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, 2008, a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of
correct copy of the foregoing Amended Petition was mailed to Defendant, by placing said pleading
in the U.S. Regular Mail postage prepaid addressed to:
Susan Patricia Weeks
Attorney at Law, Owens, James, Vernon & Weeks, PA,
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur dtAlene, ID 83814.
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STATE OF: lLrAHO
OUNT\/ OF KOClTENAI
Scott Rose
Attorney at Law
3 00 Main Street, Suite 153
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 342-2552 Telephone
(208j 342-3669 Fax

scott@,idahoiulaw.corn
i

Idaho State Bar #4197

Plaintiffs' Attorney

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUD1ClA.L DIST.RTCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, Dii AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Viking Construction, Inc.,
an Idaho Corporation,
CASE NO.: CV 04-8889
Plaintiff,

OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Hayden Lake Irrigation District,

an Idaho quasi-municipal

corporation,
Defendants.

Comes now Plaintiff, by and through its attorney of record, Scott Rose, and submits this
Opening Brief in support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.

Introduction
The Hayden Lake Irrigation District (hereinafter, "District") c.harges a tax when a
consumer or user of water for a newly built house.desires access to water. The tax is misnamed
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as a fee interchangeably, for example as a "hookup fee", "tap-on fee", "hook-on fee'", or
'konnection fee" (hereinafter, "Tap-on Fee"). In the Complaint it is referred to as a "Charge."

New users make a capital investment into the general fund for unidentified hture
expansion of che water system. Tap-on Fees are the Board's primary method of obtaining cash
reserves. Tap-on Fees are an end-run around the requirement of elections and ratepayer approval.
Tap-on Fees are void. Tap-on Fee increases are also void. Both Tap-on Fees and their
increases violate Idaho Constitution k-ticle 12, 9 2. They are not created or applied pursuant to
ordinances with due process of notice or opportunity to be heard. Tap-on Fees are not reasonably
related to services provided. Tap-on Fees are not in accord with the contract terms entered
between the District and the United States. Furthermore, Tap-on Fees are not in accord with the
Idaho Development Impact Fee Act, Irrigation District Domestic Water System Revenue Bond
Act, I.C. Title 42, or I.C. Title 43 as the Districts' vehicle to acquire revenue. Tap-on Fees are

-

redly a tar;. As a tax they are void because they me in violation of the Idaho Constitution -4rticlr:

\VI § 3, Article VII $§ 6, 5 and 2, Article XV $9 2 , 4 and 5, Article I 5 14, as well as, Article I 9
10 of the United States Constitution, and the 5"' Amendment through the 14thAmendment.

Plaintiff seelts relief on summary judgment zs a matter of law on its claim Tap-on Fees art:
(1) unconstitutional, (2) violate Idaho and federal statutory law, and (3) breach the contracts
between the District and the United States. Plaintiff further respectfully requests the Court enjoin

the District fiom denying new users in the District access to their water, and enjoh h e District
from collecting Tap-on Fees. Plainti%ffurtherrespectfizlly requew the Court order return of all

the Tap-on Fees Plaintiff paid to the District fiom September 8,2000 forward to the present. I.C.

5 5-224.

Plaintiff also further respectfully requests costs and an award of attorney fees.

Viking Construction, Xnc., v. HLID
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
District predecessor, Interstate Irrigation District, a privately owned Washington
corporation registered as a foreign corporatioil in Idaho on September 15, 1906, and platted the
Hayden Lake Irrigation Tracts on July 29, 1910. District, a quasi-n~unicipalcorporation, was
formed from its predecessor the Interstate Irrigation District in 1914 pursuant to the Carey Act and
Reclamation Act of 1902 and to Idaho law. (Aff. Ex. A, pp. 1-7). According to the Supreme

Court of the United States, in part:
The official reports show that, in 1902, there were in sixteen states and territories
535,486,73 1 acres of public land still held by the government and subject to entry.
A large part of this land was arid, and it was estimated that 35,000,000 acres could
be profitably reclaimed by the construction of irrigation works. The cast, however,
was so stupendous as to make it impossible for the development to be undertaken
by private enterprise; or, if so, only at the added expense of interest and profit
private persons would naturally charge. With a view, therefore, of making these
arid lands available for agricultural purposes by an expenditure of public money, it
was proposed that the proceeds arishg from the sale of all public lands in these
sixteen states and territories should constitute a trust fund to be set aside for use in
the construction of irrigation works,-the cost of each pr0jec.t to be assessed against
the land imgated. and as fast as the money was paid by the owners back into the
trust, it was again to be used for the construction of other works. Thus the fund,
without diminution except for small and negligible sums not properly chargeable to
any'particularproject, would be continually invested and reinvested in the
reclamation of arid land. See H.R. Report No. 1468, 57th Congress, 1st session.
The general outline of this plan was approved by Congress, which, on June 17,
1902 (32 Stat. at L. 389, chap. 1093), passed 'An Act Appropriating the Receipts
from the Sale and Disposal of Public Lands in Certain States and Territories to the
Construction of Irrigation Works for the Reclamation of Arid Lands.'(fnl)
The statute provided that the money arising from the sales of the public lands in
these states and territories was to be known as the reclamation fund,and was to be
used for the purpose of reclaiming arid lands. Provision was made for preliminary
surveys, and when the Secretary determined that a projecr was practicable, he was
authorized to make contracts for its construction, if there were funds avaiIabIe. The
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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land capable of being irrigated was to be open only to homestead entry, and ( 4-6)
the Secretary was then to give notice of the charges which should be made per acre
and the number of instalments, not exceeding ten, in which the charges should be
paid; these charges to be determined with a view of returning to the reclamation
fund the estimated costs of the construction of the project, . . . and all moneys
received from the above sources shall be paid into the reclamation fund. . - .
(Swigartv. Baker, 229 U.S. 187, 33 S.Ct 645 (1913)).
Pursuant to the Reclamation Act (1902) the United States finances the construction of
irrigation projects and works,recovers its costs by means of repayment contracts with (the
landowners through) the inigation district, so that the cost of an irrigation project is assessed

against the property benefitted. (Reclamation,4ct (1902) ModiJication ofAct (IY22), 42 ,3tatf
541.; Reclamation Act as amended (1939)). To facilitate the purpose Congress passed the

Reclamation Extension Act of 1914, which at Section 7 authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
appoint an inigation district as ". . . the fiscal agent of the.United States to collect the annual
payments on the construction charge of the project and the annual charge for operation and
maintenance and all penalties. . . ." 3 8 Stat. 658; 43 U.S.C. 477.
The State of Idaho statutory scheme at Title 43 authorizes creation of an irrigation district
pursuant to the plan contemplated by Congress embodied in the Reclamation Act. State statutory

law controls appropriation and distribution of water to ratepayers. California v. Linised States,
438 U.S. 645,650, 98 D-Ct. 2985,2988 (1978). Thereunder assessments for construction,

maintenance and operation costs are carried on pursuant to coniracts with the Bureau of
Reclamation. Irrigation districts may only exercise the govemmentd function of raising revenue
to defray the expenses of irrigation systems within the imgation district through its ratepayers.

Indian Cove irrigation District v. Prideqam, 25 Idaho 112, 136 P. 6 18 (19 13).

Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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.Initially the District borrowed $150,000 for construction through the Bureau, refinanced
and decreased its geographic footprint in 1933. The District and the IJnited States thereafter
entered into four contract^^ namely the: 1949 Contract, 1957 Contract, 1962 Coiltract, and 1977
Coiltract. Pursuant to the Contracts and statutory schemes the District has the limited power to

annually assess members for distribution and use of water uniformly and apportioned equitably.
(43 US-C.A.

S 461)-

The District first instituted Tap-on Fees in 1947 when the District amended its Bylaws to
provide for Tap-on Fees. As will be addressed below the initial Bylaws did not comply with
statutory requirements and the amendment was in violation of I.C. 9 42-2401. The 1947

Amended Bylaws were adopted without notice, opportunity to be heard, or a vote by the
ratepayers. The Tap-on Fee amount increased marginally with later Bylaw amendments also
without notice, opportunity to be heard, or a vote by the ratepayers. After the water quality and
District-fmancial problems of the 1980's Tap-on Fee increases became more pronounced. (Aff.

Ex. A, pp. 38,40, and 42). The District Tap-on Fee amount escalated exponentially after the
defeat of the unpopular 2001 bond election. (AfY.Ex. A, pp. 43-56). An earlier bond election
also failed. (Aff. Ex. A, pp. 34-37, 105)

The question about the lawfulness of Tap-on Fees came abo~ltbecause the District
increased the amount of the Tap-on Fees by $500 on the evening of September 7,2004,

implementing the increase immediately first thing on the morning of September 8,2004. (Aff.
Ex. A, pp. 138-139). At the time, Plaintiff had 65 homes sold based on the pre-increase Tap-on
Fee amount. The increase cost Plaintiff the additional amount of $32,500 on the 65 pre-sold
homes. The District refused to give Plaintiff 90-to-1SO days time to digest and close on the preViking Construction, Inc, v. HLID
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sold homes at the pre-increase Tap-on Fee amount. Thus Plaintiff filed its Petition for
Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief to resolve the legal questions whether a Tap-on Fee

and/or the Tap-on Fee increase were lawful.
The motivation for the increase was predicated on predictions of fiture requirements for
more wells and infrastructure due to future growth. (Aff. Ex. A, pp. 138 - 140). According to
Cathy Meyer of the McCall & Landwehr accounting firm,the accountant who audits the District,
"[B]eginning in January, 2002, the Board designated that hookup fees (net a charge for meters) be

set aside to fund planned future water system improvements." (Meyer Depo., p. 3 9,l. 23 - p. 41,
1. 17; p. 55,l. 16 - 58,l.l,

Ex 9, p.10, Note ?). The District deposited Tap-on Fee revenue into a

general fund for capital improvements beginning at least by January 1,2002. (Meyer Depo. p. 6,
1.24 - p. 7 , l . 11; p. 41,ll.13-17). ".411 hook up's have been going into the capital improvement

fund for several months" before April 2,2002. (Aff. Ex. A, p. 71). Prior to J m u q I , 2002, at
least for 200 1, District simply put Tap-on Fees collected into its general checking account, which

is also a general fund. (Meyer Depo. p. 42,l. 11-7). The District's Board of Directors
contemblates future capital expenditures be incurred without the help of the Bureau at the
dis~roponionateexpense to new ratepayers. (-MY.EL.A, p. 111).
There was a successful recall drive removing the Chairman of the Board of Directors over
the proposed 200 1 bond financing; and the concept of financing capital improvements with Tap-

on Fees began in earnest. (Aff. Ex. A, pp. 46-47, -80). After die 2001 bond election failed the
Board sought direction on how to raise money for firture improvements without increasing

assessments. Tap-on Fees were increased by $400 in 2001. (Aff. Ex. A, pp. 57). The Board then
unsuccessfuly tried to run the funding as an ordinary and necessary expense. (Aff. Ex.A, pp. 58Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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62). The momentum for using Tap-on Fees increased. (Aff. Ex. A, pp. 63-65((2)).
Like the initial creation of Tap-on Fees the decision to increase the amount was made
unilaterally without an authorizing ordinance. The Board failed to provide notice, oppol-tunity to
be heard, input from its elector-landowning ratepayers, or the ratepayers' approval. The

September 7,2004, domestic Tap-on Fee increased from $2200 per house to $2700 per house.
The commercial Tap-on Fee also increased substantially. Presently the District is believed to
charge $2,75 1 per house domestic Tap-on Fee against appurtenant parcels already in the District
for water access. Simply put the Board is collecting money one way- or another without authority

because it can shake-down lot owners, especially builders, for payment of Tap-on Fees.

C.
Issues
Plaintiff seelss a summary judgment determination that:
(1) District's imposition of Tap-on Fees violates the U.S. Constitution -4iticle I $ 10, the 5th
Amendment through the 14' Amendment, and the 14" Amendment and the Idaho Coilsti~tion;
(2) District's imposition of Tap-on Fees is null and void as an unlawful tax disguised as a fee

without an enabling statute, and imposed non-unifody and non-proportionately;
(3) District's imposition of Tap-on Fees violate procedural due process, substantive due process,
and equal protection;

(4) District does not have federal or state statutory.authorityto impose Tap-on Fees under
irrigation law;
(5) To the extent Tap-on Fees are regulatory in nature the District must comply with the Idaho

Development-ImpactFee Act's (LC.
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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an authorizing ordinance to provide due process prorections of notice and the oppodunity to be
heard;

(6) District's imposition of Tap-on Fees breaches the contracts it entered into with the U.S..4;

(7) District did not establish equitable Bylaws as required by I. C. $9 43-304 and 43-1 901 et seq;
(8) District's impositioil of Tap-on Fees violates the Irrigation District Domestic Water System
Revenue Band Act (I.C. 43- 1901 et seq);

(9) District must generate its revenue fiom ratepayers ratably and proportioilazely to h d capital

projecrs; and

(10) District's imposition of Tap-on Fees and its increases are not permissible under law.

Introduction.

Irrigation district law requires equal treatment to every land-owning ratepayer. The
imposition of Tap-on Fees treats different land owners disparately. The imposition of Tap-on
Fees penalizes Viking Construction, Inc., directly and singularly, causing irreparable harm.
District's Tap-on Fee and its increase unlawfully places disproportionate burdens on new users.

New users are paying all the costs of improving the water facilities for the benefit to all the
ratepayers within the District. "The irrigation system is a unit, to be, and intended to be, operated
and maintained by the use of a common fund,to which all the lands under the system are required
to contribute ratably, without regard to benefits specifically and directly received from each derail
to which the fund is from time to time devoted." Nampa & zkieridiun Irr. Dist. v. Bond, 268 U. S.
Vildng Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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2.

Tap-on Fees Violate The Constitution of the State of Idaho, Article VIII. 6 3.
The Constitution of the State of Idaho, Aticle VIII,

5 3 bars irrigation districts from

incurring an indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for any purpose, without elector approval
for a proposed expenditure exceeding the income and revenue in the year in which the irrigation
district incurs the indebtedness or liability other than for ordinary and necessary expenses.
Because the money is being collected for future capital improvement projects the District vrolates
-4rticle VIII, § 3. The statutory scheme for financing capital improvement projects in I.C., Title

43, Chapters 4, 7, and 19 is consistent with the requirement for voter approval in Article VIIL, $ 3.
Tap-on Fees are not consistent with Article VIII, 9 3.
Article VIII, $ 3, was designed primarily to protect taxpayers and citizens of political
subdivisions. Feil v. City of Coeur d!Aiene, 23 Idaho 32,49-50,129 P . 643,648-49 (1912). "They

are the ones who would bear the consequences of the subdivision incurring excessive
indebtedness. In order to do so, the framers of our Constitution granted the qualified electors of

the politicd subdivision the constitutional right to vote upon whether the subdivision could incur
indebtedness or liabilities exceeding its income and revenue for the year. It cannot do so 'without

the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof voting at an election to be held for hat
purpose.' " Koch v. Canyon CounQ, 177 P.3d 372, IDSCCI 33707 - 012508 (ID.2008).
The District violates Arricle VLII,

9 3 in more than one way.

First, the District is

committing its resources into the future. The commitment of financial resources has been for
more than one year, and presumably it will be for more than one year from the present. Second,
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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the commitment is to finance the liability regarding future capital improvements. Third, the
financing of future capital improvements necessarily contemplates a plan incurring liability.

Fourth, financing future capital improvemenis with Tap-on Fees will unavoidably impact future
assessment rates and assessments. miles v. Idaho Power Co.,116 Idaho 635,778 P.2d 757
(1989).
"Broadly speaking, Article VIII, § 3 imposes two requirements to be met by Iocd

governments before incurring indebtedness. The first requirement is a public election securinz
two-thirds of the vote, and the second is the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the debt
within thirty years." (Cityof Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 13 7 P.3d 3 88 ((2006)). Because the
District does not want to collect mnual tax sufficient to pay a debt nec.essary to financecapital
improvement projects it is avoiding public election aItogether through Tap-on Fees. The tas
relates to indebtedness and liability exceeding the income and revenue in the year of the tax
without elector approval. The Tap-on Fee violates ID. Const. Art. VIII, Q' 3.

3.
e 12.

Inigation districts have limited authority to regulate pursuant to their police powers for
"the collection of revenue incidental to the enforcement of that regulation." Idaho Building
~ontracrors~ssociariakv. City ofCoeur d'AIene,126 Idaho 740,890 P.2d 326 (1 995); Id. Const.,

Art. 12, 5 2. The Idaho legislature granted the District police power authority pursuant to LC. $4
42-101, 42-220, 42-4201 and 42-3212 to adopt an ordinance concerning the health, s d e t y and
welfare of its ratepayers. Potts Con.srructinn Company v. Norrh Kootenai Water District, 141

Idaho 678 116 P.3d 8 (2005). Passage of an ordinance requires and ensures protection of due
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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process, such as hearing(s), notice(s), and opportunities to be heard, as well as, protection from
the arbirrary and capricious nature of how the District sets Tap-on Fee amounts.
Furthermore the District did not comply with the Development Impact Fee Act at, I.C.

$5

67-8201 et seq. The Development Impact Fee Act sets out the due process prorecrions the
District ignored. The Development Impact Fee Act requires governmental entities to meet a
number of conditions before imposing impact fees for planning and financing public facilities
needed to serve new growth. I.C.

$5

67-8202,67- 8204. For starters under the Development

Impact Fee Act the District needed a plan, and must provide notice and the opportunity to be

heard.
There is no dispute in facts the District has not adopted an ordinance allowing for Tap-on

Fees. Therefore the Tap-on Fees can not in h e first instance be viewed as a regulatory fee within
the District's police powers. The collection of Tap-on Fees violates the Idaho Constitution,
Article 12, 5 2.
4.

The Tawon Fee is Not a R e g u l a t o r v .

As stated above, the District did not attempt to pass an authorizing ordinance making
regulations concerning Tap-on Fees fkom which to collect a fee. Without passage of an ordinance,

the Tap-on Fee on its face is not a regulatory fee, but is therefore by default, and in fact, a tax.
Even still Tap-on Fees are not a regulatory fee, because they do not function like a real fee.
Tap-on Fees covers no actual costs involved in the physical application of water. The
District's Bylaws require the landowner (builder) to pay the District for parts and labor (meters,
administration and installation). (Bylaw, Article 8). The District's Bylaws require that the
Viking Canstruction, Inc., v. HLID
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landowner (builder) pay- the costs far transporting water from the point of delivery to the point of
application. (Bylaw, Article 5). Charging the landowner (builder) thereafter for parts and labor
(meters, administration and installation) and transportation of water through Tap-on Fees burdens

the landowner (builder) twice. The District bears no actual costs involved in the physical
application of water, and the District passed no regulation for Tap-on Fees to related to regarding

the physical application of water. Therefore the Tap-on Fees do not relate to the cost of
enforcement of a regulation.

The "meter ser" is paid by the developer. (Aff. Ex. A, pp. 72, 84, 87, 109). The actual
connection to the meter is carried out by the landowner (builder). The District requires developers
to construct the infrastructure, parts and labor wirhin the District to service the residential lots

located in a new development. Thereafter a developer transfsrs the water systcm infrastructure
builtto theDistrict. (Meyer Depo.,p. 45,1.11 - p . 48,l.21;Ex. 12,13, and 14, EX.9, note 10;

Aff. Ex. B).
Since all the direct costs involved in 'konnecting" are paid by others, the Tap-on Fee is
merely a revenue generating tax and not a regulatory fee. Furthermore there is no rational relation

between the Tap-on Fee amount and any reasonable or actuaI costs to District. A regulatoiy fee

must reasonably relate to the cost of the underlying regulation and a tax requires an enabling
statute. City v. Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 899 P.2d 41 1 (1 995). Tap-on Fees
are a forced contribution upon select ratepayers to serve public needs at large.

Its worth noting the District expended $372;401 for additional fixed assets in 2004.
(Meyer Depo., p. 59,ll.3-22; Ex. 16). Almost half of that amount was paid for just with the Tapon Fees Plaintiff paid relative to the 65 homes ($175,500) immediately impacted by the overnight
Vilung Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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increase in September 2004. Besides banking Tap-on Fees for new capital assets (more wells) in
the future, District also expends those revenues currently for improvements and additions lo tlie
existing system, such as the sohvare for remote monitoriilg of wells and pumps (SCADA system)

costing over $200,000. (Meyer Depo., p. 48,l. 22 - p. 50,l. 5; p. 52,l. 1 8 - p. 54,l. 22; Ex.9, note
7, Ex. 11).

In State v,Nelson, the Supreme Court explained the difference between a fee m d a tax, in
part, as follows:
A license that is imposed for revenue is not a police regulation, but
a tax, and can. only be upheld under the power of taxation. (Kansas
City v. Corrigan; 1 8 Mo. App. 206.) A city or village cannot, in the

exercise of its police power, levy taxes. (Mankato v. FowIer, 32
Minn. 364,20 N.W. 361; Pitts v. Vicksburg, 72 Miss. 181, 16 So.
4 18; 3 blcQuillin on-Municipal Corporations, sec. 99 1.)
One of the distinctions between a lawful tax for regulatory purposes
and one solely for revenue is: If it be imposed for regulation, under
the authority of sec. 2, art. 12, of the constitution, the license fee
demanded must bear some reasonable relation to the cost of such
re,@arion; but if it is imposed under the general taxing power and
can be lawfully maintained under such taxing power granted by the
organic law, then the amount of such tax that can be imposed upon
the citizens or business rests wholly within the discretionary power
of the taxing authority.
State v. Nelson, 36 1dah.o 713, 2 13 P.

358 (1923).

Potts Const. Co. v. North Kootenai Water Dist., the Idaho Supreme Court further
explained, as follows:
GencraIly police powers consist of government conduct that has
"for its object the public health, safety, morality or welfare." 6A
Eugene McQuillin, The Law of blunicipal Corporations, Police
Powers $ 24.28 (3d ed. 1997). A municipaliry may collect fees
considered incidental to regulation and enacted pursuant to the
municipality's police powers. Idaho Const. art. 12 § 2; Idaho Bldg.
Viking Construction, Inc., v. m D
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Contractors Ass'n v. City of Coew d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 742-43,
890 P.2d 326,323-29 (1995) (citations omitted). Such municipal
fees must be rationally related to the cost of enforcing the .reguiarion
and cannot be assessed purely as a revenue-generating scheme.
Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 504, 768 P.2d 765,
767 (1988). Brewster distinguished between a fee enacted ~lndera
municipal's police power authority and one vvhich operates as
general tax on the public. Id. at 505, 768 P.2d at 768. A municipal
corporation's taxes on the general public require specific legislative
authorization. Id.; but see Kootenai County Prop. Ass'n v. ICootenai
County, 115 Idaho 676, 680, 769 P.2d 553, 557 (1989). According
to Brewster, "a fee is a charge for a direct public service rendered to
the particular consumer, while a tax is forced colltribution by the
public at large to meet public needs."

In addition to having a regulatory purpose, a municipal fee must be
reasonably and rationally related to the regulatory purpose. Sanchez
v. City of Cddwell, 135 Idaho 465,468,20 P.3d 1 , 4 (2001)
(citation omitted). The burden falls on the party challenging the
validity of a police power to show that it is either in conflict with
the generd laws of the state, unreasonable or arbitrary. Plumrner v.
City of Fruitland, 139 Idaho 8 10,813, 87 P.3d 297,300 (2004).
Whether or not an ordinance is unreasonable or arbitrary is a
question of law. Sanchez, 135 Idaho at 468, 20 P.3d I (citing
Lewiston Pistol Club, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Nez Perce
County, 96 Idaho 137, 525 P.2d 332 (1974)). Generally courts are
not concerned with the wisdom of ordinances and will uphold a
municipal ordinance unless it is clearly unreasonable or arbitrary.
Id.; State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365,373, 399 P.2d 955, 959 (1965).

Potts Const. Co. v. North Kootenai Water Dist., I4l'Idaho 678, 116 P.3d 8 (2005)
In Brewster v. City of Pocatello, the Idaho Supreme Court held, "[A] fee is a charge for a
direct public service rendered to the particular consumer, while a tax is a forced contribution by
the public at large to meet public needs." Idaho Building Contractors Association v. City of

Coeur d 't4lene, 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995). "It is only reasonable and fair to require the
business, traffic, act, or thing that necessitates policing to pay this expense. To do so has been
unifomiy upheld by the courts. On the other hand, this power may not be resorted to as a shield
Viliing Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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or subterfuge, under which to enact and enforce a revenue-raising ordinance or stature." Brew~ster
v. City ofPocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 504, 768 P.2d 765 (1985). ". . . [Tlaxes serve the purpose of

providing fbnding for public services at large, whereas a fee serves the purpose of covering the
cost of the .particular service provided by the state to the individual." Idaho Building Contractors

Association v. City of Coeur dJAIene,126Idaho 740,890 P.2d 326 (1995), citing AZpert v Boise
FPater Corp., 118 Idaho 136,795 P.2d 298 (1990),
The t e s t of whether Tap-on Fees is a regulation or a tax may be firrther gleaned from the

test set-out in Loomis v. City o f Bailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (199 1). According to the
Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho Building Covttractors Association v. City o f C o e u ~d'-4lene, "In

Loomis v. City of Hniley, we articulated a two-part test in determining the propriety of city action.
'First, we must determine whether the connection fee constitutes an impermissible tax. Secondly,

we must determine whether the connection fee is appropriately and reasonably assessed. ' Id. at
437.807 P.2d at 1275. Under the fust step of the analysis, we consider whether, on its face, the
impact fee is a tax or a reguIation.

Ifit at least appears to be a regulation, tve then reach the

question of whether or not it is reasonably related to the regulared activity. If it is not reasonably
related to the regulation, then it is purely a revenue raising assessment, and once again is not
permissible without a specific legislative enactment." Idaho Building Contractor... Association v.
City of Coeur dt4lene,126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995).
Tap-on Fees are not incidental to a regulation, are not rationally related to the cost of
enforcing a re,dation, a e assessed purely as a revenue-generating scheme, and are not a charge
for a direct public service rendered to file particulm new house ratepayer. A statute, which

actually imposes a tax in the guise of a fee is constitutional. C h a p a n v. Ada County, 48 Idaho
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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632,284 P. 259 (1930).

Tap-on Fee revenue is placed into the General Fund to be expended on capital
improvements both inside and outside of the development in which the new house is located, on
non-capital improvements, and not for use solely in the area where the land under the new house
being assessed the fees is being constructed. Tap-on Fees are commingled with assessment

revenue and other revenue such as from maintenance and operation fees. Commingled (Tap-on
Fee) monies have been spent on general purposes of the District. There is nothing which in any

way limits the use of the revenue from Tap-on Fees. (Meyer Depo. p. 42,1.8 - p.43,l.13, Ex.
1.2,13, and 14; p. 61,1.18

- p.68, 1.8; and p.70,l.

20 - p. 71,l. 7).

The revenue is not dedicated to repair, rspiace, or maintain, the water system components,
nor is dedicated for operations. The revenue is without geographic limitation as to where the new
capital assets will be employed. The revenue is certainly nor spent on the newly constructed

house. Tap-on Fees are charged in addition to parts and labor (meters, administration and
installation) and transportation of water. (Uylmis, Article 5 and 8). Not only do Tap-on Fees not
cover the costs associated with connecting, they are charged for the benefit of the ratepayers at
large. The Tap-on Fees are spent like tax revenue is spent, and not spent reasonably related to any
regulated acbvity in the application of water to a new home.
Even if Tap-on Fees were deemed to be a regulatory fee, the Tap-on Fee still fails because
the amount is not appropriately and reasonably assessed. The District simply pulled the Tap-on

Fee amounr out of thin air, arbitrarily. Instead of simply pulling a number out of thin air, a
formula to determine the proportionate share of each lot based on real costs of system additions
and improvements is required to perfect a fee. A formula calculated with the help of professionals
Viking Construction, Xnc., v. HLfD
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logicdly justifies and targets an amount to assess, so that the fee reasonably relates to the service
demands and needs of the project.

A real "fee" charged must relate to the value of the service rendered. The District's Tapon Fee charge does not relate to the value of service rendered at all. No actual service is provided
by District reIated to the Tap-on Fee. No calculations were made by the engineers or accountants

for the district, or by the district directly relating the fee to the value of a service. There is no
value of service. On its face the Tap-on Fee is a revenue measure rather that a I-egulato'q-fee.
Fosters, h c . , v. Boise City,63 Idaho 201, 118 P.2d 721 (1941). The Tap-on fee is not a
regulatory fee, it is a tax.
According to the Board of Directors' minutes and the District's CP,4, the reason for the
so-called fee is because "[Tlhe District is growing due to development and the need for more
wells and infrastructure is going to be necessary sooner than later."; (Minures 9-7-04; Meyer

Depo., p. 39,l. 23 - p. 41,1.17; Ex 9, p.10, Note 7). The purpose of Tap-on Fees (revenue for

capital asset improvement) is on its face not a regulatory fee, but is a tax. Though the benefits me
district-wide, the costs are shifted to new home buyers only. The so called, "fee" revenue is not
collected to pay for the individual service associateci with a new house, but is for the public at

large. Idaho Building Contractors Association v. Ciry of Coeur d 'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 890 P .2d

326 (1995). A fee that is not regulatory but is imposed for revenue purposes is really a tax, even if
it is called a fee. McQuillen, Municipal Corporations. Since it is imposing Tap-on Fees primarily
for revenue raising purposes, Tap-on Fees are a tax and can only be upheld under the power of
taxation. State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 713,213 P. 358 (1923).
//
Viking Construction, 'Inc., v. H.LJ~D
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T~D-on
Fees Violate The Constitution of the State of Idaho, A.rticle VII, 6 6 .
With specific legislative authority, a quasi-municipality can impose taxes. The

Constitution of the State of Idaho, Article VII, $ 6, permits assessment-and collection of taxes
limited ro the taxing pow-er granted by the legislature. "I-Iowever, that taxing authority is not serfexecuting and is limited to that taxing power given to the municipality by the legislature." Idaho
Building Contractors Association v. City of Coeur d:4lene, 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995),

citing Brewsrer v. City of Pocafello, 1 15 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988). Taxing requires an
enabling statute. There is no enabling statute for Tap-on Fees.
The federal and state statutes read as a whole appear to prohibit rather than allow a slush

f i n d for unidentified expenditures for unidentified municipal projects. Rather, irrigation districts,
as quasi-municipal corporations may only assess annual charges against the land within its

boundaries for capital improvement projects. Taxing is limited to either general assessments, or
to paying back the principal and interest on indebtedness incurred by borrowing money from the
federal Reclamation Fund, borrowing money from a lending institution, and/or through the

issuance of bonds.' I.C., $$43-304, -401, -1901 eq set.

Through Tap-on Fees the District Board is requiring newly tapped-in users to shoulder the
burden of future construction of unidentified public capital improvement water projects, even
though the land has paid pro-rata assessments since the District's inception. There is no doubt the
1

Arguably the legislative tax authority may also be found in the Development Impact Fee Act
(I.C. Title 67, Chap. 82), contingent on the municipality meeting due-processrequirements. District
made no effort to meet the demands of the Development Impact Fee Act or due process, and having
failed to meet the contingencies no authority to tax is granted to District pursuant to the
Development Impact Fee Act.
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLU)
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District faced unprecedented growth and fiscal problems in paying for future anticipated
improvements and water supply. Nonetheless, the fiscal concerns do not allow the District to
circumvent the law on municipal financing and taxation.
"The fact that additional services are made necessary by growth and development does not
change the essential nature of the services provided: they are for the public at large." Idaho

Building Cuntpactors Association v. City of Coeur dJAlene,126 Idaho 740, 744, 890 P.2d 326
(1995). The statutes require the ratepayers to approve through elections an increase in obligations.

The District skirts around elector approval. The District is attempting to utilize so-called Tap-on
Fees instead of holding electiuns.

The irrigation district statutory law regarding financing project construction is consistent

with taxing all the ratepayers in accordance with the enabling statutes. LC,,

43-304, -401. A

board of directors of an irrigation district is required to determine the aggregate a m o m necessary

to be raised for all purposes connected with the maintaining and operating of the works of the
irrigation district. The costs should be financed through annually set assessment rates against the

land for repayment based on appoi.tionment, as 'Yhe right to the use of water acquired under the
provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the
basis, measure, and limit of the right." (43 U.S.C. 9 372; I.C. 543-1 823). Tne water delivered is

to be paid for pursuant to the annually set assessmenr rate and proportionably. I.C. Title 43,
Chapter 7.
I.C.,

5 43-401 requires a general project plan be formulated delineating and explaining

proposed construction, costs, and how m irrigation district proposes to raise the funds for carrying

out the plan. The matter must be put to a special election of the ratepayers for approval after
Vilring Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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proper notice. Reconstruction, rehabilitation or replacement of structures and worlcs also require a
special election of the ratepayers for approval after proper notice pursuant to LC.,$, 43-401A.

I.C.,

3 43-329 requires proposed project improvements be adopted by the board with a resolution

calling for an election by the ratepayers for the purpose of submitting the question as to whether

or not the proposed improvement shall be constructed, and thereafter the board must submit the
matter to the electors, after proper notice.
Pursuant to I.C., Section 43-321,

[Tjhe board of directors may call st special election and submit to
the qualified electors of the district the question whether or nor a
special assessment shall be levied for the purpose of raising money
to be applied to any of the purposes provided in this title, and shall,
at the same time, fa a date upon wbicl~such assessment shall
become delinquent, which date shall be not less than sixty (60) days
nor more than ninety (90) days from the date of said meeting of said
board. Such election must be called upon the notice prescribed, and
the same sliall be held, and the result thereof determined and
declared, in all respects in conformity with the-provisions of section
43-401, [ Idaho Code]. The notice must specif.4.the amount of
money proposed to be raised, and the purpose for which it is
intended to be used. At such elections the ballors shall contain the
words "Assessment .... yes" or "Assessment .... no." if two[-]thirds
(2/3) or more of the votes cast are "Assessment ....yes," the board
shall immediately levy an assessment sufficient to raise the amount
voted.
Only after the ratepayers decide in favor of capital project funding is the board statutorily enabled
to levy an assessment contingent upon a Court's approval. I.C., Section 43-704. The District's
Board did not call a special election, provide notice, or submit the question whether or not a
special assessment sshall be levied to the qualified electors of the district. I.C., Section, 43-32 1, 329, -401, -401A.

In the present manner the Board of Directors has neither identified, nor developed a
Vilang Construction, Ins, v. HLlD
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general plan for a capital improvement project. I.C., Section 43-304, -401. The Board of
Directors has not deterniined the amount of money it intends to spend or borrow for the unknown
project. The District's Board of Directors are preventing its ratepayers fiom controlling its affairs
ignoring the constitutional and statutory requirements for levying a tax assessment. lFvi2nzpa V.

Nampu and Meridian Irrigation District, 19 Idaho 779, 115 P. 979 (19 15). The Board is charging
new ratepayers a tax without m enabling statute.
There is no specific legislative enactment which specifically permits, or statutory authority

granting taxing power for collection of Tap-on Fees to financefuture construction of future public
capital improvement projects out of concern for future expansion. State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 713,

213 P.358 (1923); Idaho Burlding Contractors Association v. City of Coeur dlAlene, 126 Idaho

740,890 P.2d 326 (1995), citing Kootenai County Proper@ Ass'n v. Kootenai County, 115 Idaho
676,769 P.2 553 (1989). Since the Tap-on Fee charged is not expressly authorized by the

legslatwe holding otherwise would violate Article II,5 6 of the Idaho Constitution and render the
express statutory finance language within the irrigation district statutes meaningless. (Sun Valley
Co. v. City ofSun Valley, 109 Idaho 424, 427,708 P.2d 147, 150 ((1985)).

- 6.

'

Tap-on Fees Violate The constitution of the State of Idaho. Article VII. 65 and 6 2.
The Idaho Constitution Article VII,

8 5 requires uniform taxation, "[AJlItaxes shall be

uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits, of the authority lelying the
tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws, which shall prescribe such regulations as
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real and personal. . . ." "What can not be

done directly because of constitutional limitations cannot be accomplished indirectly." 0 'Bryant
Vilzillg Construction, Inc., V. HLID
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v. The City ofIdaho Fulls, 78 Idaho 3 13, 303 P.2d 672 (1956). Only new consumers of water are

charged Tap-on Fees. Prior users are not required to make a capital investment into the general

fund for unidentified future expansion of the water system. Tap-on Fees-larza w not uniformly
levied and can not stand.

The Idaho Constitution Article VII, Section 2 requires proportional -taxing," . . . every
person or corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its propem , . . ."
Only new users are charged a Tap-on Fee. Other users in the District are not proportionately

paying a Tap-on Fee tax for capital investment into the general fund for unidentified future

expansion of the water system in proportion to the value of his, her, or its property. The tax not
proportionately levied and therefore it cannot stand.
Consistent with the constitutional requirements of uniform and proportionate taxes, the

Idaho Supreme Coun heid, "[Alfter an irrigation district's works have been completed, as in this
case, the cost of the maintenance and operation, whether collected by means of assessments or

tolls: 'shall be spread upon all the lands of the district and shall be proportionate to the benefits
.receivedby such lands growing out of the maintenance and operations of the said worlcs of said
district.' " Gedney v. Snake River lwigation DisPici, 61 Idaho 605, 104 P.2d 909 (1940), citing
I.C. $$42-701,42-905, and 43-1901 et seq.

The Idaho Supreme Coun explained in Little v. Nampa-Meridian lirigation Dislrict, the
benefits and costs must be apportioned at the same rate as other users where the water needed and
made available is the same, in part as follows:
Idaho Code, $9 43-1812,43-1817,43-1821,43-1822,43-1823 and
43-1 824 provide the method and basis for assessment of operation
and maintenance where the irrigation district has a contract with the
Viking Construction, Inc., v- HLD
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Bureau of Reclamation.
It was the intention of the Legislature that the lands o f an irrigation
district should be considered as a whole and such lands must be
assessed for the maintenance and operation of the warer system at
the same rate where the benefits, that is the water needed and
received, are the same. Colburn v. Wilson, 24 Idaho 94, 132 F. 579.
The Legislature in enacting irrigation district laws intended that
lands irrigable by means of the system within a district should be
considered as a whole, and each tract should be chargeable for
maintenance and operation at the same rate as other tracts are
chargeable where water needed and made available in each case is
the same. Gedney v. Snake River Irrigation District, 6 1 Idaho 605,
104 P.2d 909.

Where the benefits are uniform the assessment must be uniform and
in this connection the amoilnt of water delivered is the benefit.
Thus, where the amount of delivery of the water is uniform, the
assessment must be uniform. Gedney v. Snake River Irr. Dist., 61
Idaho 605,104 P.2d 909; Brown v. Shupe, 40 Idaho 252,233 P. 59.
Little v. ATampa-MeridianIrrigation District, 82 Idaho 167, 3 50 P .2d 740 (1960).

Taxes can only be imposed ratably and proportionately. Tap-an Fees are not ratably and
proportionately set. Tap-on Fees cannot therefore be sustained as a tax. Tap-on Fees violate
Idaho Constitution Article VII,

5 5 5 and 2 respectively.

TIlerefore Tap-on Fees are void.

Tau-on Fees Violate The Constitution of thebStateof Idaho. Article XV. 6 2.4 4. and 8 5.

Tap-on Fees interfere with landowners' appurtenant water rights. The water rights are
with the land, and the land is essentially all the real property located within the District's

boundaries. The landowner ratepayer can not be denied their share of the appurtenant water
rights. The United States Supreme Court held in part, "[alppropriation was made not for the use
of the government, but, under the Reclamation Act, for the use of the landowners. . . and the water
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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rights became the property of the landowners." Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 95,57 S . C t 412, 41641 7. The Idaho Supreme Court held, ''(T'Jhere is a stamtory duty to furnish water under the Carey

Act, and upon the payment of the rentals and tolls for the operation and maintenance of the system
for the irrigating season of 1916, it is the duty of the company to furnish the water." Adams v.

Twin Falls- Oakley Land & Wurer Co.,29 Idaho 357, 16 1 P. 322 ((19 16)), citing Mandell v. San

Diego etc. Co., 89 Fed 295; San Diego etc. Co. v. Sharp, 97 Fed. 394, 38 C.C.A. 220). Tap-on
Fees interfere with landowners' appurtenant water rights by depriving access to water unless a
Tap-on Fee is paid.
''[Vhe right to collect rates or compensation for the use of water supplied to any county,
city, or town, or water district, or the inhabitants thereof, is a franchise, and can not be exercised

excepr by authority of and in the manner prescribed by law." (Const. Idaho, Article XV, $2). The
new potential user is deprived.his, her or its franchise interest in water unless a Tap-on Fee is
paid.
"Whenever any waters have been . . . appropriated

. . , distribution shall be deemed an

exclusive dedication to such use; and whenever such waters so dedicated shall have once been . . .
distributed to any person who has settled upon . . . or improved land for agricultural purposes with
the view- of receiving the benefit of such water under such dedication, such person, his heirs,
executors, administrators, successors, or assigns, shall not thereafter, without his consent, be
deprived of the annual use of the same, when needed for domestic purposes. . . upon payment
therefor, and compliance with such equitable terms and conditions as to the quantity used and
times of use, as may be prescribed by law." (Const. Idaho, Article XV,

4 4). ". . . the right to

continue the use of any such water shall never be denied or prevented from any other cause than
Viking Construction, Inc.,

V.
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the failure on the part of the user thereof to pay the ordinary charges or msessments which may be
made to cover the expenses for the delivery of such water." I.C.

5 9 42- 1.0 1,42-220, 42-914.

Tap-on Fees neither cover the expenses for delivery of water, nor are Tap-on Fees ordinary
and assessments. The Tap-on Fee tau is exacted even though the user did not fail to pay

the ordinary charges or assessments covering the expenses for the'delivery of water.

The Idaho Constitution, Article XV, $5 provides that priority in time shall give superiority
of right to the use of water. Regarding priority the use of the water is by the land within the
District's boundaries, and not the individual lot or the individual. Thus under Idaho Constitution,

Article XV, $5 each user within the Dislict boundaries is on equal priority. Therefore denying
water to new users on lands already within the District's boundaries water except upon payment

of a Tap-on Fee denies that new user's priority position.
Subdivision 01the land into smaller parcels may impact the annually set assessment rates

assessed against the land paid by the ratepayers. But the right to coiltinue the use of w-ater shall

not be denied or prevented. "The Reclamation Act provides that 'the righ~to the use of water
acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be app~~rtenant
to the land irrigated, and beneficial

use shall be the basis, measure, and limit of the right. 43 U.S .C. 5 372." United States v. Pioneer
Irr. Disr., 144 Idaho 106, 157 P.3d 600 (ldaho 2007). "Irrigation districts act as trustees for the

landowners managing the water right, and staading in place of the landowners in cases involving
the appropriation of the water. I.C.

8 43-3 16 ("title to all property ... shall be held by such district

in trust 'for... the uses and purposes set forth in

~title.")

Further, I.C. 5 43 - 1829 provides that

the districts hold the water rights in trust for the landowners." Id.
The District holds its water rights in trust for the landowners and their assigns within its
Viking Construction, Inc, v. HLXD
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boui~dariesbecause the right to the use of water is appurtenant to the land irrigated. Beneficial

use of the water applied to the land lying within the District creared the water right in the first
place. 43 U.S.C.

8 372; LC. 5 43- 1829.

Subdividing the land into smaller parcels does not

remove the appurtenant relationship already existing between the water use and the land.
Subdividing the land into smaller parcels neither defeats constitutional nor statutory pre-existing
tvater righrs. ID. Const. Art. I, 9 14 and LC. 4 542-219(5); Bennett v. Twin Falls, etc., Co., 27
Idaho 643, 150 P. 33 6 ; Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist.v. Briggs, 27 Idahv 84, 147 P . 7 5 ; Knowles v,
Nerv Sweden Irr. Disl., 16 Idaho 2 17, 10 1 P. 8 1 ;~Werchant'sNat. Bank of Sun Diego v. Escondido

Irr. Dist.,144 Cal. 329, 77 P. 937.
"Under the constitution and laws of the state and the decisions of this court, after the
water has once become appurtenant to a certain tract of land, the land and water cannot be
separated to the injury of any other person or unless consented to by the owner of the land."

(Adams v. Twin Falls-Oakley Land &I Water Co.,29 Idaho 3 57, 161 P. 322 (( 1916 ) ) , citing Hard

v Boise City Irrigation & Land Co., 9 Idaho 589.76 Pac. 33 1, 65 L.R.A. 407). Each new
consumer or user (and future ratepayer) in the District is entitled to water for being geographically

located within the District's boundaries. The lot prior to subdivision already benefitted and
already paid assessments since the beginning of the District's existence. Tap-on Fees interfere

with pre-existing property right to water of the new ratepayer in violation of Idaho Co~lstitution,

Article XV,4 2,s 4, and 8 5 for collecting compensation from landowners for the opportunity to
access water appurtenant to their land to which they share priority with prior users.

Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLW
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Tapon Fees and Increases Violate Constitutional Rights to Due Process and Equal Protectio~

(a). Procedural Due Process Violations.
The Board amended the District's Bylaws on August 19, 1947, while retaining the ability
to alter, amend or repea3 the Amended Bylaws. Tap-on Fees were created and adopted in the

1947 Amended Bylaws. (Aff. Ex. A, pp. 14-2 1). Unilateral imposition of the Tap-on Fee is
found in $11 of the 1947 Amended Bylaws. Section 11 is in part, as follows: "If a tract is divided

and additional taps or openings are desired for more than one service on the tract as originally
platted the persons desiring such opening shall pay to the district the sum of $10 for each opening

or tap to, the domestic water system."
The District 1947 minutes do not recite notice or opportunity to be heard was provided to
the ratepayers before adopting the Amended Bylaws which were amended to include adoption of
Tap-on Fees. The District minutes do recite the Board authorized printing of 250 copies of the
Amended Bylaws after the adoption of the ~ m c n d e dBylaws imposing Top-on Fees. No other
documentation showing notice and hearing accorded to District ratepayers. Subsequent Tap-on
Fee increases recorded in later Amended Bylaws (1969 and 1,978)were also adopted without

notice or the opportui~ityto be heard. (AE Ex,A, pp. 22-33).
The Board adopted the present Amended Bylasvs on May 7,2002, without complying with

I. C. 42-2401. Article 8 of the 2002 Amended Bylaws requires new users to pay a

". . . tap-on

fee for each connection to the water system plus parts and labor." (Aff. Ex. A, p.76). Aaicle 9
concerning only "Industrial/Comrnericd Rates" of new business establishments states that meters

are included in cost of hook-on; and for the fee amount to "Call the Office for Details." (Aff. Ex.
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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A, pp. 76-77). Thus the Board removed the commercial fee amount to an administrative function
from being a Bylaw item. The Board administratively set domestic Tap-on Fees at a regularly

scheduled September 7,2004 meeting without amending the Bylaws again. The September 7 ;
2004 increase in Tap-on Fees giving rise to this action were simply passed soIely as an act of the
Board administrativeIy as opposed to being raised with amendment to the Bylaws. (Aff. Ex. 4:

pp.138-139).
The 2004 domestic water Tap-on Fee increase was a spur of the moment decision by the
Board of Directors made with passion and prejudice without notice or ratepayer input. The

increase was implemented irhmediately, the next day. (Aff.Ex. A, p. 138-1 40). The immediate
implementation violated procedural due process.
The Due Process clause prevents the deprivation of a property interest without appropriate

procedural protection by requiring notice and an opportlmity to be heard. According to the

.

Fourteenth Amendment, inpiirt: ". . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." "The right to enjoy property without ~mlawfuldeprivation is a "personal"

right which has long been recognized. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538,552, 92

S.Ct. 1113, 1121,3 1 L.Ed.2d 424 (1 972). Both notice and a hearing are required under the
Fourteenth -4mendment before such a deprivation of an individual's property takes place. Fuentes
11. Shevin,

407 U.S. 67, 81-82,92 S.Ct 1983, 1994-95,32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). The purpose of

these requirements is not

only 'to ensure abstract fair play to the individual' but to also protect the

individual's use and possession of p r o p e e from arbitrary encroachment. Id.at 81, 92 S.Ct.at

1994." Duhr v. ~Vknzpa& Meridian Irr: Disr., 128 Idaho 3 19, 912 P.2d 667 (Gt.App.1996).
Vilung Construction, Xnc., v. HLU)
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"Procedural due process requires that 'there must be some process to ensure that the
individual is not arbitrarily deprived ofhis rights in violation of the state 01- federal constitutions.

This requirement is met when the defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be
heard.' Sfate v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 72, 822 P.2d 960, 969 (1991) (citing Mullane v. Central

Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,313,70 S.Ct 652, 656,94 L.Ed. 865, 872 (1950);
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1 190, 14 L.Ed.2d 62,65 (1 96.5)). The
opportunity to be heard must occur 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningfid manner' in order to
satisfy the due process requirement. Castanedcz v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 927, 950 P.2d

1262, 1266 (1998) (quoting Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 573, 798 P.2d 27, 32 (1990)). Due
process 'is not a concept to be applied rigidly in every matter. Rather, it 'is a flexible concept

calling for such procedural protections as are warranted by the particular situation.' " Cifyof
Boise v. Industrial Comm 'n,129 Idaho 906, 9 10,935 P.2d 169, 173 (1 997) (quoting In I-e Wilmvr,
128 Idaho 161, 167,911 P.2d 754,760 (1996)). Aberdeen-Springf7eld Canal Co. v. Peiper,133

Idaho S2,91, 982 P.2d 917,926 (1999) "An essential principle of due process is notice of the
issues to be considered and the opportunity for an appropriate hearing before being deprived of a
significant property interest.". Haho State Bar v. Everard, 142 Idaho 109,115, 124 P.3d 985
(2005), citing Cleveland Bci

O J C .v.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,105 S;Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d

494 (1985).

The District arbitrarily deprived Plaintiff of its constitutional rights failing to provide
procedural safeguards of notice and an opportunity to be heard. The only remotely potential
notice the District provided was for the Board's September 7: 2004 meeting. As a matter of law it
did not comply with due process. In Discovery Plaintiff requested copies of all notices of public
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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hearings scheduled regarding the proposed 'Tap-on Fee increase, and the only written notice.
provided by the Irrigation District is attached and hlly incorporated herein as Affidavit Ex. A; pp.
132, 135, and 136. The Board (1) posted an agenda to the District's building door for the Board

meeting which neither mentioned "hookup fee", "tap-on fee", "hook-on fee", "connect fee",
"connection fee", "Tap-on Fee", or any other "fee", nor did it apprise ratepayers the Board
contemplated increasing fees (Aff. Ex. A, p. 135), and (2) placed a notice in the newspaper that
there was regularly scheduled meeting on the evening of the publication (Aff. Ex. A, p. 136).
The "Notice" posted on the District building's door for the September 7, 2004, Board

meeting simply stated "RATE INCREASE'' which at best nlisleadingly reIers to assessment rates
the District is required to set on or about the same time of year. J.C.

5 4 42-1 005, -3214; 43-701 et

seq. The published written notice in the Coeur d'Alene Press of the Board meeting was a simple
statement announcing the meeting and did not state any pui-pose(s) of the meeting. (AR.Ex. A, p.

136). The September 7, 2004 Agenda also only listed rate increases. (Aff. Ex. A, p.137). As a
matter of law, simply posting "Rate Increases'' does not measure-up to due-process requirements.

In the least, tl~eDistrict should have met the requirements of due process in passing an ordinance.
(b). Substantive Due Process Violations.
A substantive due process claim "protects individual liberty against certain governmental

actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." Cantwell v. City of
Boise,

- 1~080718122 (2008), citing Anderson, 137 Idaho at 517, 50 P.3d at 1012 (quoting

Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S.115, 125 (1 992); Daniels v. Williams, 474

U.S. 327,331 (1986)). "The Fifth ~mendmentto the United States Constitution, made
applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person shall be deprived
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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of life, liberty, or property witlzoui: due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. This encompasses

both procedural and substantive due process protections. In the context of legislation dealing with
social or economic interests, the Court assumes a deferential review. See Aberdeen-Sprinsf;e1d
Canal Co.v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 90, 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999), In this context substantive due
process requires that legislation which deprives a person of life, liberty, or property must have a
rational basis. Id. That is, the statute must bear a reasonable relationship to a permissible
legislative objective. Id. The reason for the deprivation must not be so inadequate that it may be
characterized as an arbitrary exercise of state police powers. Id," Spencer v. Kootenat County,

IDSCCI 33060 - 030608 (2005).
The District failed to adopt an ordinance concerning Tap-on Fees or their increase. This

failure deprived Plaintiff of the opporhmity to contest lhe ordinance, adoption of the Tap-on Fee,
or increases in the Tap-on Fee amount. Without adoption of an ordinance there is no rational

basis for depriving Plaintiff of its property. Without adoption of an ordinance there is no
reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective. With or without an ordinance, the
Tap-on Fee deprives the landowner of property without due process of law.

The imposition of Tap-on Fees constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property under the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment made applicable through the Fo~lrteenthAmendment and
Article I, 3 10 of the Constitution of the United States, and Article I,

9

14 of the Idaho

Constitution. "Private property may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to
be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefor." (Idaho Const., Article I, §
74). Tap-on Fees violate Art. I,

5 13, because the District is taking Plaintiffs (1) money, (2)

water property right, andlor (3) value from the lot or newly constructed house without just
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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compensation or due process o f law.
Furthermore the amount of the Tap-on Fee and the amounl of the increased exaction by the
District are arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. It is an abuse of governmental power. The
manner in which the amount was derived or developed is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious,
as -well. No calculations by an engineer were made as to the amount of money reasonably and

rationally related to the objectives of the District. (Aff. Ex. A, p. 142). No cap~talimprovement
project plan was created. There was no basis for arriving at the $500 increase or the $2,700 Tap-

on Fee.
(c). The District Bvlaws Are Not Fair and Equitable.

On August 3, 1915 the Dislrict adopted its initial bylaws.

(MY.Ex. A, pp. 8-1 5). T h e

adopted Bylaws were consistent with a closely held private corporation. In particular at Section 9

the Board of Directors empowered itself to alter, mend or repeal the Bylaws without notice to the
ratepayers. The currant Bylaws continue to allow for the Board to unilaterally alter, amend, or
repeal the Bylaws at any regular or special meeting of the Board of Directors. (Aff. Ex. A, pp. 78-

79,Art. 18). As such the adopted'Bylawswere not consistent with a public entity quasi-municipal
corporation, violated ratepayers' due process rights, and violated the statutory ~equirexnentfor
bylaws to be just, fair and equitable. I.C. 9 43-304.

I.C.

5 43-304, empowers a board ". . . to establish equitable by-laws, . . for the distribution

and use of water among the owners of such land, as may be necessary and just to secure the just
and proper distribution of the same. . .

."

There is no statutory authority granting a board of

directors the unfettered ability to alter, amend or repeal established bylaws. Yet the District's

Bylaws adopted on August 3, 3 915 permitted the Board to unilaterally and without the input from
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLUD
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t l ~ eratepayers change the Bylaws by fiat without @ving notice or opportunity to be heard to the
ratepayers. Section 9 of the Bylaws, is neither an equitable bylaw to the ratepayers/electors, nor
does it pass constitutional due process. -4s implemented the Bylaws empowered the Board to take
the ultim,ate decision making as to whether to incur additional expenses for projects encumbering

their land away from the rate-paying electors.

Idaho Code 5 42-2401 provides a statutory mechanism to amend bylaws. HLlD neither
complied in amending its Bylaws in 1947 creating Tap-on Fees, nor in 2002 raising the amount of
Tap-on Fees. The legislation provides for due process protections and a two-thirds (2/3j ratepayer
approval, as follows:

6 . T o change or amend its articles of incorporation or bylaws or
adopr new articles or new bylaws, by a two-thrds (2/3) vote of the.
stock represented, at m y regular meeting of the stockholders, or at
any special meeting duly called for that purpose in accordance with
the provisions of sections 30-3 10 and 30-311, Idaho Code:
provided, that any proposed changes in the articles of incorporation
or bylaws or any new articles of incorporation or bylaws shall be
either proposed at a meeiing of the srockholders or approved by at
least one-third (1/3) of the board of directors; and before being
finally adopted the board of directors shall cause such proposed
articles, bylaws, or changes therein (or a summary of them) to be
published in a newspaper of general circulation published in the
county in which the main office of the canal company is situated,
for at least once each week for four (4) weeks prior to the meeting at
which such articles, bylaws, or changes therein are finally adopted
and said notice shall state the lime and place at which the vore on
fmal adoption will be taken.
I. C.

5 42-2401
Bylaws giving power to the Board to adopt, amend and repeal the bylaws without

ratepayer notice, without opportunity .to be head, and without ratepayer approval are bylaws

which are not equitable or just. The legislature granted boards of directors specific authority to
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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seek amendment of bylaws. The power to amend bylaws is not in a board's sole discretion. The
power to amend bylaws is in the ratepayers' control. I. C. 8 42-2401. The present day Bylaws,

and in particular ArticIes 8, 9, and 18 of the 2002 Amended Bylaws sl~ouldbe declared null and

void from their inception as not in compliance with governing law.
(d). Eaual Protection Violauons
Differential treatment to some ratepaylers at the whim of the Board goes to the earlier
argument on uniform and proportionate taxes, and it is an equal protection violation. Over the
years the Board of Directors waived both assessments a d Tap-on Fees willy-nilly. The following
examples are for illustration and are not exhaustive. Friends Church's assessments were waived
by the District. (.+Iff. Ex. A, pp. 73,94-95 (Resolution dated February 18, 2003)). Some

developers received a credit for Tap-on Fees, even though they are paid by builders and not by
de&lopers. (Aff. Ex. A, pp.81-84, 86-87, 89-90, and 73A-73B, 124 ((Resolutions 02-002
rescinded by 04-004)). Delbert Ken and John Sperle received waivers of Tap-on Fees. (Aff. Ex.

A, p. 39 and pp. 110-112). The Board established a dedicated fund, ostensibly funded by some
but not all developers in the District, which are not funded by developers at all, but by builders
through so-called "capiralization and hook-on fees.'' (Aff. Ex. A, p. 128). Some multi-family
projects paid one Tap-on Fee whiIe others paid a Tap-on Fee per dwelling unit in the project.

(Aff.Ex. A, pp. 68-69,

122-124). Some prior Tap-on Fees were "transferred" while odlers were

not. (M.Ex. A, pp. 85-92). Mr. Sperle wanted a credit instead of a transfer, and though it is not
clear whether or not he received a credit some developer(s) did. (Aff. Ex. A, pp. 110-112). At

least one developer received a special financial reimbursement out of Tap-on Fees for its
obligatory costs associated with setting meter boxes. (Aff, Ex. A, pp. 114-116 ). Developers
Viking Construction, Inc., V. .HLID
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started to receive reimbursements for meter sets out of Tap-on Fees. (A%.Ex.A, pp. 114, 128).
For those ratepayers who live in a house built before August 20, 1947, no Tap-on Fee was charged
at all. The Districr violated Plaintiff's equal protection rights by treating it differently from other

ratepayers.
(e). Ad~risorvCommittee.

The September 7,2004 Minutes reflect that the "Advisory Committee" recommended the
immediate increase. The Advisory Committee formed in 2,003 fist met on May 13, 2003, but it

did not discuss Tap-on Fees. (Aff. Ex. A, pp. 96, 99, 101-102, 104- 105, 107-105). It met again on
August 18,2003, but it did not discuss Tap-on Fees. (Aff. Ex. A, pp. 1 11-113). One year latzr
the Board in its Auwst 17,2004 meeting calIed for the Advisory Committee to meet at a

worlcshop on "rates." (M.Ex. A, pp. 129-1303. The first and only rime the Advisory
Committee met on "Rates & Connect fees" was on September 1,2004. (Aff. Ex. A, pp. 132-134).

Nonetheless at this first and only ,4dvisory Committee meeting regarding "Rates & Connect Sees"
held on September 1,2004, the ~ d v l s o r yCommittee recommended increasing Tap-on Fees by$500 to $2,700.

The September 1,2004 Advisory Committee meeting wits held without any professional
engineering or accounting guidance, concerning Tap-on Fees. The Advisory Committee only
looked at a "Rate Comparison Sheet" to see what it could get aw7aywith. The Rate Comparison
Sheet" presented to the Advisory Committee already concluded (before the September 1,2004
meeting) Tap-on Fees should be increased from $2,200 to $2700. (Mf.Ex. A, pp. 132-134).
There was neither notice nor opportunity to be heard regarding formation of Advisory

Committee, nor sufficient notice of the one and only Advisory Committee meeting held on
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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September 1, 2004 which concerned Tap-on Fees. The recommendations of the -4dvisory
Committee were neither published, nor available for inspection or reflection. Neither the

Advisory Committee, nor the,Board sought input f?om the ratepayers. There is no indication
whatsoever what the basis was for the Advisory Committee calculating a $500 increase, but for
comparing exactions from other water suppliers located in Kootenai County. (Depo . Rolxbach,
Vol. I, p- 64, 11. 2 - 8).
Notice was not given that thz Board was seeking input from an Advisory Committee about

future financing of krure projects through Tap-on Fees. Notice was not given of the date and
time of the Advisory Committee meetings in contravention to the creation of the Advisory
Committee. (Aff. Ex. A, pp. 96-108). The Advisory Committee's recommendations violated both
procedural and substantive due process.

9.
Taw-on Fees Violare the Contracts with The United

States

District entered into Contracts with The United States for financing improvement and
replacement of the water distribution system on (1) February 16, 1949, (2) April 20, 1957, ( 3 )

-

March 19, 1962, and (4) September 30, 1977. (Aff--Ex.C, pp. 1 4). The Contracts' terms are

still in effect and binding. In addition, the April 20, 1957 contract is still in repayment and its
terms incorporated terms of the 1949 Contract, and both the 1962 and 1977 Contracts
incorporated relevant terms of the 1957 Contract.

The Contracts transferred title to all of District's irrigation system to The United States,
including the distribution system. (1949 Couztract, Art. 23; 1957 Contracr, AH. 22; 1962

Contract, Arr. 12; and 1977 Conrract ,4rt. 14; .Aff. Ex. C, pp.1-4). The United States holds title to
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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District's entire imgation system.
Pursuant to the 1957,1962, and -1977 Contracts, the District shall only charge residential
"operating units" a uniform tract charge which is sufficient, when taken together with the acreage
charge, to meet & the expenses of the District. (Aff. Ex. C, pp.2-4; 1957 Contract, Art. 12; 1962

Conpact, Art. 12; crnd 1977 Contract Art. 15; Arizona v. California, 373 U S . 546, 589, 83 S.Ct.

1468, 1492-93 (1963); 43 U.S.C. Sections 491,498; United States v. Pioneer I n . DDist., 144
Idaho 106, 137 P.3d 600 (Idaho 2007)). Tap-on Fees violate these Contract terms with the United

States.

To equitably apportion the benefits and costs the 1957, 1962 and 1977 Contracts only
allow collection of uniform annual assessments expressed as a rate per-acre of assessable land and
a tract fee. This is consistent with Idaho's statutory requirsment for assessments to be against the

lands, not against the consumer or user(s). See I.C.

5 5 43-305 and 43-306. The assessment for

the support of future capital improvements benefitting all the District's ratepayers shifts the cost
of the yet unlaown future project(s) from the District's ratepayers at large to the new ratepayers.
It shifts the assessments from against the land to people in breach of the Contracts. The 1957

Contract Article 12 and therefore the 1962 and 1977 Contracts are in part, as follo~rs:
12.

(a) Operating units in single ownership in the project area to which
irrigation water is to be provided hereunder vary in size from less than two
and one-half (2 %) acres to approximately eighty (80) acres. The majority
of the units comprise less than f i v e (5) acres and are used primarily as
suburban homesites rather than family supporting f m s . The per-acre
value and benefits of the works provided for by this contract are greater for
these smaller sized units, and, consequently, the relative per-acre repayment
ability thereof is greater.
(b) Taking account of the difference in relative per-acre repayment
ability, as determined by the size of the operating unit in single

Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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ownership, in order equitably ro nlu~ortionthe benefits derived
under this contract and in accordance with the provisions of law
relating thereto, the District shall make the annual assessments and
charges for irrigation water on the following basis:
,

( I ) There shall be established for each vear a uniform
charge for land in the District for which irrigation water is available
from the project supply, herein called the assessable land, which
charge, herein called the acreage charge, shall be exuressed ax a
rate per-acre o f assessable land; and
(2) There shall be established for each yems a uniform tract
charge for each oueratin~unit. the amounr ofthis charge to be
sufficient, when taken together with the acreage charge, to meet ali
the expenses o f the District, including its costs of operation and
maintenance, its annual construction charge obligation and its

requirements for maintenance of a reserve fund. . . . (emphu.sis
added).

(Aff. Ex.C, pp. 2-4; Aff. Ex. D).
Since uniform assessments and tract fees are required to cover all the expenses of the

Disttict, a charge for Tap-onFees can only be a collection of money for something other than ,the
expenses of the District. Costs must be apportioned and assessed against the land, and paid for in
relation to the apportioned benefits. Paying expenses out of Tap-on Fees breaches the District's

Contracts with the United States. Charging Tap-on Fees and only charging some ratepayers Tapon Fees are a breach of the District's Contracts with the United States. Plaintiff is a beneficiary of
these Contracts. The Court should declare Tap-on Fees null and void.
10.

Tap-on Fees Violate the Imgation District Domestic Water System Revenue Bond Act.
Tap-on Fees do not conform to the statutory scheme set out in tlie Irrigation District
Domestic Water System Revenue Bond Act. I.C. 43-1 901 et seq. In tlie present matter without

Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLXD

Summary Judgment Brief

38

..:

.

*

d"

*

.

8/8/2008 12:46 P M
-1

,

A".

- -

.

\

FROM. S c o t t

.

=s.s

-->,-

-.

S c o t t R o ~ eA t t o r n e y a t Law

.

,

,

.

.

"

8

L

'

TO: 1 208 4461188
..\.

\

\,.

PAGE. 040 OF 0 4 3
b3..,

>d

. - ..,<

notice, opportunity to be heard, or ratepayer approval, the Board prevented the ratepayers from
determining whether assessments, charges and tolls are to be levied. I.C.,

$5 42-24Q1, 43-305, -

306, -1901 eq set. In the present matter, the District Board has not generated a particular planned
capital project whatsoever. Yet it is collecting revenue for future construction of the unidentified
capital project.

The Irrigation District Domestic Water System Revenue Bond Act requires "Any
irrigation district acquiring, constructing, reconstructing, improving, bettering or extending m y
works pursuant to this act, shall manage the works in the most efficient manner consistent with
sound economy and public advantage, to the end that the services of the works shall be m i s h e d

at the lowest possible cost. No irrigation district shall operate any works primarily us a source of

revenue to the district, but shall operate all such works for the use and benefit of those served by
the works and for the promotion of the welfare and for the improvement of the health, safety,

comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the irrigation district." (emphasis added). I.C. 5
43-1 907.
Furthermore the works are to be self-supporting. I.C. $ 43-1 9 11. The District however is
using Tap-on Fees as a source of revenue. "Unless and until fill and adequate provision has been

made for the foregoing purposes, no district shall have the right to transfir the revenue ofworks
to its general fund." (emphasis added). I.C. § 43-1912. Tap-onFees are deposited into the
general fund. The revenue from the works is to pay for the expenses in construction, operation,

maintenance, replacement and depreciation of the works. I. C.

5 43-19 12.

Revenue from Tap-on

Fees paying for those expenses is not an option.
Pursuant to the Irrigation District Domestic Water System Revenue Bond Act to launch
Vilcing Construction, Inc., Y. HLID
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consrruction the board m u s t firsr meet numerous pre-conditions such as passing a resolution
which contains information about the works to be constructed and a reference to the.engineers'

work product, cost estimates, and provide notice to the ratepayers. The board must hold an
election of the ratepayers with a majoriry of ratepayers approving the measure by a proper election
with proper notice.

"If,at the election, a majority of the qualified electors, voting at the election,

vote in favor of issuing the revenue bonds, then the district may issue the bonds and create
indebtedness or liability in the manner and for the purpose specified in the resolution." I.C. 3 431914. The Board is using the wrong mecl~anismto get money. In contravention to the Irrigation

District Domestic Water Svstem Revenue Bond Act is transferring Tap-on Fee revenue to its
general fund. The Tap-on Fees are primarily a source of revenue to the district.

Once the ratepayers approve the construction and issuance of revenue bonds a board of
directors must establishperiodic rates, fees, tolls and charges to pay for the revenue bonds issued
to construct domestic water service, I.C.

$9 43-1 903, 43-1909(d) and (e). The construction

payments and operation and maintenance costs, are to be proportional '&d the irrigation district is
required to establish total annual assessments and charges against benefitted lands. I.C. fj 43-

1903.
The Board is using the wrong mechanism and not meeting the required procedures set-out

in the Irrigation District Domestic Water System Revenue Bond Act. It has neither provided a
proposed resolution or resoluuuns (a) setting forth a brief and general description of the worlts
with a preliminary report or plans and specifications concerning the anticipated construction, a

reference to the prelim*

report or plans and specifications prepared and filed by an engineer,

and (b) setting forth the costs and cost formula. estimated by an engineer and accountant; nor held
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLlD
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an election for the ratepayers' approval. Tap-on Fees should be illvalidated as void because the
proper mechanism for constructing capital,projects is a revenue bond.

Attorney Fees and Costs
Plaintiff respectfully requests costs and an award of attorney fees. In support of this
request for attorney fees and costs it should be noted the District could have obtained a judicial
determination of the validity o f Tap-on Fees a d increases under the Judicial Confirmation Law.

I.C. $ 7- 1301 et seq. The Dislict did not seek assistm.ce pursuant to the Judicial Confirmation

Law, even though it was apprised of the requirement to create reasonable formulas with
professionals' assistance in enforcing an impact fee. (Aff. Ex.A, pp. 66-67, S2). Plaintiff was
forced to address the issue and obtain the Court's dec.1arations.

As well, Plaintiff respectfully requests costs and an award of attorney fees pursuant to the

Private Attorney General Doctrine, 42 U.S.C.$ 1983 aad 42 U.S.C. 9 1988, Rule 56 I.R.C.P., I.C.
tj 12-117 and 1.C.

9

12-121.

Conclusion.
Summary judgment should be granted to Plaintiff as a matter of law Tap-on Fees are
unconstitutional, violate Idaho and federal statutory law, and breach the contracts between the
Disuict and the United States. The District's exacts money wirhour elections and ratepayer

approval at the expense of new users for District-wide capi~alinvestments. The exaction is a tax
I/
11
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without an enabling statute applied non-uniformly and non-proportionately.

DATED this

8

day of August, 2008.

SCOTT ROSE

By:
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

6day of August, 200 8, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Brief in Support of Summary Judgment was mailed to Defendant, by placing said
pleading in the U.S. Regular Mail postage prepaid addressed to:

Susan Patricia Weeks
Attorney at Law
James, Vernon & Weeks, PA
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8 3 8 14
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Scott Rose
Attorney at Law
300 Main Street, Suite 153
Boise, Idaho 83702

(205) 342-2552 Telephone
(208) 342-3669 Fax
scott@,idahoi~law.com

Idaho State Bar No. 41 97

Plaintiffs Attorney

:,

i

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DIS-I'RICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Vilung Construction, Inc.,
an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,

1
1
1

1

1

1

VS.

)

Hayden Lalte Irrigation District,
an Idaho quasi-municipal
corporation,

CASE NO.: CV 04-8889
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO
ENLARGE TIh4E 'I'O DISCLOSE
EXPERT WIlXESSES

1
1
1
)

Defendant.

1

PlaintifYs ~ o i i o ito
l Enlarge Time to Disclose Expert Witnesses having come before the
Court; that Defendant stipulated to Plaintiffs motion; and with good cause appearing;

IT IS H E E B Y ORDERED AND TIJIS DOES ORDER Plailltiffs Motion to Enlarge
Time to Disclose Expert 157itnesses is granted;
Viking Constr~lction,hlc. v. Hayden Lake Irrigation District

Motion to Enlarge

Page No.1
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Scott R o ~ rAttorney a t Law

FROM: Scott

TO: l a 4 6 1 1 8 8
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IT IS I I E m B Y FURTHER ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER the amendment of
the Uniform Pretrial Order; Plaintiff shall disclose Expert UTimessesnot later than one hundred-

twenty (120) days before trial; and Defendant shall disclose Expert U7itaessesnot later than sixty
( 6 0 ) days before trial.

DATED this

+'
day of June, 2008

CLERK' S CERTIFICATE OF MAILTNG

fl

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of June, 2005, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order to Enlarge Time was served as follows:
FAXED
hfA1LE.D to
Defendant and Plaintiff addressed to their attorneys:

$
'-

Susan Patricia Weelts
Attorney at Law
Owens, James: Vernon & Weeks, PA
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 8 14

Fax: (208) 664-3.684
Scott Rose
Attorney at Law
300 West hllain Street
Suite 153
Boise, ID 83702

Fax: (208) 342-3669
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STATE 3; ICaHG
cOUI\JT\~ (': l:O[1TEi?41
Scott Rose
Attorney at Law .
300 Main ~treet,;~uite
153
Boise, Idaho 83702

i:LEAi< DISTRICT COURT

(208) 342-2552 Telephone
(208) 342-3669 Fax
scott~~,idahoiulaw.co~

Idaho State Bar #3 197

Plaintiffs' Attorney

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRTCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTEN141
Viking Construction, Inc.,
an Idaho Corporation,

1

1

CASE NO.: CV 04-8889

'I

AFFJDAVIT OF SCOTT ROSE
INSUPPORT OF SUMMARY
JUDGIVIENT

1
Plaintiff,

j
VS.

)

Hayden Ldte Irrigation District,
an Idaho quasi-municipal
corporation,

1

~efendants.

1

1
)

1
)

STATE OF IDAHO )
SS.

County of Ada

1

SCOTT ROSE, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
I. That the stateme.ntscontained herein are made of your Affiant's own personal
knowledge and are true and correct to the best of his information.

2. That I have read the foregoing Affidavit, know the contents thereof and believe the
Viking Construction, Inc., v. HLID
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statements therein consained to be true and correct;
3 -4ttached hereto are true and correct copies of documents acqured through discovery

including but not limited to Hayden Lake Irr~gationDistrlct records (Exhibit .4), -4udited
Financial Statements (Exhibit B), and Federal Contracts (Exhibit C).
4. Attached hereto is a true and correct copy of a recent Notice of Assessment obtained

directly fiom my client as (Exhibit D).

5. Also attached hereto are true and correct copies of the Depositions of Cathy Meyer a d

Bert Rohrbach (Exhibit E).
FURTHER your Affiant say naught.
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i%otzuv Public for Idaho
Residing at Eagle, Idaho
My Commission Expires: 5113/14
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I I-IEREBY CERTIFY that on the ?2 day of August, 2008,a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Affidavit of Scott Rose in Support of Summary Judgment was mailed by regular U.S.
mail to Susan Patricia Weeks addressed, as follows:
Susan Patricia Weeks
Owens, James, Vernon & Weeks, PA
1626 Lincoln Way

Coeur d'Aene, ID 838 14
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Scott Rose
Attorney at Law
300 Main Street, Suite 1 53
Boise. Idaho S3702
(208) 342-2552 Telephone
(208) 342-3669 Fax
scott(3i dahoipl au7.corn

Idaho State Bar #4.197
Plaintiffs' Attorney

\

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Viking Construction, Inc.,
an Idaho Corporation,

Plaintiff,

Hayden Lake Irrigation District,
an Idaho -quasi-municipal
corporation,

)
)

CASE NO.: CV 04-8889

1

1
1

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

1

1

1

1
)

Defendants.

I
I

COMES NOW, Plaintiff. by and through its attorney of record, Scott Rose, and hereby
Motions the Court pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for Summary

Judgment.
Plaintiffs Opening Brief is filed herewith, along with the Affidavit of Scott Rose wilh
exhibits attached'in support of this Motion. This Motion is also based on the Court's file in this
Viking Construction, Inc., v.

HLID
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matter in particular the Amended Verified Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief.

Plaintiff respectlidly requests costs and attorney fees.

DATED this

day of August, 2008.
Scott Rose

By:
Plaintiffs Attorney, ISB# 41 97

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

-8 day of -August, 2008,a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment was mailed by regular U.S. mail to Susan Patricia
Weeks addressed, as follows:
Susan Patricia Weeks
Attorney at Law
Owens, James, V e m n & Weeks, P-4
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur dlAlene,ID 83814

Viking Construction, Inc, v. HLID

Motion for Summary Judgment

SUSAN P. WEEKS
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS,
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur dlAlene, ID 838 14
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684
ISB #4255
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Case No. CV-04-8889

Viking Construction, Inc.,
an Idaho Corporation,

ORDER
Plaintiff,
VS.
Hayden Lake Irrigation District an Idaho
quasi-municipal corporation.
Defendant.

I

The Court heard the motion from both parties for relief from the pretrial scheduling order
on July 10,2008. The Court being fully advised in the premises;
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties are granted relief from
the pretrial scheduling order and may file motions for summary judgment to be heard October
22,2008 at 3:00 p.m.
DATED this

a lsi-clay of August, 2008.

District Judge
ORDER: 1

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on t
true and correct copy of the
to the following:

day of

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
SCOTT ROSE, ESQ.
300 Main Street, Ste. 153
Boise, ID 83702
Fax: (208) 345-1836
SUSAN P. WEEKS
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d7Alene,ID 838 14
Fax: (208) 664-1684

ORDER: 2

008, I caused to be served a
cated below, and addressed
Overnight Mail
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SUSAN P. WEE.KS
JAMES, VERNON Bt WEEKS, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Caeur dlAlene,I
D 83814
Telqh.one:(208) 667-0683
ISB '&I255

Attorneys for Defmdmt

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Viking Construction, Tnc.,
an Idaho Corporation.,

Case No. CV-04-8889

MEMORANDUM M RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Hayden Lakc Irrigation District, an Idaho quasimunicipal corporation,

I.

INTRODUCTON

Haydcn Lake Irrigation District ("HLJD") is an irrigatkn district generally located north
of Pmirie Avenue an.dWest of U.S. 95. The Board of County commissioners received a petition

for th.e formation of the NLID in 1 91 3 and HLID was organized in 1 9 14. At that tims it: acquired

the water righis and the diversion and distribution system of the Interstate Irrigation Company, a

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO PLAITNIFF'S MOTION FOR SUhMARY
JUDGMENT: 1

01/30

JVW

Washington corporation. Tt is not controverted that HLlD is an imgation district o r g ~ z e d

und.erthe laws of this state. In addition to deliv&ng irrigation water,HLID maintains a
domestic water system.
Viking Construction is a residential builder. It has typically entered into a wntract to buy
lots fiom developers and offered 'home sales packages' on those propertics wherein the buyer
chose a lot and a floor plan design offered by Viking. Viking then constructed the home for an
o p a l amount of money. Viking Construction also builds speculation homes that it markets and

sells.

As noted by Viking in its opening memormdum, Haydm Lake Irrigation District (HLID)
has consistently charged a tap on fix for connection to its systcm. At its September 7,2004
meeting, HLD reviewed the recommendations of a committee of mcmbers o f the district and
increased its residential connection fee by $500.
After the fec was increased, Viking Construction requested that HLTD delay the fee

increase. Viking Construction indicated it had prc-sold several home packages on a plat that was
peacling final approval, and th.eprice of thc package did not anticipate the increased connection
fee. Viking Constmcti.onexpressed the bclief that the action o f HLID in increasing the fee had

inequitably cost it profit on the land package sales.

HLID collects the connection fee when new usas connect to its system. A portion of the
fee covers the a.ctual cost of hooking into the system. However, the larger component of the fee

is an equity 'buy-in fee charged to new member.
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Viking Construction filed a declaratory judgment action and request for injunction
against Hayden Lake Irrigation Distrjct on December 10,2004. On March 3 1,2008, the court
allowed Viking Construction to file an amcnded petition. In its amended petition, Viking
Construction sought to havc the connection fees it was charged to hook up to h e district's
domestic water system declared illegal and rcfimded, or in thc alternative, to havc my increase in
the fee to be declared null and void.

II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

The Iaw is well established in Tdabo that on a motion for summaryjudgnent, the trial

court must determine whether thc pleadings, deposition, and admissions, togetha with tiffidavits,
show that there is no genuine issue ns to any material fact an.dtha.t the moving party is entit1,edto
judgment as a matter of law. 1;R.C.P. 56Q; Bnnt v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541,808 P.2d
876,878 (1991). The burden of proving the absence of an issue of mate6.dfact rests at all times

upon the moving party. McCoy v. .Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,769,820 P.2d 360,364 (3.991);G C% M
Farms v. FuakJrrigafion Co., 119 ldaho'514, 517, 808 P.2d 851,854 (1991).

In j.R Simplot Co. v. Bosen, -Idaho

,

P.3d -(S.Ct.Opinion 31706,2006),

the court set forth the requirement whm the case is a court trial:
"'Whenan action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial
court as thc trier of fact is entitlcd to arrive at thc most probable inferences based
upon the un,disputedevidence properly before it a d grant the summary judgment
despite the possibi.li.tyof conflicting inferences. Shawver v. HucMeberry EsZates,
L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354,360-61,93P.3d 685,691-92 (2004). 'The test for
reviewing the inferences drawn by the trial court is whether the record. rcasonab1.y
supports the inferences." Id.
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111. ARGUMENT

A.

Character of Irrigation District

Duting discussion of this matter, tho character of an irrigation district will become a topic

of discussion. An irrigation district is purely a mature of statutc. ldnho Code, Title 43.
Through the years, the court has stm&ed with the classification o f an irrigation district.
Irrigation districts have bccn clx~ractaizedas various entities. Early on, it was described as not a

"publjc service corporation" in the strict sensc, but rathcr a mutual co-operative corporation
organized not for profit but to disto'bute water to its mmbers for use within the district. Nampa
& Meridian Irr. D i s ~v. Bn'ggs, 27 Idaho 84, 147 P. 75 (1 915). It has been held that they are,

strictly speaking, not a "municipal corporation", but a "quasi-municipal corporation" operating

its imgation system in proprietasy capaci.ty,and any municipal powers thereof are only

incid.mta1. T i n p a l l v. King Hill Irrig. Disr., 66 Idaho 76,155 P.2d 605 (3 9 1.5). It has been held

that an "irrigation district," whilc exercising certa.ingovemm.entalpowers, is brought into
existence for private benefit of landowners within its limits; it owns and opcrates its ix-rigation

system in a proprietary ra.therthan public capacity, and assumes and must bear burdens of

property ownership. EIdrtdge v. Black Canyon I7-r. Dist., 55 Idaho 443,43 P.2d 1052 (1935).
They have been characterized as a quasi public corporation fool which no stock is issued. Hale v.
McCammon Ditch Co., 72 Idaho 478,244 P.2d 151 (1951). The Supreme Court has also
characterized an irrigation district as a unit and a legal entity holding title to its property md

water rights in trust for uses and purposes set forth in its statutes. Bradshuw v. Milner Low Lifi

?rr. Dist., 85 Idaho 528, 381 P.2d 440 (1963).

MEMOMNDUM TN WSPONSE TO PLATTNIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT: 4

. In Briscndine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation DISL.97 Idaho 580, 546 P.2d 80 (1 976), the

Supreme Court obscrved again westlcd with thc characterization o f an irrigation of an imgation
district and obsmed thc following:

In past decisions, this court has t m e d an irrigation district a 'quasi-municipal1
corporation or a 'quasi-public' co~oration.Hale v. .McCammonDitch Co., 72
Idaho 478,244 .P.2d 151 (1.951). Tinpall v. King IJill Irrig, Dist., 66 Idaho 76,
155 P.2d 605 (1 915); Stephenson v. Pioneer Irrig,Dist.,49 Idaho 1 89, 288 P.42 1
(1 930). See .Barker v. Wagner, 96 Idaho 2 14,526 P.2d 174 (1974).
The Court then proceeded to determine whether an irrigation district was a public corporation for
purposes of faIling within the Idaho Tort Claims Ad. Th.e Court held it was not a public
corporation for such purposes.

B.

Connection Fees do not Violate Artic1.eV,m,Section 3 of thc Idaho Constitution

In its m.emorandumin support of motion for summary judgmmt, Viking cla.imsthat the
connection fee &urged by violatod Article VnI, $3 of the Idaho Constitution. This m i o n
provides:
Article Wl. Public Indebtedness nn,d Subsidies

4 3. Limitations on county and muiicipal indebtedness
No county, city, board of education, or scl~ooldistrict, or other subdivision of the
state, shaIl incur my indcbtdness, or liability, in any manner,or for any purpose,
exceeding in that year, the income and revenue provided for it for such year,
without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof voting at iin
election to be held for that purpose, nor unless, before or at the time of ii~cuning
sucl~indebtedness, provisions shall be made for the colle~tionof an annual tax
sufficient to pay the interest on such indebtedness as it falls due, and also to
constitute a sinking fund for the payment of the principal thereof, within thirty
years fiom the time of contracting the samc. h n y indebtedness or liability
incurred contrary to this provision shall be void: Provided, that this section shall
not be construed to apply to the ordinmy and necessary expenses authorized by
the general laws of the statc and provided further that any city may own,
purchase, construct, extend, or equip, within and without the corporate limits of
such city, off street parking facilities, public recreation facilities, and air
navigation facilities, and, for the purpose of aying the cost tbmof may, without
regard to any limitation herein imposed, wit?I thc assent of two-thirds of the
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qualified electors voting at an dectjon to be held for that purpose, issue rcvenue
bonds thcrefor, the principal and interest of which to bc paid solely from revenuc
derived fromrates and charges for the use of, and the senrice rendered by, such
facilities as may bc prescribed by law, md provided fiuther, that any city or otha
political subdivision of the state may own, purchase, construct, extend, or equip,
within and without the corporate limits of such city or political subdivision, water
systcm, sewage collection systems, water treatment plants, sewage treatment
plants, aud may rehabilitate existing electrical generating facilities, and for the
purpose of paying the cost thereof, may,without regard to any limitation herein
imposed, with the assent of a majority of thc qualified electors voting at an
dection to be held for that purpose, issue rcvenue bonds thcrefor, the principal
and intcrest of which to be paid solely from revenue derived h m rates and
charges for the use of, and the service rmdered by such systems,plants and
facilities, as may be prescribed by law; and provided fiuther that any port district,
for the purpose of carrying into cfFect all or any of the powers now or hercafier
granted to port districts by the laws of this state, may contract indebtedness and
issue rcvenue bonds evide~~cing
such indebtedness, without the nccessity of the
voters of the port district authorizing the same, such revenue bonds to be payable
solely fiom all.or such part of the revenues of the port district derived fiom any
source whatsoever excepting only those revcnues derived from ad valorem taxes,
as the port commission thereof rnay detcnnine, and such revmue bonds not to be
in any manner or to any extent a general obligation of the port district issuing the
s m c , nor a charge upon the ad valorcm tax revenue of such port district.

The issue of wh.etherthis sectitonapplies to imgation districts has been resolved by our Supreme
Court.

In Jensen v. ,Boise-Kunafir. Dist-, 75 Idaho 133,269 P.2d 755 (1954), the Supreme

Court hdd that an irrigation district is not a munici.palityas referred to in this section,of t l ~ e

constitution and this section of the constitution does not apply to an irrigation district. Thus,

IlLID is not ,tinviolation of this constitutional provision.
C.

Connection Fees do not Violate Article XII, 8 2 of the Idaho Constitution
Viking claims that HLTD violated ArticIe XII, $ 2 of the Idaho constitution because the

connection fee is unrelated to fee for regulation pursuant to this constitutional provision. This

constitutional provision provides as follows:
Article XTJ.Corporations, Municipal
9; 2. Local police regulations authorized
Any county or incorporated,city or town may make and enfomc, within its l.imits,
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all such local police, sanitary ruld other regulations as are n.ot in conflict with its
charter or with the general. laws.

The argument that fee increases require an ordinance pursuant to this constitutional
provisi,on was specifically rejected in Snake River Homebza'Zders Ass n
' v. Civ ojCaldweN, 101

Idaho 47,607 P.2d 1321 (1.980).
Moro importantly, this constitutional provision applics only to counties or incorporated
cities or towns. By its tcnns, it does not apply to imgation districts. Thus, the power of an
irrigation district to impose connection fees i s not derived fiom the constitution.
Viking also advances the argument that HLID has limited police powm to collcct a

connection fee pursuant to I.C.55 42-101,42-220,42-4201, and 42-3212. Viking avers to the
fact that HLIR did not pass an ordinance pursuant to any of these statutes, and that passing
ordinances assure due process. Althotlgk it i.s not clear in Viking's memorandum,apparently

Viking's argument is that HLID had to pass an ordinance in order to charge a connection fec.

The statutes cited by Viking do not stan,dfor this proposition.
Idaho Code 5 42-101 merely provides that the state owns the waters of the state and is
responsible for the appropriation and allotment of the waters. Idaho Code $ 42-220 provides that

once a licmse is granted the licensee bas a right to use the water an.d the right is appurtenant to
the land upon which beneficial we has been made. Idaho Code $42-4201gives thc Director of

Water Resources thc right to grant liccnscs for ground watcr recharge In Lincoln, Gooding
Jerome and Twin Falls counties. Finally, I.C. 4 42-32 12 applies to water and sewer districts, and
discu,sses the general powers of the board. There is no related statute i.n the irrigation district

portion of the code at Title 43.
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Despite the significant differences bctween Title 42 and Title 43, Viking daims that

HLTD is controlled by Potts Comt. Co. 1). North Kootenai WaferDist.,141 Idaho 678, 116 P.3d

'

8, Idaho (2005) based upon LC. 5 42-420 1 (addressing issuancc of an appropriation 1icense for a
pilot ground watcr rechngc projects in southern Idaho) and LC.4 42-3212 (general powcrs and
duties of water and sewer districts). Thcre i s no similar provision in Title 43 addressing
irrigation district's general power and duties and purpose. Potts Const. Co. v. North Kootenai

Water Dist., supra, docs not stand for the proposition that irrigation districts have police powers

pursuant to the genera1 powers and duties granted to it by the legislature.
Vikings also claims in this section of its memorandum that the collcction of a connection
fee violates the Devdopment Impact FCCAct. Jt i s unclear how this argument relates to the

allcged violation of Article XII, 5 2. Nonetheless, this arpmcnt is without mmerit. ldaho Code 9

67-8203(9)@) specificallyexcludes connection fees .From this act.
D.

The Irrigation District is Authorized by Statute to Charge a Connection Fee
Woven t.h~ougboutViking's memorandums are challenges l o HJJD's autllority to charge

a connection fee to new mcmbers. Rather than address thess piecemeal, HLID will address them

in this section of its response.
Viking contends that because HLID did not pass an ordinance that the connection fee is
by default a lax. Viking cites to no authority to support this argument.

'

Apparently there is a typing error in the Suprme Court's final opinion and the court intended
to say to cite to LC. 5 42-3201 (purpose of water and saver district is to promote health and
wclfare o f members of district.)
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Since 1914, the District's by-laws have provided for charging tap on (comection)

fees to

new users. The Board dctm,ined at that time that it was equitable to existing members to
charge new members a connection fee for gaining the bencfit and use of the existing system.
Addressing the issue of whether the Board h a thc statutory powm to charge a connection
fee, Idaho Code # 43-304 grants the Board thc power to manage and conduct the business and

affairs of the district, and to "to establ.ishequitable by-laws, rules and regulations for the
distribution and use of water among the owners of such ].and, as may be necessary and just to

secure the just and proper distribution o f the same, which said by-laws, among other flings, shall

establish a fiscal year, and in case the by-laws do not provide for thc establishment of a fiscal
year, the fiscal ycar shall commence the first day o f Novmber and end the thirty-first day of

Octobcr of each and every year. Said by-laws, rules and regulations nus st bc printed in
convenient firm for distributionthroughout the district." CIenrly, this .statute provided the had
statutory authority to establish by-laws, rules and regulations which addressed new user

connection charges as long as such by-laws wcre equitable and just among the owncrs.

The majori.ty of Viking's argument foc~ws
upon its contention lb,atthe connection fee

must be a fee related to a regulation to be valid. In the present case, HLID is n.ot collecting the
connection fcc pursuant to a. police power regulation. Rather, it i s collecting the fees under the
statutory au.thoritygrantcd it with respec$ to the establishment of equitable by-laws and in the

autlority granted in the Imgation District Domestic Water Systm Reven,ueBond Act (Title 43,
Chapter 19). This act has substantially identical provisions contained in the Ida110 Bond
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Revenue Act analyzcd in Loomis v. City of Hailq, supra. As such, it is clear h e connection fee
is not a tax.
Viking asserts that the Board has no power to require a comection fee to its system

because its power to collect revenues i s limited by Title 43, Chapters 7 (which requires that fie
District cstablish an assessment to provide for operation and maintenance of the syste~m);Tide

43, Chapters 4 (which allows bonds to issuc for the original construction and the rehabilitation of
an existing systm); slnd Chapters, (which allow money to be raised by bands).
Viking Construction claims that these provisions are the exclusiv~method under which
the District can collect revenues. Nothing in Chaptcrs 4, 5 or 7 indicates that an inigation
district is limited to collecting revmucs only through assessrncnts or bonds as argued by Viking.

In fact, I.C.4 43-905 provides that an irrigation district can use tolls in combination with
assessments to defraying the expenses o f the district for the care, operation, managment, repair
and improvement af such portion of ita system that are completed and in use (including salaries

of of%icersand employees) at the time the toll is set, and that imgation districts can require

payment of the toll in advance of service.
Tt is undisputed that I-Iaydm Lake Trrigation District has three contracts with the Bureau
of Reclamation. It i s further undisputed that its system includes a domcstic water systcm With

respect to domestic water, Title 43, Cl~apter19 (Irrigation District Domcstic Water Systcm

Revenue Bond Act) allows imgation districts (includir~gthose that havc contracted with the

Bureau of Reclamation) to charge tolls and charges for expenses incurred in the construction,
operation and maintenance of domestic systems, and to maintain such rescrves as are reasonable
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to assure continuous and eficient domestic water service; and to require the payment of such,

tolls and charges in advance of thc delivery ofwater. See I.C. 5 43-1903. These code sections
disprovc Viking Construction's position regarding the narrow construction of the Board's power
to charge connection fees.

Further, the analysis provided in case law of similar provisions refutes Viking's
argument. The powcrs of H L D granted pursuant to LC.6 43-1 909(e) are the s m e as thosc
granted to municipalities pursuant to I.C.$ 70-1030(f). The powers granted by the legislature

pursuant to I.C.9 50-1030(f)were analyzed in the context of a municipality in Loomis v, Cily of
Hailey, 119 Jdaho 434,807 P.2d 1272 (1 991). Therein, the Suprme Court addressed many of

the arguments raised by Viking in illis matter.
Thc Supreme Court comme~~ced
its analysis in Loomis

City ofHaiZey, supra, by

disposing of the argument that a sewer connection fee was a tax. The Court noted that here was
a difference between a municipality's exercise o:fits police powers and its proprietary functions.
T l . e Suprme Court recognized that when acting under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act

(I.C.tj 50-

1027 - I.C.$ 50-1042) that the city was exercising its proprietary functions. The Supreme Court

hdd that a city derived its authority to charge water and.sewer conncction fees pursuant to thc
Idaho Revenue Bond Act and since the charge related to exercisc of a proprietary function, the

ch,argcwas not a tax. The court explicitly he1.dthat the Idaho Revalue Bond Act authorized the
collection of sewer connection Fees an,d as long as the fees were allocated and budg~tedin.
conformity with that Act they would not be construed as taxes. The Suprcrne Court concluded

that when the rates, fecs and charges conformed to the statutory scheme set forth in the Idaho
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Rsvenue Bond Act QI w m imposcd pursuant to a valid police power, thc charges wme not

construed as taxes.

he second prong of the Loornis v. Czt~)
ofHaiZey, supra, case was an analysis ofwhether
thc fees oollected pursuant to the Idaho Revenue Bond Act were allocated and budgctcd in

conformity with that Act. Viking makes sevcral unsupported claims of facts in summ ofits
summary judgment memorandum touching on this matter.

Viking points the court to the bylaws of thc Distzict, specifically M c l e s 5 and 8 tl>eof

BY^ a

~ s Viking
. ~ claims that the connection fees is inequitable and a tax because it burdens a

member twice undcr the bylaws and raises revenue for the same service twice. Article 5
provides that it is the District's responsibiIity lo ptovidc a connection to its water system for

member and that it is the membm's responsibility to pay for the costs to connect from the
District's water rncter to tliejr point of application. Said in another way, 14LID will not pay for
the member's private lines from their residence to the water meter. This is a standard practice in

all water systems. Article S addresses new domestic water users and provides that the member
will be required to pay a tap-on fee plus reimburse the district its parts and labor to connect the

now mmber to the system. For unclcar reasons, Viking providcs mil-lutes from the year 2002 to
the Court regarding a policy in 2002 wherein developers were installing their own rnetcrs and
paying the costs for the rnetcrs directly. Mowcvcr, in deposition, HLID informed Viking's

counsel that this policy was changed in 2003, and met= sets were subsequently done by district
employees with district materials and the costs associated with this connection were being
-

Although Viking does not give a record cite for these bylaws, they are located at Exhibit "A*,
pp. 74-79.
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collected as a component o f the connection fa.
(See Rose, Exhibit E2, Rohrbach Vol, H5p. 70,
il. 21-25; p. 71, p. 72-73, p. 74,1l. 1-4.) Nothing in this sct-up is a double charge or even a

revenue to the district. The private l.in.eis the member's own property o w e d by the member and

it gcnentcs no revenue to the District for the homeowner to pay for its installation. The payment
for the meter set is a reimbursement of an expenditure by the District to provide a meter to

connect a new membu to th.e existing s y s t m . Thus, h e fees chslrgcd pursuant to the bylaws am

just and equitable in this res,pect.
Viking repeatedly claims that the connection fee is for future cxpansi.on of the systm.

Thcre i.s no cite to any material in the record in support of this contention. Viking also claims in
its memorandum that in 2004 with respect to asscts acquired by HLID in 2004 that "[a]lmost half
of that amount was paid for just with the Topon Fees ?laintiff paid relative to the 65 homcs

($175,500) immediately impacted by thc oventight increase in September 2004." Again &ere i,s

no cite to the record showing that Viking paid this amount of connection fees betwem
September 8,2004 and December 3 1,2004,or even that th.e assets were acquired after that p0in.t

in time. Indeed,thc only i,nfomationprovided in the record is the deposition testimony of Cathy
Meyer introduced by Viking. Con,siderationofM.s, Meyer's deposition testimony j.n context
belies this allegation by Viking, In addition, her testimony rcvea1.sthat the increase in HLID's

assets in 2004 whi.chViking claims it hnded were acquired by dedication of the assets by
deveSopers pursuant to deve1.opmmt agreements.
Ms. Meycr's is not BLID's accountant as implied by Viking. Ms. Meyer's is an

ind.ependentcertified public accoun.tantwho has been engaged by HLID's Board of Directors to

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO PJdAITNIFF'SMOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT:13

audit the d.istrict's books to assure conformity with Gov-ent

Accounting Standards Board

(GASB) stan,dards. Thc purpbsc of the audit is to provide reasonable assurance to the Board and
the mmbers that the finnancid statements of HLID are without material misreprssmtation.

(Rose Affidavit, Exhibit E, Meyer Deposition, p. 6,11. 22-25, p. 7,11. 1-1 1.)

In the course of her audits, in 2003, Ms. Mcyers made a .recommendation,that fie D i s ~ c t
set a capitalization policy. However, the term as she used it was unrelated to a connection fee

policy. Rather, it related to when to book an asset and track depreciation. (Rose Affidavit,
Exhibit El, Meyer Deposition, p. 13-20.) Ms. Meyers clarified at deposition her use of the word
"improvements" in her audit in her parlance was somrthing that extended the life of an asset, but

did not expand its breadth. Her example of an improvement was placing a new engine in a

vehicle to extm,d its Iifc. (Rose .Affidavit, Exhi.bitEl, Meyer Deposition., p. 31,11. 7-13.) In the
rubric of Loomis v. City of iXJcriley,supra, this example would be a replacement of a system

component.

Ms. Meyers testified that in 2002 the Board began setting aside the llaokup fccs in a
separate account with the state treasurer net o f the mcter charge for water systm improvements.

(Rose Affidavit, Exhibit El, Meyer Deposition, p. 40,11. 1-14,p. 41, 1-17.) The name o f tbe
account where the connection fee was deposjted a.s it showed.on HLTD's books was "1014 State Treasurer's Invest Pool" to whicl~hook-up fces were deposited net of meter sets. (Rose

Aff., Exhibit El, Meyer Deposition, Exhibit 22, 13, and 14). Prior to 2002, the hook up fees

wmc placed in the general account but accountcd for separately as a different revenuc account
labeled "capital, fund", (Meyer d.eposition,p. 82,11. 8-25, Exhibit 18.) These fccs are utilized
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specifically to maintain the existing infrastructure and kecp it and viable, and not allow it to
becornc defunct. The money was not used to purchase additional system assets to providc
additional capacity. (Rose Aff Ex. E2, Rohrbacll Dep-Vol. I, pp. 86-87; p. 88,ll. 1-1 5.) The

money has not been used to subsidize dacily operations to avoid an increase in assessment rates
for operation and maintenance. (Rose AfX Ex. E3, Rohrbach Dep. Vol. 11, p. 92,ll-24-25;
p. 93,
11. 1-8.)

Viking claims in its memorandum that thesc connection.few were used to acquire a. new

well and expand the system. Howevcr, Ms. Meyer's testimony indicated that the well that was

acquired by the Distri.ct was exchanged to the District in lieu o f payment of a dryland conversion
fee owed to the Di.sttictby a developer pursuant to a development agreement (Rose Affidavit,

Exhibit E, Meycr Deposition, p. 43,ll. 15-25; p. 44,11. 1.-22.) Ms. Meyers also testi6ed that: the
District had acquired si.gnificantinfrastructure worth in excess of !$100,000 pursuant to
deve1,opment:agreements. However, she was clear there was no actual expense to the District
related to these acquisitions because they were transfers to the District by developers pursuant to

development agreements (Rose Affidavit, Exhibit E,Mcyer Deposition, p. 45,lI. 11-25, p. 46,ll.
1.1-25, p. 47,ll. 1-1.1..) 'In 2004, there were capital contributions by developer's which increased
the assets ofthe District. (Meyer Deposition.,p. 80,l. 25, p. 26,ll. 1-5.)
The onIy pl.nnned expenditures of the connection fces testified to by Myers was

replacernmt of existing water lines and the costs associated with instal1,ntionof a SCADA
systcm. (Meycr Deposition, p. 49,11.4-14.) Ms. Meyex's testified the District kept a separate

bookkeeping record of the money spent from cach.o f its revenue accounts, including hook-on
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fees. ( ~ e ~~cposition,
e r
p. 66,ll. 4-8.) Ms. Mcyer's audit did not include in its scope a tracing

thc expenditure of connection fees to the item of cost. (Mcyer Deposition, p. 72,ll. 7-14.)
However, during her audits nothing came to her attention that indicated that opnation fces were
being paid with the connection fees. (Mcyer Deposition p. 73,l. 20-25; p. 74,l. 1-9.) Contrary
to Viking's unsupported position that the SCADA system was an cxpansion of thc system, it
replaced a failing system component of the existing watar towcr facility. (See Rose Affidavit?

Exhibit A, p. 1I 3)(advisory committee recommendation that Board acquire SCADA systm to
replace existing controIlcr system on reservoir) and E3, Rohrbach Deposition, Vol.11, p. 51,ll.
20-25; p. 52,11. 1-21 .) It added no capacity to the s y s t m and was not an cxpansion. The other
gl-cd

expenditures from this fee were for replacing inhstructure that had reached its effective

lifc. (Rose A K Ex. E3,p. 53,lI. 7-17.) The only other transfer of money ftom this systcm

shown in the

is that FILD transferred an amount to mimburse the general find for

amounts expended for the mcter sets. (Rose Aff. Ex.A p. 72.)

Viking also avers to a failed bond dection nnd argues that the connection fees wmc really

bcing collected to pay for the project that would have bcm financed by the bond failed bond
election. Viking cites to the record regarding several meetings whercin the bond levy was
discussed with members and members expressed certain individual concerns. However, Viking
is incorrect that there was a failed bond election. The bond proposal was for a new water tower
to provide addi.ti.ana1fire flow vol;umcs to the membas of thc district. Aftcr several public

bearings and review by a member committee, thc Board dicl not go forward with a b0n.d election.

(RoseAffidavit, Exhibit E2,Rohrbach Deposition, Vol I., p. 10,11. 11-14.) In fact, a later
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advisory committee recommended against considering the tower as an option for the d i s ~ c t .

(Rosc Affidavit Exhibit A?p, 108.)

More importantly, the financing options for the tower at were discussed and considered

were independent and unrelated to the hook-up fees charged by HLID as demonsmted by the
rate committee recommendations to the Board in 2001, The committee recommend& the Board
seek a 1.5 million dollar bond levy in November 2001 for building the tow= and if that faild, it
recommended setting up a capital expenditure reserve h n d dedicated to financingthe tower

finded by a rate increase to all users. Tndepcndent of the tower construction, the rate committee
madc a separatc rate increase recornmmdation of domestic hook-up fees of $2,500 to bring the
district's fecs more in line with the cquity buy-in of other local water districts. (Rose Exhibit

"A",p. 41.) This money was not port of the recomrncnded dedicated capital expenditure reserve
for financing the tower.
As of the date of this suit, assessment rates had increased significantly. These ratcs have

been used to pay for somc of the improvements which had been contemplated in the 2001 bond
levy unrelated to the tower. Other improvments still have not been performed. (Rose Ex.E3,
Rohrbach Dep. Vol. 11, p. 90,11. 10-25; p. 91,ll. 1-22.)
Part of Viking's attack on the connection fee i s that it allows the collection of money

without a vote by the rnembcrs on a bond. A similar argument was addressed and disposcd of by
the Supreme Court in Loomis v. Hailey, s ~ ~ p t Therein,
u.
the Supreme Caurt held that the

Revenuc Act a1lowcd the use of rcvmues to provide for thc expense of replacement and

depreciation, indud.ingreserves for these purposes. Further, the Supreme Court observed that
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the Revenue Act required that the system be sclf supporting. The Supreme Court held given

these provisions that a bond election was not required to collect corlnection fees and to establish

rcsmes for these purposes under the Act. These same provisions exist in the idgation district
Revenue Act. Thus, a bond elcction was not required for HLID to collect thesc fees and to hold

them in rescwe for the specified purposes.
Viking also argues that the $500 connection fcc increase was not appropriately and

reasonable detemined, It cites to nothing in thc rccord to support this contention. Viking claims
the, "Dist~ictsimply pulled the Tap-on Fee amount out of thin air, arbitrarily." Viking complains

that the connection fees are not applied solely to the benefit of the members paying thc fee.
Viking claims that Idaho law rcquires use of a fonnula to inmase the connection fce. Regarding

the rcasonablcness of the fee, in .Loomis v. Hailcy,supra,thc Court discussed its previous holding

in Kootenai County Property Ass'n v. Koote~zaiCounty, 115 Idaho 676, 769 P.2d 553 (1989),
wherein property owners chnllengcd the appropriateness of a flat fee rate imposed instead of a
ratc which reflected actual scwage use. The Supreme Court cited wit11 approval its holding in that
the legislature had not irnposcd exacting ratc requirements upon localities and the law required
only that the fee be reasonably related to the benefit conveyed. Thc Court noted it was not the

province of this Court to d c t m i n e how a municipality should allocate its fee and rate system.

n e Court further held so long as the fees and rates charged co~iformedto the statutory
requirements and wmc reasonable, the fees, ratcs and charges would be upheld. The Court also

held that the fees, rates and charges imposed by the municipality must be reasonable and produce
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sufficient revenue to support the system at the lowest possible cost as required by the Idaho

Revenue Bond Act.

In Hailey v. Loomis, the appellant Inad e the same argument that the conilection fee bore
no reasonable relationship to the actual cost of hooking up to thc system as Viking makcs in this
case. 'This argument was rejected. The Court specifically held that a crmnection fee may bs
imposed by the police power or other statutorv Dower and would be upheld by the courts if it is
not unreasonable and not arbitrarily imposed. The Loomi,.. Court

clarified that merely

because the charge represented something more than the actual cost of the actual physjcal
hookup did not make the connectiori fee illegal.

Turning to the prcsent case, the fees werc not set arbitrarily. For ap,proximatdyfive

'

decades, perhaps longer, thc district has charged a. hook-up fee for the equity bu.y-in of a member

into the existing water system when the n e w m m b m connected. (See Rosc Affidavit, Exhibit
"A", Rohrbach.Dcp. Vol,.1, p. 30, 10-14.) In fact, thc tap-on fce for domestic watcr use was first
addressed in the 1947 Bylaw of the District. (RoseAffidavit, Exhj.bit"A", pp. 19-20, Section
1I), This section provided for a tap-on fee for a new parcel crcated upon subdivision,provid.cd

for payment in addition to the tap-on fce of the actual additional expenses of making the
connection, and provided that the member had to pay to improve infrastructure ifnecessary to

serve the subdivided parcel,

The rate increase issu.cwas addressed on.morc than one occasion by an advisory
committees to the board. On Mach 4,2002, the committee indicated in its minutes it needed
more information researched before a rate incrcase could be a.ddressed. (Rose AffS5Exhibit 'W',
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p. 65.) At tht April 2,2002 meeting, the Chairman of the rate committ~,Virginia Bdscr,

requested an operations and maintolance report from the Dimict's engineer. JUB, for

replacement of piping in connection with making a recommendation on a rate inmease, (Rose

NF., Exhibit "A", p. 71 .) T h i s request reflects that the rate cornmiltee was assessing necessary

reserves for the system to operate.

On August 17,2004, the rate increase year whi,ch Viking raises in this suit, the Board.
tabled discussions of rate snd connection fces to schedule a meeting of the advisory comittec
and conduct a director's workshqp. (Rose Aff. EX.A, p. 130.) The advisory committee met on

September I., 2007 and made recommendations.
At thc Board's regular m.eetingon September 7,2004, following a lengthy debate, the

Board passed a $500 rate increase in thc domestic conn.ectj.onfee. (Rose A f ! Ex. A, p. 138.)

This fee included an equity buy-in component and a rmuncratioa component to thc district for
the actual cost of the meter installed to connect to the systan. (Rosc AfT. Ex.E2,Rohrbach Dep.
Vol. 11, p. 2g311. 1-20.) The board understood that equity buy-in was compmsation for those

d.cvices, appurl:cnances, infrastructure, backbone, pumps, tanks and such items necessary to
deliver water to the members that had been supported and maintained or kept operational by
existingmembers for 50 plus ycars. (Rose Aff. Ex. E2, Rohrbach Dep. Vol. I, p. 71,l. 8-17.)
Besides the advisory committee recommendation, tb.e Board had reviewed the water

managanent plan, it had the water master rcports, and a series of control system failures. It had
done analysis and had input fr0.m its cngineer c1arifyin.gthose parts of the water managemmt

plant that addressed antiquated, obsolete or margi.nallyhnctional areas of the district. The
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Board reviewed the gen~ralagc and condition of the district's infrastrucbe. A11 of these factors

were weighed in determining the amount of the required increase for resaves. (Roae Aff Ex.

E2,Rohrbach Dcp. Vol. I, p. 80,ll. 8-25; pp. 81-S2.
The samc concept of buy-in as was used by the Board was utilized by the advisory

committee. (Rose Aft: Ex. E2,Rohrbach Dep. Vol. I, p. 7,ll. 21 -25; p. 72,l. 1.) Part o f what the
committee lookd at in its meeting was the value of comparable systems in the area. (Rose Aff.

Ex.A., pp. 133-134.) The committee had a worksheet from which it worked which reflected
rates charged for equity by-in fiom cornparable surrounding systems. Future growtl~of the
district was not discussed as part of the fee increase. Therc were discussion of taking care of
existing infrilstructure and what maintenance or impmvements might be ncccssary. Thc main
topic of concern was to set a fee that reflected m equitable buy-in for new members to the
system. (Rose Aff. Ex. E2, Rohrbach Dep. Vol. 1, pp. 62,11. 3-25, pp. 63-65, p. 66,ll. 1-22.)

Thc committec used a comparative analysis, which included a comparison of surrounding water
purveyors and what they were charging to buy into comparable systems. (Rose AfX Ex. E2,
Rohrbach dep. Vol. I, p. 68,ll. 3-8.) The commitbe also had HLJD's water management plan

which contained discussion about the currcnt state of the infrastructure and the engineer's
projected fbture needs and replacements for repairs. (Rose Aff. Ex. E2,Rohrbach Dep. Vol I, p.

75,lI. 12-24.) However, no engineer or accountant was engaged to calculate the equity b~~y-in.

(Rose Aff. Ex.E2,RohTbach dcp. Vol. I, p. 69,ll. 16-25.)
Viking claims that the above process used by HLID in its dccision making is

unreasonable and arbitrmy. Viking contends that a rate increase an not occur without an
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engineer's study. Our courts do not require such exactitude. Thc method used by HLID

dmonstratcs that equality of treatment of all me~nbcrswas the main concern of the Board. Tbe
above discussion dmonstrates that the Board did not randomly choose a number but rather
utilized a methodology that included study and use of figures and analysis of its system. HLID
considered the value of the existing system, thc cost to purchase equity into comparable local
water distribution systems, the water management plan of the district and its engineer's analysis

of system needs for rcpair and replacement.

In Pons Const, Co. v. North Kootenai Water Dist., 14 1 Idaho 678, 116 P.3 d 8 (2005), the
Potts court recognized that thc burden falls on the challenging party to demonstrate that the fee is

eithcr in conflict with thc general laws of the state, unreasonable or arbitrary. It also recognized

that whetha or not an ordinance is unreasonable or arbitrary is a question of law. The Potts
court also noted that generally courts are not concerned with the wisdom of ordinances and will

uphold a municipal ordinance unless it is clearly unreasonable or arbitrary. Although the present
case concerns statutory authority granted to HLID,the same standards should apply. Viking has
made no showing that the connection fee prior to the $500 increase was unreasonable or

arbitrary. The record is replete with evidencc that the District has consistently charged this
connection fee and has regularly adjusted the fee aRcr review and analysis. Furtha, Viking has
not demonstrated that the fcc increasc in September 2004 was unreasonable or arbitrary. To the
contrary, HLID has demonsirated througl~Viking's own submissions to the rccord that il acted

reasonably and its decision was bas& upon valid considerations and figurcs, even though they

were not generated by an engineer i r ~a report.
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E.

The Connection Fee does not Violate Art. VII,

5 6, Idaho Constitution

Viking claims the connection fee violates Article VII, 8 6 of the Idaho Constitution. Thi,s
clause provides: "The legislature shall not impose taxes for tb.epurpose of any county, city,

town, or othcr municipal corporatian.,but may by law invest in the corporate authorities thaeof,
respectively, the power to assess and dl.ecttaxes for all purposes of such corporation." Viking

provides no substantive argument on how it is alleged that the legislature has imposed tax for
the benefit of HLD. First, IiLID is not a municipality. Second, the legislature has not imposed

a tax for its benefit.

In support of this contention, Viking cites the court to Idaho Bldg. Conivactors Assh v.
City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995) whcrein tb.e court held that police

power rcgu1.ationsenacted for the firthermce of tb.epublic health, safkty or morals or welfare of
its residents and rdated fees authorized pursuant to these regulations priinarily for:the purpose of

raising revenuc is in essence a tax and can only be upheld under th.epower of taxation.
.As discussed previously, in this case, the connection fee is not c1,nimcdto relate t o

regulation as was the case in to Idaho BZdg. Contractors Ass'n v. City of Coeur dYlene. It was

not passed for the health, safety, morals or welfare of the rnmnbcrs of the district. Rather, it was

established by by-law as a just and cquitable means to provide for new m.embcrsbuying into the
existing system and is a fee authorized by the Bond Revenue Act. In this context, Lewiston
Orchards Irrigation District v. Gilm.ore, 53 Idaho 377,23 P.2d 720 (1.933)recognized that an

irrigation district is acting in a proprietary manner and not exercising the secanday and
incidental municipal powers that it may have been granted. Thus, the analysis provided in Idaho
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Bldg. ContractorsAss 'n v. City rfCoeur d 'Alel?eJs u p ~ qis not useful. The comcction fee is a
fce authorized by statute as was the case in Loonzis 17. Czp ofHaiEey, supra,
Viking also argues in this section of its ~lnemorandumthat the federal and state laws

prohibit the district fiom. having a "slush" fund for unknown future expenditures. However, as

presented previously and discussed thorougl~lyabove, state law not only allows a a idgation
district operating a domestic water system to have reserves,it requires it to provide for a resenre.
I.C. 8 43-1903.

Viking also argues that I.C. 5 43-401 prohibits a rescme. Nothing in I.C.9 43-401
prohibits a reservc. Thi.s argument runs contrary to the express provision of I.C. 8 43-1 903 and

LC.8 43-1 91 1, which require the district to keep the d.omesticwater system, self supporting and
to set rates fiom time to achieve t h ~ sobjective, together with reserves. A similar argumcnt was
made and rcjected by in Loomis v. Haz'ley, supra, wherein the Loomis court noted that nothing in

the Bond Revenue Act statutes required that the electors approvc dl changes to the ratea, fees, or

charges uscd to finance public works projects. The same is true of thc irrigation district's Bond

Revenue Act.

F.

The Fee does not Violate Art. VXX,

319 5 and 2, Idaho Constitution

Viking alleges the connectian fee is not imposed ratably or proportionately set and
therefore violates the above provisions o f the Id,aho conslltution. Jrigation district annual

assessments (Tit1.e43, Chapter 7) are not taxes pursuant to these provision.^ of the constitution.
Brown 1). Shupe, 40 'Idaho 252,233 P. 59 (1924). Connection fees collected pursuant to the

statutory provisions of the Bond Revenue Act arc not taxes. Loomis 17. I'ailey, supra.
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Viking cites to Lillie v, Nampa-Meridian Irrigation District, 82 Idnho 167, 350 P.2d 740
(1960) in support of this contention. However, an analysis o f thc facts and hoIding of this case

shed little light on the matter before this court. The titfkcase involved the proper ~nethoda ~ l d
basis for assessing annual operation and maintmance costs pursuant to Title 43, Chaptm 7 to

similarly situatcd members of the Distict. It did not address any fees collectcd pursuant to f i ~

Bond Revenue Act, Title 43, Chapter 19. Using this case authority is like comparing apples to
oranges. The fact that the Little court concluded that annual assessments for operation and
maintenance had to be uniform between similarly situated members does not aid the court in this

matter. The cwe which provides the bcst gujdance is Loomis v. Hailey, supra,discussing the
similar provisions of another Bond Revmue Act as applied to municipal corporations. Under the

holding of Loomis. it is clear that charging a comection fee pursuant to the Revenuc Act will not

be deemed a constitutional violation per se because it relates to the proprietary functions of the
district.
Viking cites to Gedney v. Snake Rive7 Irr. Di,sirict, 6 1 Idaho 605, 104 P.2d 909 (1 940) in
its memorandum for the proposition that the Supreme Court analyzed Tit1e 43, Chapter 19 ad
held that all tolls must be proportionaI. Thcse statutory provisions were not a topic of discussion

in the case. Rathcr, assessments for operation and maintenance of the irrigation system portion
of the district was discussed and it was held that different assessments for maintenance and

operation could not be charged to members even though the cost of transmission to some lands

might be more expensive than othcrs because all properties received the same benefit. This
holding does not guide or assist the court in the pmsent casc, which does not concern
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disproportionate operation and maintenance assessments. Rather, this case involvcs whethcr it is
just and equitable to charge a connection fee to n e w members connecting to H L J p s domestic

wakr system ,and the parameters of this connection fee as authorized by Title 43, Chapter 19.
G.

The Connection Fee doES not Violate Articlc XV, $8 2,4 or 5 of the Idaho

Constitution.
Viking claims the connection fee interferes with its constitutional rights pursuant to the
above provisions of the Idaho constitution to access water rights hdd in trust for the members of

the district. In support of its position, Viking cites Adams

1).

Twin Falls-Oakley Land & Water

Co., 29 Idaho 3547,161 P.322 (1 9 16). ?his case involved the l~omesteadri&ts of an cntryman

paying for authorized construction charges pursuant to the Carey Act. Thc defendant was a
construction company which was deemed an operating company. It was not an irrigation district.

The case involved the court's construction of a contract clause which provided that am entryman
purchaser was not entitled to water from the operating company if he was in default under thc
payment tenns of a contract for construction of irrigation facilities. The purchaser entryman

claimed the contract clause was void as against public policy reasons and contrary to the
entryman statutes. The Adams court held that the mtsyman statutes limited the construction

company's remedy in the evmt of default lo filing a lien ag~nstthe real property and foreclosing

on it. The case was specific to the rights of a sctller of lands under the Carey Act. It can't be
extended to stand for the proposition that any of the provisions o f Title 43, Chapter 19 are

unconstitutional.
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In the present case, the new members who wish to connect to the District's systems are

not settlors of land under the Carey Act nor are they existing m m b m who have paid their

annual assessmmt. This case simply docs not stand for the proposition which Viking contends it
does that that there is a statutory duty for an imgation district to supply domcstic water undct ttle

Carcy Act to a new member if rentds and tolls (i.c. the assessment) is paid ivegardless of
whether the new member pays the rcquired connection fee under the Bond Revenue Act.

In fad,

X.C.8 43-1903 allows for HLID to require payaent of the connection fee in advance of delivery
of water.
Viking also cites the court to the provisions of LC.$ 42-220 for the proposition that an

irrigation district docs not havc authority to charge n connection fee. Tlvs code section applics to

the rights of licmsees vis a vis the state. It does not define the rights and obligations of a
member of an imgation district.

Viking also tries to characterize the requircmcnt of paying a connection fee as a condition
to receiving service as being the equivalent of the denying a new member in the district with his
priority rights to the water. No case law is cited in support of this position.

In fact, there is no

case law that holds that n new member in an irrigation district who wishes to

add a connection to

the domestic water system is unconditionally et~titledto the delivery of water without payrncnt of
the fees and charges authorized by Title 43, Chapter 19.

H. Thc By-Laws are Valid
Viking Construction contends that even if the Board had thc statutory power to estabIis11
connection fces that tbe by-laws arc illegal because members did not authorize the by-law
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changes. Jdnho Code S; 43-304allows the directors of an irrigation district to establish equitable
by-laws, rules and regulations for the distribution nncl use of water among the owners of Iand in

the district. The only requirements that members vote on a by-law appears in I.C.

5 43-11 1,

whicli allows a 213 vote of the members to pass a by-law altering the code requirement that a
voter live within the district to allow a voter lo live within 15 miles of the district in order to be

eligiblc to votc and 1.C. 5 43-201, which allows a 213 vote by members to pass a by-law altering
the code raquirement that a director live within the district to allow a director to servc if they live

within 15 miles of thc district. These are the only by-laws that thc legislature expressly requires
that ihe m m b m vote upon. All other by-laws by statute are established by the Board with the
only requirement being that they be cquitable. I.C. 9 43-304.
Nonetheless, Viking claims that LC.(j 42-2401required a vote by the mernbm to
approve the by-law changes occumng from 1947 forward. This code section applies to
operating companies with stockholders. It does not apply to irrigation districts. Thus, its tenns
do not control in this matter. Rather, the statutes set forth above are controlling.

Viking also claims that its due process rights were violated by a fee increase. Viking
asserts: ''The District arbitrarily deprived Plaintiff of ils constitutional rights failing to provide
procedural safeguards of notice and an opportunity lo be heard." Viking identifies no
constitutionallyprotectedright of which it was deprived. The setting ofratcs md fecs does not
deprive any member of their right to receive water from the District.

I.

Thc Connection Fee doES not Violate thc terms of the Contracts with the Bureau of

Rcclamation.
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Viking claims the District is prohibited from charging connection fees to its domestic
water system by the terms of its four contracts with the Bureau of Reclamation, First, Viking
claims that the Bureau holds title to TCTD's entire irrigation system. Tl~isclaim simply is not
true. Viking's own facts recited in its mernorand~unprove thc falsity of this clsm. The last

contract with the bureau was entcred into in 1977. The wells, which are the sole sourcc of water
to HLID, were put in place in thc 1980's when it was determined that Hayden Lake was no

longer a viable source for domestic watcr. Thus, the main sourcc of water for HLID is not
owncd by thc Bureau and not addressed in the Bureau coi~tracts.Further, all infrastructure that

has been added, which has bem significant in recent years as reflected in thc audits attacI~edto
the Rose affidavit, is not owncd by the Bureau. SignioRcantportions o f the Dist~ict'ssystem are
not cncumbercd by the Bureau contract.
Further, Viking's analysis of tbe contracts is flawed. The Bureau contracts allow for
reserves for the system. They do not limit the Distrid with respect to the domestic watcr system.
The limitations contained in the contract relate to the collectioi~of the bond assessment and
operation and maintenance assessments for irrigation waters, which are separate from connection

fees to maintain the domestic water system.
J.

The Judicial Confirmation Process is not Available for Advisory Opinions

Viking requests attorney fees arguing that HLTD should have had its authority to charge

connection fees predetermined by a court pursuant to LC. $ 7-1 301, ct. seq, These provisions of
Idaho law are for a court to determine if a governing body of a political subdivision has authority
to issue bonds. It is not an avenue for an advisory opinion on interptctation of irrigation district
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law. As to the remaining arguments raised by Viking for attorney fees, such a discussion i s
premature pending &.is Court's decision,

K.

Conclusion

The actions &ken by HLID's Board in this matter were authorized by statute and not in
cxcess of its authority. The fee charged was reasonable. It was arrived at th rough a reasonable
cxercjse of judgment. Therefore, thc Court should deny Viking's motion for summary judgment

and dismiss its case.

DATED this %thday of October, 2008.

-

SUSAN P.WEEKS
Attorney for Ddmdant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of October, 2008 I served true and concct
copies of the foregoing document by facsimi1.eand e-mail upon thc following:
Scott Rose

Attorney at Law
300 Main Street, Suitc 153
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208)342-3669 Fax

scott@idahoiplaw,com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
VIKING CONSTRUCTION, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
CASE NO. CV-04-08889
Plaintiff,

1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER IN RE:
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
VS.

HAYDEN LAKE IRRIGATION DISTRICT, an
Idaho Quasi-Municipal Corporation,
Defendant.

)
)

1
1

Plaintiff seeks a determination regarding payments charged by
Defendant when a consumer or user of water for a newly built house
desires access to water. Plaintiff moved for Summary Judgment.
Scott Rose, attorney for Plaintiff.
Susan P. Weeks, JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, attorneys for
Defendant.
-

-

-

The Plaintiff, Viking Construction, Inc., ("Vilting")

filed a Petition for

Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief against the Defendant, Hayden Lake Irrigation
District ("HLID"). Vilting seeks the following determinations:

(1)

Whether or not the Charge imposed by HLID is permissible or not
permissible;

YWY
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(2)

Whether or not the increase in the amount of the Charge imposed
by HLID is permissible or not perinissible; and

(3)

Whether or not the immediate implementation of the increase in
the amount of the Charge imposed by HLID is permissible or not
permissible.

Viking conteilds that (1) the payments do not pay for any type of physical
connection; (2) the payineilts are neither a fee nor are they regulatory in nature; and (3)
HLID has not invoked its police powers to the extent it has police powers by passage of
an ordinance permitting the charges. Viking claims that the charges are without statutory
authority and in violation of Viking's due process and equal protection rights. Viking
alleges that the charges are nothing more than a disguised unconstitutional tax.

I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Hayden Lalce Irrigation District is an irrigation district generally located
north of Prairie Avenue and West of U.S. 95. In addition to delivering irrigation water,
HLID maintains a domestic water system.
There is a lengthy history behind the Hayden Lake Irrigation ~ i s t r i c t . ' HLIDYs
predecessor was Interstate Irrigation District, a privately owned Washington corporation.
Initially, Interstate Irrigation District platted the Hayden Lake Irrigation Tracts on July
29, 1910. The Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners received a petition for
the formation of the Hayden Lake Irrigation District in 1913. In 1914, HLID was formed
pursuant to the Carey Act and the Reclamation Act of 1902 and pursuant to Idaho law.
At the tiine of its foimation, HLID acquired the water rights and the diversion and

'

The history has been extensively covered in the briefing and supporting affidavits. Likewise, the parties
have set forth in detail the development of the events leading up to this lawsuit.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER IN RE: I U J I f l A R Y JUDGMENT: 2

distributioil systein of the Interstate Irrigation Conlpany. HLID is coilsidered to be a
quasi-municipal corporation.2
Vilting Construction, Inc., is a construction company that builds custom and
speculation homes. Vilcing previously owned and currently owns multiple parcels of land
located within the Hayden Lalce Irrigation District and within the City of Hayden, Idaho.
In order to obtain a building permit from the City of Hayden, Viking must show that it
has paid the fees or charges imposed by HLID. These payments or fees, which have
consistently been charged over many years, have been referred to by different terms such
as "tap-on fees," "hook up fees," or "connection fees;" they will also be referred to here
as "charges" or "payments."
At a regular meeting on September 7, 2004, HLID amended and raised its
charges.3 The increase was implemented the following day.

The domestic charge

increased from $2200 per house to $2700 per house.'
Before the charges were raised, HLID did not hold an election to obtain ratepayer
approval. HLID did not pass an authoriziilg ordinance prior to the increase.
Prior to the meeting, Viking had pre-sold sixty-five (65) houses for delivery after
September 8, 2004, on a plat that was pending final approval. The contract price for
those homes was based on the $2200 charge and did not anticipate the increased charges.
Vilcing requested that HLID delay the increase. HLID refused to provide water without
receiving the payment of $2700 per home.

In the argument section of its briefing, HLID notes that the appellate courts have struggled with the
classification of irrigation districts and characterized them in different ways. However, it appears that the
parties, including Plaintiff, acknowledge that irrigation districts have been termed "quasi-municipal"
corporations. Brizeindine v. Nuinpa MerirZiar~Irrignlioiz District, 97 Idaho 580, 548 P.2d 80 (1976).
A committee of members of the district studied the matter and recommended that residential connection
fees be raised by $500.00.
4
At the same time, the charges were increased on commercial properties as well.

fly
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HLID collects these paynleilts when new users connect to its system. A portion
of the payment covers the actual cost of hooking into the system. However, according to
HLID, the larger portion of the payment is an equity buy-in charged to new members.
The priinary method for HLID to obtain cash reserves is through the equity buy-in
charge.
Vilcing filed a declaratory judgment action and sought injunctive relief against
H L I D . ~ Subsequently, Vilcing filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Viking seeks
summary judgment as a matter of law that the charges are (1) unconstitutional; (2) violate
Idaho and Federal statutory law; and (3) breach contracts between the Irrigation District
and the United States. Viking seeks injunctive relief and damages.

The Irrigation

District opposes the Motion. The parties have filed affidavits and submitted briefing.

I1
STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 56, Zncllto Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for summary judgment where
there is no genuine issue and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In order to make that determination, the court must look to "the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any . . . ."
On a motion for summary judgment, the facts in the record are to be liberally
construed in favor of the party opposing the motion. If the court will be the ultimate trier
of fact and if there are no disputed evidentiary facts, the judge is not constrained to draw
inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment; rather, the
trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from

--

The operative pleading is now the First Amended Complaint.
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uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 808 P.2d 876
(1991); Loonzis v. City ofHailej7, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991).
If there are no genuine issues of material fact, the court will determine whether a
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Zumwalt v. Steplzan, Balleisen &
Slavin, 113 Idaho 822, 748 P.2d 405 (Ct.App. 1987), rev. denied (1988).
I11
DISCUSSION
A.

Alleged Violations of Constitutional Provisions
Viking contends that HLID has violated several Constitutional provisions,

particularly provisions of the Idaho Constitution. HLID denies that it violated any of the
Constitutional provisions. The Constitutional provisions have been extensively briefed.

1.

Section 3 of Article VIII of the Idaho Constitution

The Constitution of the State of Idaho, Art. VIII,

5

3, sets forth limitations on

county and municipal indebtedness. Before incurring indebtedness exceeding the income
and revenue in the year in which the indebtedness is incurred, local governments must (1)
hold a public election securing two-thirds (2/3) of the vote; and (2) collect an annual tax
sufficient to pay the debt within thirty (30) years. See City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho
1, 137 P.3d 388 (2006).

Viking argues that the provision bars an irrigation district from incurring an
indebtedness without elector approval for a proposed expenditure exceeding the income
and revenue in the year in whlch the district incurs the indebtedness. According to
Viking, HLID violates this provision because the money is being collected for financing
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of capital iinprovement projects. Vilcing contends that HLID must obtain approval from
the voters.
However, the issue of whether or not this section applies to irrigation districts was
resolved by the Idaho Supreme Court in Jensen v. Boise-Kuna Irrigation District, 75
Idaho 133, 269 P.2d 755 (1954). In Jensen, the Idaho Supreme Court held that an
"irrigation district is not a municipality such as referred to in this section . . . ." Jensen v.
Boise-Kuna Irrigation District, 75 Idaho at 142, 269 P.2d 761. Thus, under Jensen, the
requirements of Idallo Constitution, Article VIII,

5

3, do not apply to HLID. This

provision does not apply to HLID and does not prohibit HLID from taking action.
Viking's Motion for Summary Judgment cannot be granted.
2.

Section 2 of Article XI1 of the Idaho Constitution

Article XII,

5 2, of the Idaho Constitution addresses municipal corporations.

Any

"county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits all such
local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with
the general laws."
Under this constitutional provision, a municipality may provide for collection of
revenue incidental to enforcement of a regulation enacted under a municipality's police
powers. However, that revenue must be distinguished from a fee or charge imposed by a
muilicipality primarily for revenue raising purposes. In the latter case, it is a "tax" and
can only be upheId under the power of taxation, which requires a specific legislative
enactment such as an ordinance. See Idalto Building Contvactors Association v. Civ of
Coelir rl'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995) (an impact fee was not a police
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power regulation; it was a tax that was purely a revenue raising assessment so it was not
perinissible without specific legislative enactment).
Thus, a municipality may collect fees considered incidental to regulations; taxes
require specific legislative authorization. A "fee" is a charge for a direct public service
rendered to the particular customer while a "tax" is a forced contribution by the public at
large to meet public needs. In addition to having a regulatory purpose, a "fee" must be
reasonably and rationally related to the regulatory purpose. A municipality cannot, in the
exercise of its police powers, levy taxes. See Potts Construction Co. v. North Kootenai
Wcrter District, 141 Idaho 678, 116 P.3d 8 (2004); Foster's Inc. v. City of Boise, 63
Idaho 201, 118 P.2d 721 (1941).
In this case, it appears that Viking is claiming that HLID had to pass an
ordinance, which would ensure due process, in order to charge a connection fee or
increase that fee. Viking claims that HLID had limited police powers to collect a
connection fee.
HLID makes the following arguments. First, with regard to any fee increase,
HLID argues that this Constitutional provision does not require that an ordinance be
passed before fees can be increased.

The proposition that fee increases require an

ordinance under this constitutional provision was expressly rejected in Snake River
Homeb~iilrlersAss'n v. City of Callwell, 101 Idaho 47, 607 P.2d 1321 (1 980) (holding
that a city may adopt an increase in the rate charged for extending its water mains by
resolution rather than by ordinance).
Second, HLID argues that this particular constitutional provision applies to
coiul~tiesor incorporated cities or towns. By its terms, it does not apply to irrigation
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districts. According to HLID, the power of an irrigation district to impose connection
fees is not derived from the Constitution.
Third, HLID argues that the statutes cited by Viking in its briefing as limiting the
police powers to collect a coilnection fee simply do not apply. Viking is citing to statutes
found in Title 42 of the Idaho Code. There are no related statutes in the irrigation portion
of Title 43 ."

Upon review, a distinction must be drawn between two particular concepts: (1)
the difference between fees for direct services rendered to customers incidental to
regulations and "taxes" or fees collected for revenue raising purposes which require the
enactinent of an ordinance; and (2) the difference between sewer and water districts as
opposed to irrigation districts which are organized and exist under different titles in the
Idaho Code.
To the extent that HLID imposed an otherwise valid rate increase, Art. XII,

5 2, of

the Idaho Constitution did not require HLID to pass a specific ordinance in order to
increase the rate. Upon examination of the Constitutional provision and cases referring to
it, this particular provisioil has been applied to counties and incorporated cities or towns.
With regard to whether or not this is a fee for a direct service or a tax, that issue will be
addressed in more detail in Section B below.
The action taken by HLID to increase the connection charge does not violate Art.
XII,

tj

2, of the Idaho Constitution. Therefore, Viking's Motion for Summary Judgment

cannot be granted on this ground.

Title 42 addresses "Irrigation and Drainage - Water Rights and Reclamation." Chapter 32 of Title 42
addresses the formation of "Water and Sewer Districts." Title 43 addresses "Irrigation Districts." Since
HLID is an irrigation district, it is governed by Title 43 rather than Title 42.
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3.

Section 6 of Article VII of the Idaho Constitution

Article VII of the Idaho Constitutioil addresses "Finance and Revenue." Idaho
Const., Art. VII, $ 6, allows "Municipal corporatioils to impose their own taxes." The
provision reads as follows: "The legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of any
county, city, town, or other municipal corporation, but may by law invest in the corporate
authorities thereof, respectively, the power to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of
such corporation."
For purposes of this provision, assessments by irrigation districts are authorized;
an irrigation district is a municipal corporation within the meaning of this section.
Oregon S.L.R.R. v. Pioneer Irrigntiolz Dist., 16 Idaho 578, 102 P. 904 (1909).
Under this provision, the legislature does not impose "taxes" on an irrigation
district. Rather, the legislature may empower the irrigation district to collect taxes.
The focus again shifts to whether or not HLID was imposing a "tax" upon Viking.
HLID contends that it was acting pursuant to statutory authority and not in pursuit of a
regulatioil or under the police power. A conclusion here depends upon a determination
with regard to the classification of the charge. If the collection is determined to be
pursuant to statutory authority, the connection fee does not violate this Constitutional
provision. If that is the case, Viking's Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied.
See the determination regarding classification in Section B below.
4.

Sections 5 and 2 of Article VII of the Idaho Constitution

As noted above, Article VII of the Idaho Constitution addresses "Finance and
Revenue." Section 2 deals with "Revenue to be provided by taxation." Section 5 deals
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with "Taxes to be uniform

-

Exemptions." Both of these sections apply in situations

i~lvolvi~lg
taxes.
Vilcing claims that the connectioil charge is not imposed uniformly or set
proportionately. Therefore, according to Viking, the charge violates the Constitutional
provisions.
HLID conte~ldsthat its annual assessments, which are enacted pursuant to Title
43, Chapter 7 of the Idaho Code, are not taxes that are governed by these Constitutional

provisions. Brown v. Sltupe, 40 Idaho 252, 233 P. 59 (1924). Furthermore, HLID
contends that connection fees collected pursuant to the statutory provisions of the Bond
Revenue Act, which is found in Title 43, Chapter 19 of the Idaho Code, are not taxes.
If the charge is found to be pursuant to statutory authority, it is not a tax. In that
event, these Coilstitutional provisions would not apply and Viking's Motion for Summary
Judgment on this ground would be denied. See the decision in Section B below.
5.

Sections 2,4, and 5 of Article XV of the Idaho Constitution

Article XV of the Idaho Constitution addresses "Water Rights." Section 2 deals
with the "Right to collect rates a franchise." Section 4 deals with "Continuing rights to
water guaranteed." Section 5 deals with "Priorities and limitations on use."

These

sections apply to irrigation districts. Bradslznw v. Milner Low Lift Irrigation District, 85
Idaho 528, 381 P.2d 440 (1963); Ynden v. Gem Irrigation District, 37 Idaho 300,216 P.
250 (1923).
Upon review, it is determined that, under the specific facts of this case, these
sections do not apply to malce HLID's actions unconstitutional.

Therefore, Viking's

Motion for Summary Judgment based upon this ground must be denied.
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B.

Classification of the Charges as a Regulatory Fee, a Tax, or Statutory

The issue presented in this case is whether the connection fee imposed upon
Vilcing by HLID should be classified as: (1) revenue collected incidental to regulations as
fees for direct public service; (2) revenue raised as a tax, which requires specific
legislative approval and authority; or (3) a charge imposed pursuant to statutory
authority. On the one hand, Viking contends that the charges must constitute either a
regulatory fee for a direct public service or a tax; if they are taxes, the passage of an
ordinance was required in order for the charges to be valid. Without such an ordinance,
Vilcing argues that the charge would be invalid. On the other hand, HLID claims that the
connection fees were imposed pursuant to statutory authority, which makes them valid
charges; the statutes provide authority for HLID to establish its By-laws and thereafter
impose connection fees.
It is undisputed that, at the time that the charges were imposed in September of
2004, HLID did not attempt to or pass an authorizing ordinance which would provide for
collection of the charges. The question is whether or not such an ordinance was required.
Thus, a determination must be made as to whether the charges were "regulatory,"
whether they were a "tax," or whether they were enacted pursuant to enabling s t a t ~ t e s . ~
Viking contends that the connection fee is not a regulatory fee for a public service
direct to the customer. According to Vilcing, all of the direct costs involved in connecting
are paid by

other^.^

Vilcing argues that, therefore, the connection fee is a revenue

111 this case, Viking appears to be challenging both the initial connection charges and the increase in the
connection charges. However, the two are interrelated. If the connection charges are not taxes, then the
increase will not be considered as a tax either.
8
But see the discussion regarding payments for actual costs on p. 15, infr~l.
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generating tax. Since HLID did not pass an ordinance, Viking claims that the connection
fee as a tax is invalid.
HLID takes the position that it is authorized by statute to charge a connection fee,
which in this case has been called a Tap-on Fee. Title 43 of the Idaho Code addresses
"Irrigation Districts." Chapter 3 of Title 43 addresses the "Powers and Duties of Board
of Directors" of an irrigation district. Idaho Code $43-304 grants the board the power to
manage and conduct the business of the district. According to Idaho Code § 43-304,
Said board shall have the power to manage and conduct the business
and affairs of the district, make and execute all necessary contracts,
employ and appoint such agents, officers and employees as may be
required and prescribe their duties, to establish equitable by-laws,
rilles and regulationsfor tlze distribution and use of water among
the owners of such land, as may be necessary and just to secure
tlze just and proper distribution of the same . . . ."
HLID argues that this statute provides statutory authority for its Board to establish bylaws, rules, and regulations which address new user connection charges so long as such
by-laws are equitable and just among the owners.
The By-laws for HLID provide for charging a connection fee to new users and
have done so for many years.9 The Board determined that it was equitable to existing
members to charge new members a connection fee for gaining the use of the existing
system.
The conclusion here is that the connection fee can be imposed pursuant to the
statutory authority granted to it to establish equitable by-laws.''

In this case, the

coilnection fee imposed by HLID was not a tax that required the enactment of a specific
9

HLID claims that the By-laws have provided for charging a connection fee to hew users since 1914. The
By-laws have been amended on several occasions. For example, the 1947 Amended By-laws adopted
certain Tap-on Fees. The present Amended By-laws were adopted on May 7,2002.
10
HLID also relies upon authority granted in the Irrigation District Domestic Water System Revenue Bond
Act, which is found in Title 43, Chapter 19.
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ordinance. It was a valid charge imposed pursuant to statutory authority and the duly
enacted By-laws.
Viking claims that, even if HLID could collect a connection fee pursuant to
statutory authority, its power to collect revenues is limited by Chapters 4, 5, and 7 of
Title 43 of the Idaho Code."

However, those chapters are not the only methods under

which irrigation districts can collect revenues.
HLID has three contracts with the Bureau of Reclamation. HLID has a domestic
water system. Chapter 19 of Title 43 of the Idaho Code, which is the "Irrigation District
Domestic Water System Act," allows irrigation districts, including those who have
contracted with the Bureau of Reclamation, to impose tolls and charges for expenses
incurred in the construction, operation, and maintenance of domestic systems. Irrigation
districts can maintain reserves and can also require the payment of such tolls and charges
in advance of the delivery of water. See Idalzo Code $43-1901, et seq.
HLID relies upon authority granted in Idaho Code $ 43-1909(e), which is part of
the Irrigation District Domestic Water System Revenue Bond Act. The statute sets forth
certain powers for irrigation districts, including to "prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls
or charges . . . for the services, facilities and commodities furnished by worlts . . . ."
The case of Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991), is
persuasive here. Although that case involved a municipality rather than an irrigation
district,12the powers of an irrigation district under Idalzo Code § 43-1909(e) are the same

' I Chapter 4 of Title 43 is titled "Bonds- Issuance, Confilmatiol~and Sale;" it allows bonds to issue for the
original construction and the rehabilitation of an existing system. Chapter 5 of Title 43 is titled "Secondary
Bonds to Pay Interest;" it allows money for interest to be raised by the sale of coupon bonds. Chapter 7 of
Title 43 is titled "Levy and Collection of Assessments;" it allows for and governs assessments by irrigation
districts.
'"n Loonzis, the City of Hailey adopted an ordinance providing for new water and sewer connection fees.
Loomis and Grubbs, who were residents of Hailey, challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance and the
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as those granted to n~unicipalitiesunder Irlnlzo Code § 50-1030@, which is part of the
Idaho Revenue Bond Act. In Loontis, city residents challenged the reasonableness of the
city's equity buy-in method of determining water and sewer connection fees as well as
the collection and use of those fees for replacement of system components as an
unauthorized revenue raising method. Loomis sets forth a two step process: (1) a
determination must be made as to whether the connection fee constitutes an
iinpermissible tax, and (2) a determination must be made as to whether the connection fee
is appropriately and reasonably assessed. A distiilction is drawn between the exercise of
the police power and the proprietary functions of a municipality. In Loomis, the City of
Hailey derived its authority to charge connection fees from the Idaho Revenue Bond Act
and its proprietary function.

According to Loomis, when charges conform to the

statutory scheme set forth in the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, the charges are not construed
as taxes. However, if the charges are primarily for revenue raising purposes, they are
essentially disguised taxes and must have legislative approval. The sewer and water
connect fee in Loonzis was not a tax because it was collected pursuant to the Idaho
Revenue Bond Act and the fees were allocated and budgeted in conformity with the Act.
In the instant case, HLID collected the charges, i.e., the "Tap-on Fees," in the
exercise of a proprietary function and pursuant to the Irrigation District Domestic Water
System Revenue Bond Act. As such, the charges did not constitute an impermissible tax.
The next step is to determine whether the charges were appropriately and
reasoilably assessed by HLID. Thus, even though the charges were not impermissible as
a tax, they must still be appropriately and reasonably assessed.
legality of the procedures utilized by the city in charging connection fees as being in violation of the Idaho
Revenue Bonding Act. In the instant case, no ordinance for the increase was passed by HLID; however,
the By-laws provided for connection fee.
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Vilting claims that the connection fees are inequitable because they burden a
member twice. According to Article 5 of the By-laws, it is HLID's responsibility to
provide a connection to its water system for a member and it is the member's
respoilsibility to pay for the costs to connect from the water meter to the residence.
Article 8 of the By-laws requires a new domestic water user to pay a tap-on fee plus
reimburse the district its parts and labor to connect to the system.
Viking asserts that the Tap-on Fee covers no actual cost involved in the physical
applicatioil of water because the landowner or builder pays for parts and labor, such as
meters and installation, and for the cost for transporting water from the point of delivery
to the point of application. If the landowner or builder is thereafter charged for parts and
labor and for transportation of water through the Tap-on Fee, the landowner or builder
has been charged twice. Viking argues that, since all of the direct costs are paid by
others, the Tap-on Fee is merely a revenue generating tax.
The facts reveal, however, that there is no double payment and that HLID is
complying with its By-laws. Before 2003, developers installed their own meters and paid
the costs for the meters directly. Since 2003, HLID installs the meters and collects that as
part of the connection fee.13
Vilting also argues that there is no rational relation between the amount of the
Tap-on Fee and any reasonable or actual costs to HLID. See City of Cl~ubbuckv. City of
PocnteNo, 127 Idaho 198, 899 P.2d 41 1 (1995) (regulatory fee must be reasonably related
to the cost of the underlying regulation and a tax requires an enabling statute). According
to Viking, the Tap-on Fees are forced contributions upon select ratepayers to serve public
needs at large. Viking claims that HLID expended $372,401.00 for additional fixed
l3

As noted elsewhere, a portion of the connection fee covers the actual cost of hooking into the system.
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assets in 2004 and that alinost half of that amount was paid for with the Tap-on Fees paid
by Vikiilg on the 65 homes immediately impacted by the increase in September of 2004.
According to Vilcing, the connection fees may be used to acquire assets or for future
expansion of the system.
HLID denies that the connection fee is for future expansion of the system. HLID
also denies that half of the amount that Viking paid for Tap-on Fees was used to acquire
assets.
Cathy Meyer, who is an independent Certified Public Accountant who audits
HLID's boolcs, was deposed in this case. She testified that the increase in HLID's assets
in 2004 came through dedication of assets by developers pursuant to development
agreements.14 Therefore, the Tap-on Fees paid by Viking were not the source for any
asset acquisition by HLID.
When new users connect to its system, HLID collects the payment. A portion of
the payment covers the actual costs for parts and labor for connecting to the system. The
remainder of the payment is set aside in a separate account with the state treasurer. That
inoney is used to maintain the existing infrastructure. This would include replacement of
existing water lines and costs associated with the installation of a replacement for a
failing component of the existing water tower facility. These funds have not been used to
subsidize daily operations or purchase additional system assets to provide additional
capacity. Thus, the charges were appropriately assessed by HLID.
Vilcing complains about the method of determining the amount of the connection
fee. Specifically, Vilcing argues that the change in the connection fee and the connection
l 4 The connection fees paid by Viking were not used to acquire a new well or expand the system. Although
a new well and other improvements were acquired, funds were obtained through development agreements
with developers.
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fee increase allowed for the collection of money without a vote by the members on a
bond. However, in Loomis v. City of Hailey, 1 19 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991), the
Idaho Supreme Court approved an "equity buy-in" connection fee and held that it was not
necessary to have the coilnection fees or changes in connection fees approved by the
voters.
The question then becomes whether the amount of the payments in this case was
reasonable. Prior to the increase, Viking had not challenged the original payment rate of
$2200. HLID aclaowledges that the rates increased significantly when the payment was
raised from $2200 to $2700 per house.

A connection fee will be approved if it is not unreasonably or arbitrarily imposed.
The fee can be something more than the precise cost of the actual physical hookup. The
legislature has not imposed exacting rate requirements; instead, "the law requires only
that the fee be reasonably related to the benefit conveyed."

Loomis v. City of Hailey,

119 Idaho at 442, 807 P.2d 1280. It is not up to the court to determine how an entity
should allocate its fees and rates so long as they conform to statutory requirements and
are reasonable. Id. Idaho's statutory scheme does not require a new user to "buy in" to
the system nor does it prohibit such a "buy in" program. Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119
Idaho at 443, 807 P.2d 1281.
In this case, the rate increase issue had been before the Board for some time. The
$500 increase for a domestic connection represented: (a) the actual cost of the meter; and
(b) an equity buy-in.

In arriving at the decision to increase the Tap-on Fee, the Board relied upon the
report and recommendations of an advisory committee. The Board also reviewed the
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water management plan and relied upon input fi-om an engineer as to those parts of the
water management plan that addressed obsolete or marginally functional areas, i.e., that
discussed the current state of the infrastructure and the engineer's projected future needs
for replacements or repairs. The Board then weighed these factors in determining the
amount needed for reserves and the amount for an "equity buy-in."

The advisory

committee and the Boasd loolted at the value of comparable systems in the area and at the
rates charged for equity buy-in at comparable systems in the area. The focus was upon
talcing care of the existing infrastructure and the maintenance that might be necessary."
Vilcing claims that HLID should have engaged an accountant or an engineer to
calculate the equity buy-in. However, even though a calculation was not provided by an
accountant or engineer, the Board did not choose a number for the increase in a random
manner. Instead, the Board reviewed and analyzed the issue, relying upon various figures
and the needs of the system. The Board considered the current value of the existing
system, the values and costs to purchase equity into comparable local water distribution
systems, the water management plan of HLID with its infrastructure needs for
maintenance, and the engineer's analysis regarding system repair and replacement.
Having reviewed the process, it cannot be found that the payment rate or the fee
increase was arbitrary or unreasonable. Therefore, the Tap-on Fee of $2700 could be
imposed by HLID.
In summary, the Tap-on Fee imposed by HLID on newly constructed homes does
not constitute an impermissible tax. Furthermore, the payment amount of $2700 was not
arbitrarily or unreasonably determined. On these issues, Viking's Motion for Summary
Judgment must be denied.
-

l5

-

HLlD denies that future growth was a part of the discussion regarding the fee increase.
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VALIDITY OF THE BY-LAWS
Viking contends that, even if HLID had the statutory authority to establish
conilection fees, HLID cannot rely upon its By-laws. According to Viking, the By-laws
are invalid because the members of the District did not authorize the changes or the
increase in the connection charge.
The directors of an irrigation district have authority to establish equitable by-laws,
rules, and regulations for the distribution and use of water among the owners of land in
the district. IrkIho Code $ 43-304. The only statutes requiring that members vote on a
by-law are Ihlzo Code $8 43-111 and 43-201. However, both of those statutes pertain to
directors of the irrigation district. They do not apply to the circumstances here.
Under Ihlzo Code $ 42-2401, a vote is required to change the by-laws of an
irrigation or canal company, which are operating companies with shareholders. That
statute does not apply to districts such as HLID.
A vote of all members does not have to take place each time a rate increase is
imposed. Also, the By-laws do not have to be amended each time a rate increase occurs.
The By-laws must be equitable.

Idaho Code $ 43-304.

In this case, the

connection charge, as well as the increase, was equitable.
The HLID By-laws are valid.

Therefore, Viking's Motion for Summary

Judgment on the ground that the By-laws were invalid must be denied.
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CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS
Viking con~plainsthat both its procedural and substantive due process rights, as
well as its equal protection rights, have been violated. Vilting contends that the Tap-on
Fee was increased without notice and an opportunity to be heard. HLID did not adopt an
ordinance so Viking claims that it was denied its substantive due process rights. Finally,
Viking claims that HLID has violated its equal protection rights in that it has treated Tapon Fees for various individuals or entities differently
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part, as
follows: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." Notice and a hearing are required under the Fourteenth Amendment before
such a deprivation of an individual's property takes place. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67,92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972).
In this case, HLID provided notice of its meeting on September 7, 2004, by
postiilg an agenda to its door. The notice stated "RATE INCREASE."
Vilting has not identified any constitutionally protected right of which it was
deprived. The setting of rates and fees does not deprive any member of the right to
receive water from HLID.16
To the extent that Viking has alleged a deprivation of its Constitutional rights, its
Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied.
l6 It might have been preferable for HLID to enact an ordinance, even though it was not required. It might
also have been preferable for HLID to establish a date in the hture rather than immediately for the increase
in the Tap-on Fee to become effective. Either or both of these might have avoided at least some of the
issues presented in this case.
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v
CONTRACTS WITH THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION
HLID entered into contracts with the United States Bureau of Reclamation many
years ago with regard to water under its jurisdiction. The last contract with the Bureau
was entered into in 1977. The wells, which are now the sole sources of water to HLID,
were put in place in the 1980s when it was determined that Hayden Lake was no longer a
viable source for domestic water. Thus, the Bureau does not own the main source of
domestic water, which was not addressed in the contracts, or the infrastructure.
Therefore, while some portions of HLID's system might be encumbered by the contracts,
significant portions are not. Nonetheless, the Bureau contracts allow for reserves. The
limitations in the contracts relate to irrigation waters, which are separate from the
connection fees for the domestic water system.
The contracts with the Bureau of Reclamation do not impact the Tap-on Fee or its
increase for domestic water users. Vilting's Motion for Summary Judgment based on this
issue is denied.
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VI

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion for Summary
Judgment by Plaintiff, Viking Construction, Inc., shall be and hereby is denied as set
forth herein.
DATED this

I LI +v
day of January, 2009.

0
John atrick Luster
District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Viking Construction, Inc.,
an Idaho Corporation,
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I

I

Case No. CV-04-8889

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
vs.
Hayden Lake Irrigation District an Idaho
quasi-municipal corporation.

I Defendant.

I

I

Plaintiff, Viking Construction, Inca's motion for summary judgment came on for
hearing before the undersigned on October 22,2008. The Court having heard the
argument of counsel, being fully advised in the premises, and having issued its
Memorandum Opinion and Order in Re: Motion for Summary Judgment;
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff, Viking
Construction, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment is denied.
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BE IT FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs case is dismissed with prejudice as
no issues remain to be resolved.
DATED this

f'
.+
28 tlday
of
,\ ow v u\rq

,2009

JOHN P. LUSTER
District Judge
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NOTICE OF APPEAL
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05.7246

PJaj~denLake Il-rigatinn District,

an Idaho Quasi-Mu~licipalCorporation
Fax No.: (208) 342-3669
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT Plai~ltiff,Viking Constructiol~,lnc., an Idaho
Corpo~ationby and though 11js attorney of record, Scott Rose, appeals against the above-]lamed
Defet~dant,Hayden Lake Irrigatioll District an Idaho Quasi-iuuoicipal Corporation to the Idabo
Supreme Court from Sunlmary Judgment. entered in the above eniitled proceedjng of the First
Judicial District, by the Honorable District Court Judge, Joh~lP. L~ister?on the 29" day oT

Janu'uy 2009, as follo~~,~s:
(a:) Title. Tlie title of the dction or procezding is:

Vilcing Constroctiou, Inc., v. Hl2lD

Notice of Appeal
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Viking Constr~~c~ion.
lnc. v. I-Iayden Lalte I~~igation
District;
(b) Court or Agency Title. Thc title of the c o ~ uor
t agency which heard the trial or proceeding
and the nalne and title of the presiding judge or official is:

'I'he District Court oftlle. Fixsi Judicial District, the Honosable District Court Judge, Jolm
P. Z.uster presiding;
(c) Case Number. The nunlber assiglled to the action or proceeding by the trial court or

administrative ngency is:
CV 04-8889;
(d) Parties. The name of the appealing party aud the party's atto.rney and the name of t h e

adverse p

q and thnt party's attorney are:
Appealing Pal-@:

Viking Construction; Inc.
Scott Rose, PlaintifPs Attorney

Adverse Pas&:

Hayden Lake ll~iyiitioilDistrict
Sumn P. Weeks. Defendant's -4ttorney;

(e) Designation of Aj~peal.
Desigtlation of the Judglnent, Order or Dec.ree Appealed from is:
Su1mnar-y Judgment entered on the 29Ihday of Janua~y,2009, (the Memosandurn

Opinion nntl Order in Re: Mcltion for Sil~xvnaryJudgment was entered on January
14,2009);
(f) Issues. A preliminary statemeill of rhe issikcs on appeal which the appellailt the11in-rcncls tcr

assert in the appeal are:

I . Wether the District Court properly construed Chapter 19 o f Title 43 of the Ichho
Viking Construction, Inc., v. ALID

Notirr of Appcal
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Code (the "lnigation District Domestic Water System Act"), alld rrlclrc particulilrly whetbe1

Chapter I 'i of Title 43 of the Ida110 Code should have heen construed in pari rnateiia;
2. \Vhcthe~.the Haydell Make higation District Bylaws were proper. a ~ i dmore

particularly:
(A) whether Title 42 Irhho Code applies to irrigation ciistricts;

(13) whether the general powers ol' an irrigation district's hoard to establish
equitabk by-laws-pursnant to I. C. Sectiol143-304 anpowers the board to aineild its B y l a ~ ~ ~ s
unilaterally andforwitlloul notice:

(Cl\vhetl~erthe District's Bylaws as adopted are equitable within 1..C. Section
43-304; and
(D) whether the power of an irrigation district Lo impose a fee call be dertved from
its by law$.

3. Whether the District Court's collclusions are supported by the facts in the record;
4. Whetl~crthe fees in~poscdviolate federal law, and hreach the contracts e~~terecl
into

between the United States and the Hnyden Lake Ilrigation District;

5. Whcthcr the fecs imposed are an unlaw.ful tax;
6 . Whether Scction 2 of Article XI1 of the Idaho Colistitution applies to irrigation
districts;

7. Whether the Hayden Lakc Irrigation District's imposition of a fec violated Viking
C~onut~~uction,
Iilc.'s constitutional lights undcr Section G of Article VII of the Idaho Constitution;

8. Whether the flayden Lake Irrigation District's imposition of a tke violated Viking
Constnlction. Inc.'s constitul~onalrights under Sections 5 and 2 of Article VII of the Idahtho
Viking Construction, IIIC., v. HLlD

Nolice of Appeal
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Cons~ituiion:

9. Whether the l-layden Lake Irrigation District's itnposition ol'a fee violated \riki;ing
Const~uction,Inc.'s constitutional rigl~tsunder Sections 2, 4, and 5 of Article XV of the Idaho
Corlst i hliion:
10 Wl~ethcr111e fee impi>sedby the Hayden Lake higatition District was pemlissible;
11. Whether the Ice increase inlposed by the Hayden Lake Irrigation District was

pcmissible;

-

12. Whether the District Court properly construed the Lounzk v. CZQofHailcj), 119

Idaho 434; 807 P.2d 1272 (1991) "equitable buy-in" theory; and
13. Whether the Hayden Lake Irrigation District's imposition of tile fee violated Viki~lg

Construction, Tnc.'s due process 'and equal protection rights;
(g) .Iurisdictional Statement. Plaintiff has the ~ i g hto
t appeal to thc Idaho Supreme Court from

i l ~ District
e
Court orders as appealable orders pursuant t o Rule 1l (a)(l);
(1.I) Transcript. A standard trarlsc~ipt.is requested:

(i) Record. Tlie complete mcurd in rhis case is desired, inciucling but not limited to, the
Motion for Swnlnary Judgment. M i d w i t of Scott Rose hi S~tpportof Sumnary Judgment and

Exhibits "A", "B","C", "Dm,and "E"tl~ereto.Plaintiffv Opening Brief in Support of Motion lor
S~ilzullaryJudgment, Defendant's Melllorandum in Response tcl Plaintiff's Motion for Stu~mnzuy
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... . .
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.: ... . .... .. .
. .., .
... . , .
. . .
.
.... . . .
.. .
.
... . . . . ..
. , . .
.
......... . .
..,... ... . . . . .
. .
. .. . .
......
...... .. . .

Judgrnel~t,the Tra~lscriptof the Summary Jitdpment Hetrring, and the Transcripts of the
depositions of Bert Rohrbach Vol. I and 11, m d Cathy Meyer;
.

0) Sealed Record. An order has no.t been entered sealing all or kyport nf the red
.

.

transcript;
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(k) Certilicstiorl. I, Scott Rose, Clai~i~ant's
Atiorney, ccrtiry. as follows:
1 . 'I'hat semice of the notice oCappeal has heen made upon Judge Luster's reporter of the
Anne McMauus, by fax. as follows (208) 446- 1 185;
proceeding. 11arnel~

2. That tllc clerk of thc District Court fee in the alrlount of $1 15.00 fee and she Supreme Coult
fee in the amount of $86 arc paid by credit card and a check executed to the Supreme Court for

$86 will he sent by separate cover;
1. Thai the estimated fccs for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record have heell paid;

4. Tliai all appellate filing fees have been paid; and

5. That service has not been made on the Attorney Gener~lwith the helief that this matter is not
refelred to in Section 67-1401(I ). Ida110Code, so senrice has not been lllade ~ ~ p o
the
n attorney

gencml of the state of Idaho.

DATED this

3day of March, 3009.
Scott Rose

By:

,
Plaintiffs Attolutty, ISB# 4197
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e 2 dily of March. 2009, a true and colrect cqsy of the
foregoing Notice of Appeal was mailed by regu1u'U.S. snail to Susan Patricin Weeks addressed,
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Susan Patricia Weeks
Attorney at Law
Orvens, James, Vernon & Weeks, PA
1626 Liilcol~lWay
Coeur d'Aler~e,ID 838 14
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Inc., v. HLID
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Atlornejl at Law
300 Main Street. Suile 153
Boisq Idaho 83702

(208)342-2552 Telephone.
(206) 342-3669 Fax
scott.i~idahoipl,law.cm

filTI-IE DISTRICT C0UR.T OF Tl-IE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTIUCT OF

Docket No.: 3623 1.-7,00L)

Viking Consi:~.uction~
hlc.;
a11Idaho Corporation

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
Kooten&i County Case No.: CV 04-8889
Pre-paid Filing Fee Confi~.matiot~
No.
057296

Plaintiff.
vs.
Hayden 'Lake Irrigation District,
l~iahoQu~si-MunicipalC o r p o ~ l i l o ~ ~

Fas No.; (208) 342-3669

iui

Defa>&tnt.

NOTICE IS HEIEBY GIVEN THAT Plajwiff, V.ikh1.gConstruction, hlc., an ldaho
Corporation by mild through his ailorney of record, Scott Rose, appeals A,~7ainstthe above-named

Defend~ir~t,
Hayden Lake Irrigation District a11Idaho Quasi-n~micipalCorpol.ation to the Idaho
Supreme Court from Sum.rnary Jurfgnlc~lt,
entered in ths above entitled proceeding of the First

Judicinl District. by .the lioilornble Districl Court .Judge, John P. Luster, on the 29'"day

ol'

.la~~ua~:y
2009. :is follows:
(a) Titlc. 'Khc title of the ~ C t i oor
~ lproceeding is;

Viking Cuns~rt~ctiol~,
Inc., v.
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From-Scott Rose
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Vikiug Comtn~c~ion.
Inc. v. llayden Lakc Trrigi~tionDistrict;
(b) Cow( or. Agency Title. 7 ' 1 title
~ of the court or agency which heard thc trial or proceectig

and the ~mmcand tirlc of the presiding judge or official is:
The Distlici Courl ofthe First Judicial Distxict. the F.1on.orttblcUislricl Court Judge, John

P. Luster presiding;
( c )Case Number. The niun'ber i ~ s ~ i to
~ tile
e d action or procecdi~lg1,y the tl-id cou~:io~
ad~nL~.ist.ra.tjve
ageJ,cy is:

(d.) Parties. The name of the ul3pealjng party and .the party's nttorney m d the n ~ m e
of the

ad\jerse party and that party's artor.ney arc:
..4ppeal.i.ng?':my:

Viking C:onstructjotl, .Inc.

Adverse I'i~tty:

Scott Rose. Plaintiffs Attorney;
J-Tayden Lake irripztiio~~
Di strici

Susan P. Weeks, Defenclont's Attorney;
(c) Designation of Appeal.

Designatioll afthe Judgment, Order or Decree Appealed .tiom is:
Su~nmnr~.
Judglneni, entered on thc 29'" day ol',Joi~&vy,2009, (the Mcmc~.randun~

Opinion and Order in Re: Motinn for SLIIIIU~~I:~
Judgillent wiis entered on January
:L 4, 2009);

(fl Issues. A prelinlina~:~
sttktemenl of the issues on appeal which 1:he uppellaut then intends to
assert in the ilypeal are:
I . Whether the Dislrict Com-lpropelelyco~lstrurdCi~aplrr19 of Titlc 43 of the Idaho

Code (the "Irrigationnisrrict Domcstic Water System Act"), nnd more particularly vil~elber
V ' k h ~ gConstr~rclio~~,
Inc., v. BLTn
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From: Scoll Rose To; Fax#120044UI 119

Chapter 10 o.F?'itle 43 ofthe Idaho C:ode should have bee11 consvued in ptwi materia;

2. Wklethcr the 1-Tayden Like irrigation Districl Bylaws wcrc proper, and inore
particu.lul*l\~:
(A) whether ?'ilk 42 Idaho (:'ode applies to irrigation districts;

[U)whether the gel~ceilpowers of an irrigal i o district's
~ ~
board to esrablish
equitable by-laws pursuant to I..C. Section 43-304 etnpnwrrs the board l o amend its Bylaw-s

unilaterally uild/or without notice;

[C)whether the District's Byln~vsa~ad.op-tedore equitable within l..C. Secrian
43-304; ancl

(D) wllether tllr power of an irrigation district to impose a fee call be derived fi-om
its bylu~vs;

3 . Whether the District Court's conclusions are supported by the facts In the record;
4. W.hcr11er the Tees i rnposecl vi olnie fkdtral law, and 'breach.t:l~ecc?~ltractsentered into
between the LJ~~itrd
States and d ~ Haydcn
e
L~rlceIrrigation District;
5. Wbethcr the fees imposed are an unlnwfitl tax:

6. Wllether Section 2 o-f Al~icleXI1 of the Idaho C~o~zsrin~tiolz
applies to irrigation
districts;
7. Whether the Hiuydan Lake irrigation District's imposition of a .Fee viuhted Vikiug

Construction, Inc.'s co~stitu~i.onal
rights u.nder Section 6 of Article VII of tht: Idaho C;onstinttion:

8. Whether the 'IiJnyd.enLa'ke Irrigation District's iillposition of :'a fee v i o l ~ e dViking
Consttudii?n, 1nc.l~
constitutim~nlrights ~~nclcr
Scdions 5 and 2 of Article VII of the idalm

C o ~ ~irutioiz:
sr
Vikirlg Conatr~ictior~,
lnc., u. HLlU
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0. Whether the l-iajjdcn L&c IrriyaLion Districl's impas~lionof a fee violated \'ihiny

Const~ucticm.Inc

':, cons~itutional11g11trundcs

Sections 2,4, arld 5 of Arljclc XV ofthe Idaho

Constit~~tion:
10. Wl~etherthe fee imposed by thc Flayden Lakc Irrigat~onD~strictwas pcrm~ssible:

1I . Whethcr the fee u~cseilseimposed by the I-layden Lake Irrigittion D I S ~ T was
IC~

pei.missiblc;

13. Whethcr the Distr~ctCaul1 properly constlucd the Loomrs v City ~dIlniley. I 19
ldaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991) "equitable buq-in" theory, and
13. Whether the Hayden Lake h g a t l o n District's inzposition of the Cee vlolawd Vilcing

C:onstn~ction,hlc.'s due process and equal proreoliol~lights;
(g) Jurisdictional Sratcment. Plaintiff has the right to appeal to the ldaho Supremc Court from

the Disfl.ict CourL orders RS appenlablc orders j~ursuanlto Rule I 1(a)(] );
fh) Transcript. A transcript is r e ~ ~ i e s t ens
d , follows: the Trdnscrint of the Sumnxaw
.Tud-lncnt Hearine dated October 22.2008; ~ n That
d
service of this Amended Notice of

m e a l liufi been m d e upon . J u d s Luster'&rcnorter of the proceedin?, namelv Anne

McManus. by fix, a8 follows: (208) 446-1188.
(i) Rccord. The complete record i n t l ~ i cnsc
s
is desired. iiicluding but not Iirnited to, the

Mo~ionfor Summary .ludgrnent, Affidavit of Scort Rose in Support of Sirrmnary Judgnle~ltancl
Exlubits "A'. "B", "C", "D.;yld "E"hereto. PLGntiffs Opening Brief in Supporl of Motion for

Summary .Tudgment. Dctendant's Menzorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Suumma~y
Judgment, lhc Transcript o f the: Stlmmary ludgi~entkletlring. and the Trrznscripts of illc
deposstic~nso l ' B ~ r Iinhrbucb
l
Vol. 1and IT, md Cathy Meyer;
Viking Co~tstruction,Inc., v. HLTD
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(j)Scaled Ilecord. An order bas m ' h e e n entered sealing all 01. su~ypart of the record or
lmnscripl;
(It)

Cerlilicotion. I, Scot1 Kose, Climant's Attorlley. certify, as ~olio\l;s:

1. l l u t service of the notice of appeal Iins been ~11ud.eupon Ju.dge Zntster's reporter of the

proceeding?namely Arme h~lcManus,hy fax, as lollo~vs:(208) 446-1 188;
2 . 'fiat the clerk of the District Court fie in the aluouut of $115.00 k c and the Supreme Court
fee in the am.ounr of $86

paid by c ~ e d icard,
t
nnd a. check executcd Lo tlie Sulsremtl Court for

336 will be sent by separate cover;
3. That thr estimated fees for preparation afthe clerk's or agencq2srecord llave bee11 paid;
4. .fiat dl appellate filing fees h.ave been paid; and

5. Tllal service has riot been ii~slcleon the Attorney General with Ile heli8111at illis maner is mt:
referred to in Sectjon 67-.L4()1('1), Ida110 Codc, so service has not been made upon the attomey
general ofthe state of Idaho.

DAT.ED this

/r7 day o r March. 2009.
Scon Rose

By:

.&-(

,
'/'

Plaintiff's Attorney, 1SB# 41 97

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on i h c L day of March. 2009, a true and.comcl copy o f tllr
foregoing Notice of Appeal was lnailed. by regular '1S.S. mail to Susan Patricia Weeks addressed,
as fi)llows:
Susan Prztricia Weeks
Attorney a1 L.a>v
Viking Constrtlction, Inc., v.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

VIKING CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
an Idaho Corporation
PlaintifflAppellant,

)
)
)

1
)
)
)

vs

HAYDEN LAKE IRRIGATION DISTRICT)
an Idaho quasi-municipal corporation
1
DefendantsJRespondents.

)
)

SUPREME COURT NO.
36231
CIVIL CASE NO.
CVO4-8899
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I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
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In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai County,
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\ T ' ~day of

Daniel J. English
Clerk of the District Court

Debra D. k
Deputy Clerk
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I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and
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was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, h l l and correct Record of the pleadings and
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellants and Respondents were notified that the Clerk's Record
and Reporter's Transcript were complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town, the copies
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,2009.

I do hrther certify that the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript will be duly lodged with the
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day of
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DANIEL J. ENGLISH
Clerk of District Court
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mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
Attorney for Appellant
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SCOTT ROSE
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Boise, ID 83702
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